

Review of March 20

Exorcism

Signs: xenoglossia - *foreign language - demonic possession*
(glossalalia) - *babbling from emotion - needs interpretation*
some given power to interpret

Evil as accident or fate

A good man is hard to find

A. Further Bibliography

Fortune, Dion. Psychic Self-Defense: Esoteric Orders and Their Work. Llewellyn, 1971

Bazin, Germain. "The Devil In Art." Satan Sheed and Ward, 1953.

Sheed Soundings in Satanism

B. Scriptural passage and exorcism

Mark 16, 17

Luke 4: 33-39

Acts 10: 38

Acts 13:3

Acts 16:18

Acts 19:1-16

Power to cast out devils, etc.

Exorcist - Minor order in Cath.

C. Demonic Possession

1. Jewish Tradition

2. Christian response

Tertullian

St. Anthony

Gregory

3. The evolution of the Exorcist

4. Modern Sketicism

D. Papers due May 8:

Mail to: Anthony J. Fasano
 Director of Religious Education
 St. Nicholas of Tolentine
 80-22 Parsons Blvd

Jamaica NY 11432

(Leaving town early June and would like to have them graded by mid-May, so promptness would be appreciated)

Review of March 27

1. Art as the expression of the unconscious
2. the manifold interpretations of demonic: sin, temptation, punishment, anti-feminine, the after-life.
incubi and succubi

Further Bibliography

Erikson, Erik. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. New York: Norton, 1958.

Haughton, Rosemary. Tales From Eternity NY Seabury, 1973.

Remy, Jean, and Servais, Emile. "The Functions of the Occult and the Mysterious in Contemporary Society." The Persistence of Religion Edited by Andrew Greeley and Gregory Baum. NY: Harter and Herder, 1973.

DeMause, Lloyd. "Our Forebears Made Childhood a Nightmare. Psy To April, 1975. 85-88.

Note the Change in Address for Papers

Anthony Fasano
c/O Linda Weygandt
New York Theological Seminary
235 East 49 St
New York NY 10017

by May 8

1. The Function of the Occult

a stress

b cult vs occult

2. Examples of Occult

a. Puerto Rican Espiritismo and Santerismo

b. Luther: Sancte Sathana, Oro pro me.

c. the creative person as demonic

d. the child victimized as demonic



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Some Readings on Espiritismo

The First Book of Samuel, 28:5-25

Jerry Fenton: Understanding the Religious Background of the Puerto Rican. Cuernavaca, 1969.

Carl Jung. Memories, Dreams, Reflections. New York: Pantheon, 1963, p. 364.

Ernst Jones, The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 3. New York: Basic Books, 1957. P. 391

Issac Luchansky, "Puerto Rican Spiritualists View Mental Illness:: The Faith Healer as Paraprofessional." American Journal of Psychiatry 127: 3 (September 1970): 87-97.

Beatrice Purdy, "Mellaril or Medium, Stelazine or Seance? A Study of Spiritism as it Affects Communication, Diagnosis and Treatment of Puerto Rican People." In On the Urban Scene. Pp. 65-79. Edited by Morton Levitt. Detroit: Wayne State University, 1972.

Lloyd Rogler, "The Puerto Rican Spiritualist as a Psychiatrist," American Journal of Sociology 67 (1961): 17-21.

Daniel Wakefield, "The World of Spirits," Island in the City. Boston: Maughton Mifflin, 1959. Pp. 49-86.

Angelina Saavedra de Roca. Espiritismo como una Religión. Puerto Rico: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales.

Br. Anthony Fasano
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212 877 6127

(available for talks
in parishes, schools, etc.)

The Christian Struggle with Evil

March 13

A. Important Terms

1. two views of the future age

brought about by eschatology development, becoming
or by apocalypticism liberation, adventus (inbreak)

2. five views on the response to repression

realism Herodians, Sadducees
revolt Zealots
desert Essenes
"proper" Pharisees (separation)
religion"

a new community
voluntary, mixed, new ethic: forgive, suffering, sharing,
new leaders, new order.

3. Counter-Christ, Anti-Christ

first political--Nero
then internal false messiah Pope
then interior false self.

*Towards the Death of Satan
Reilly, London, Chapman,
1968.*

4. Millenarism (Millennial)

Revelations XX 4-6 the reign of 1000 years after Christ has
returned in glory

collective, terrestrial, imminent, total, supernatural

B. first centuries of Christianity

1. Paul

2. John

3. Justin Greek 2nd Cent AD.

4. Clement of Alexandria

5. Origen (Cosmic Fall - before creation) Writings destroyed - too dangerous.

apokatastasis apo kata stasis

back to beginning & standing

World failed to achieve
what it should have achieved -
In trying to achieve, fell -
Preached universal salvation.

Augustine: Lived - one woman, despite all the talk. Intense person
dramatic, passionate. Manichean heresy - 2 principles light & dark
Not tied in & dark & weakness.

*Satan is Angel & lives on
living on Plane Earth*

Trinity -

Linked w/ Paul said - see apocalyptic -

applied, Lucifer to Satan. Israel -

Greek Gods were Demons (states)

Angels kept humans in check etc.

Writings (formulas)

Wrote to know arcane knowledge - special fellowship

Knew fall - Devil tied in & fall. Knew Satan.

Reaching Christianity & Greek philosophy.

The Christian Struggle with Evil

Jesus relation to the Devil

II The Epistles

Satan as enemy of the Christian Community

Ephesians 6:10-12

I Thessalonians 3:5

in 2:18 Paul says Satan wouldn't let him go to them

God will crush: Rom 16:20

2 Cor 11:14 disguises himself *as angel of light* cf apocalyptic
tempts: 1 Cor 7:5

S and anti-Christ I Thes 2:9

Rom 16:20

III. John

1. relative lack of demoniacal cures before the charge of "Thou
hast a devil." *(to Christ)*

2. Identity of the world with the Devil

I Jn 2: 12, 13, 14

John 8:23 and 8:44

Jh 8:23 and 14:30 I am not of this world

I John 5:19 The whole world lies in the evil one.

I Jn 3:10

3. no dualism: The Word became flesh

4. Satan dethroned

Jh 8:36

Jn 12:31

Jn 16:11

*World:
social bodies
which can be
redeemed.*

*Planet-
Inhabitants*

The Christian Ministry with the

Church in the World

By the Rev. Dr.

Robert H. Hays, D.D., LL.D.,

President of the

Yale University

In this book the author discusses the

role of the church in the world

and the relationship between the

church and the state

and the church and the world

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Marjorie F. Ragona - Re: Feb. 27, 1975

1. Trace Jesus' struggle with Satan, with particular emphasis on the Temptation in the desert, defining the types of power Satan offered, showing how Christ was able to overcome Satan.
- ✓ 2. Trace Jesus rejection of ritual defilement, and why this was a powerful force in his favor against Satan. (Ritual=propitiation of deity)
3. How can Christianity extend Christ's victory over Satan, to combat Satanic forces in the world today?

1. If the sum of persons in a social institution is greater than the parts, can this successfully account for corporate evil? If not, what is corporate evil and how does it come about?

✓ 2. Does the Zoroastrian concept of the fight between good and evil lock us into a philosophy of religion which is out of date? Discuss alternatives to the warfare idea.

✓ 3. What caused the shift from political imagery in the Scriptures to religious imagery. At this point I would like to discuss the shift, not only in imagery, but the problems of the linguistic characteristics of the languages involved -- Hebrew vs. Greek and the problems of expressing the same ideas in Hebrew or Greek.

Marjorie Ragona
Re: March 6, 1975

Marjorie Ragona - Re: 3-4-75

1. ✓ Show how the Christian theological importance shifted from the resurrection and second coming to a mental internalization of belief in Christ and his teachings when it became apparent that the second coming was not immanent.
2. What is Mark's way of emphasizing Christ's humanity to the Gnostics who did not believe that Christ was fully human?
3. In what ways does Mark use Peter to show the Gnostic and other false Christologies, and Christ's answers to Peter as the true Christology.

Marjorie F. Ragona Feb. 20

1. If Yahweh was a God who gave man over to death as well as life, caused discord as well as concord, trace the historical progression through the Bible of the shift from such ~~xx~~ a God to the presence of Satan to account for the presence of the power of evil in the world.
2. Show how the Prince of devils (Satan) becomes identified with a. The Serpent of Genesis, b. Lucifer, c. The Devil (the Accuser, of the New Testament), d. The Adversary (of Job).
3. Trace the role of women as consorts of heavenly beings to become the mothers of either evil or divine beings in the Bible.

The Christian and Anarchy - An Approach to the
Problem of Corporate Evil

I. What causes evil?

1. Satan?
2. Social problems?
3. Greedy individuals?
4. Corporate and national greed?

II. Some prior solutions

1. Governments are instituted among men
 - a. Democracy and state religion
 - b. Monarchy and the state church
 - c. Socialism and Communism
2. Why they fail

III. Anarchy

1. The historical perspective
2. Anarchy and atheism
3. A model for Christian anarchy
4. Why it is the ideal social condition
5. How it would have to be structured

IV. The Alternatives

1. Annihilation
2. Chaos

V. Prelude to the Millenia

Marjorie F. Ragona
261 Prospect Park West
Brooklyn, NY
499-9544

The Christian and Anarchy - An Approach to the
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Marge Rogers

QUESTIONS RE LIBERATION AND JUSTICE

I suspect that my questions will sound cynical, but they are not meant to. Given the situation we are in, I find myself asking some very pertinent questions about the church, the materials we are reading, and the course.

1. Can we draw any kind of "truth" from scriptural material written by a patriarchal, warlike, oppressive group of people who wrote history and saw themselves as the chosen of God, while all other people were there to be oppressed by them in God's name.

*These are
unpleasant, some
fairly basic
questions!*

I believe we can, but we must use the material honestly and face the reality of the situation, and not attempt to use the material for our own ends, without looking at the historical and contextual exegesis with scrupulous honesty. Otherwise we are perpetuating the social myths contained in scripture. So a further question is:

Can we be totally honest about scripture?

2. Is the church truly part of the liberation of humanity or is it so bound up in its traditional oppressor role that it cannot see clearly enough to help in the liberation of anyone?

or both

I believe it can, but we must look at what the church teaches and has taught about itself, about the kinds of people who make up the church, and their methods and demand that the church first liberate itself from its enmeshment in the middle-upper white male Western socio-economic, ethnic, Calvinistic (even when we deny it), personalistic, individualistic ethic. The church belongs to all people -- even people we don't like, approve of, see as "other", and don't want to be around. The most segregated hour culturally, racially, class-wise, and husband-wife-childwise occurs at 11:00 o'clock Sunday morning. My further question is:

Can the church be totally honest about who it really speaks to, and liberates?

3. Can the church teach the virtues of honesty, ethical living, the "Golden Rule", the Beatitudes within the framework it espouses today, i.e. buildings which serve no other role except to provide for 4-5 hours a week of usage, money raised primarily to support its own lifestyle, systems which oppress even the people it best serves, and which pay absolutely no attention to the realities of most people's lives.

I believe it can, but it must stop teaching and promoting the oppression of every person. In another class this week, I learned how to gouge money out of people who did not want to give it, or who actually could not give at the rate the church was setting, but

through the chicanery of setting one woman against another, one man against another, so that pride and competitiveness were aroused we could learn to raise the budget to make ourselves more comfortable, build grander buildings, reach richer folk, and generally engage in Christian self-aggrandizement. If that is what we are teaching young clergy as "reality" and expecting them to teach their financial boards and committees, and then send them out to practice on their congregations, it is no wonder we are in the shape we are in. My further question is:

Do we know who needs the liberation from us, those in Central America, or the folks back home?

4. A further question about honesty: Can the church teach people to be honest before God about themselves, their needs, their actions, the state of their souls, when they cannot be honest with their own boards, their superiors, their colleagues, their parents, their pastors, anyone.

I think now about the vast horde of people in this school who are lying about themselves to everyone except maybe other students whom they can trust. The church is teaching them to lie, to hide, and to cover up a very basic fact about themselves -- their sexuality. It asks them to deny themselves, to dishonor the people they love, and to dishonor God by denying the fact of God's creation being "tov" -- good, very good. The church does this in the name of "morality." My further question is:

Can the church face its own immorality in dealing with God's people?

5. Can a church which has been beholden to big business, to corporation executives for its very lifeblood and support truly ask those people to support liberation in countries which it oppresses?

This is a question of even-handedness and letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing. John Q. Executive sits in church on Sunday and hears his pastor talk about liberation theology and the merging of Marxism and Christianity in South America presented positively. As a good white, male, liberal he nods knowingly, prays for the success of the movement, puts his tithe of his \$90,000 a year salary in the plate, a portion of which will go to support this movement, and on Monday goes out and makes that \$90,000 in a corporation which makes its money selling baby formula to mothers in underdeveloped countries which he knows will kill the babies eventually. He also knows that if the movement really works, he will be out of work and not able to ~~turn on~~ his \$90,000, and so the church which espouses this will also eventually go out of business, because it can't support itself on his unemployment check. My further question is:

Who are we kidding? --

6. On of our authors proposes politicalization of people as an answer to oppression. Cuba, for example, politicized its people, had a Marxist revolution, gave "power to the people,"

who then responded by emptying the jails of people who had learned to survive by theft, dishonesty, hustling, or whatever had put them in jail. *made the decision to go* These people were sent to a country where they did not speak the language, had no skills, no contacts, and did not know the system. Needless to say, they used the same survival techniques they had used with the previous oppressor and wound up back in jail. The "People's Revolution" prided itself on having made Cuba a better place to live. Among these were thousands of Cuban homosexuals, who were in jail because the Marxist government felt that homosexuality was "decadent." My further question is:

Who does politicalization benefit? Those who fit the mold or everyone? *Would Christian Marxists behave differently or more oppressively? Probably!!*

7. One of our authors is concerned about what she will do with three guineas. She has been asked to contribute them to "worthy causes." How realistic is her view of women's life? Can the Christian church better the lives of women within its structure, or does the church have to be revamped entirely.

in terms of revolution?
I believe the church can better the lives of women, but first it needs to know who and what women really are. Does the church really look at the lives of working women, poor women, women students, women in offices (with sexual harassment, inequality, etc.), and really look at its own involvement in that system. Christian nations have the widest disparity between the earnings of men and women. Socialist nations are closer in the comparative earnings, and the disadvantaged nations have the closest -- when both have nothing, there is no disparity!! My question is:

What does the church do and teach that keeps women in Christian nations in a one-down position. Even the church's structure provides lower salaries for women pastors (they get smaller and more marginal congregations), less security for women professors at its theological schools (take this one for a good example), and less opportunity for advancement into better places. Is the church willing to change? Until it is, why should society bother? *because it may have its own morality too*

I have more questions. But I believe these will demonstrate the kinds of questions I am asking. I don't think Freire will tell me what to do with the Cuban homosexual refugees, but I do believe he would be one with the system that put them on the boat and sent them to us. I don't think idealistic Tom Groome would be able to deal with the realities of the church's support system without closing his eyes to what is really being taught by the church's actions. I don't believe dear Virginia Woolf could deal with the noise and dirty diapers of a working mothers' nursery operating with half-trained people because that's what the system allows it -- if it allows nearly enough of them. I'm stuck with the reality of being a Lesbian, a Christian, a working mother who has been on Welfare, and the pastor of a church which keeps me honest in facing who I am and how I want to support that church. I had some doubts a while

back as to whether I had made the right choice, or if I should have stayed in my closet, and gone on working within the framework of the mainline denominations, through denominational structures, and been well-supported and had some job security. But I think I prefer the way I have taken. At least I can face myself and God honestly and be grateful that I am who I am, and not feel the fear and distress I see in others around me. I did my 30 years in Purgatory -- never again. But I want the church to face its dishonesty, the damage it does to people, and the turmoil it puts on both those who hide and those who demand that they hide. Neither of them face reality.

If the church lies in one area, is it truthful in others? I doubt it. We are collecting Christian brownie-points for being liberal and I'm not sure I want to buy into that.

May,
I like what you've done here very much. I think we would have some disagreements on how/if/when the Bible is useful as a source for liberation.
I think we would also disagree on Thier's meaning when he uses politicization. His thought clearly has Marxist roots, but I think the word politicization in his system is not synonymous with Marxism. Rather, it refers to a critical approach to understanding one's environment - socially, economically, + politically.

I agree the Cuban situation is homophobic - Marxism does not necessarily eliminate that any more than it necessarily eliminates racism or sexism.

I'd like to talk about this more. Your paper is very moving + challenging.
- MBR

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

TAKE HOME MID-TERM EXAMINATION

Due Date: Monday, June 22

I prefer that your answers are typed, double-spaced, with ample margins on all four sides.

There is no space limit on the answers to these questions, but by all means, do stick to the point. Your essays should be liberally laced with "facts." Make textual references wherever it is appropriate. (In other words, try not to rely solely on class notes.)

1. What problems arise when the Judaeo-Christian concept of creation is combined with the elements of Greek philosophy? Be precise in answering the question.
2. Is there a difference between late antiquity and the early Middle Ages? Make reference to specific people or works as well as to specific themes or concepts in answering the question. Consider the opposition: why would someone disagree with you, and why do you believe your answer is nonetheless correct?
3. Is Augustine's conversion a conversion to Christianity or to Platonism? Explain your answer, once again, acknowledging the opposition. You might think here of the literary structure of, for example, the Confessions.
4. What is the theory of illumination? Explain how the theory grows, for Augustine, out of his Christianity as well as out of his adoption of elements of Greek philosophy.
5. Use Augustine's Neoplatonic hierarchy to characterize his solution to the problem of evil in as much detail as possible. Is Augustine's solution adequate? Explain.
6. How does Boethius improve on Augustine's solution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will?
7. Why might someone say that early mediaeval culture is monastic culture?
8. What is the problem of universals? (Porphyry's three questions might help here.) Does the problem have anything to do with theology? State precisely one of Boethius' solutions to the problem of universals.

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Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

Schedule of Readings

The numbers to the left of the readings listed below correspond to the numbers on the "Schedule of Topics." Readings should be completed, whenever possible, by the date on which their number falls. So for example, readings at number 4 should be completed by June 11. Where the bibliography contains only one title by a given author, only the author's name is given below.

1-3. Begin reading Augustine--look at what is coming.

*Essential Aug-
46, 74-76*

- ✓ 4. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. *45, 48, 53-54, 63*
- ✓ 5. Augustine, Confessions. Selections from On the Teacher, On the Trinity, City of God.
- 6. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will. *I 18 (64)
I, 11 (75)*
- ✓ 7. The Rule of St. Benedict.
- 8. Selections from Peters.
- ✓ 9. Beowulf. Selections from Paul the Deacon, Bede.

- ✓ 10. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy.
- ✓ 11. Selections from Boethius, On the Trinity, Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge.
- 12. Two Lives of Charlemagne.
- ✓ 13. Recommended: Selections from The Carolingian Chronicles.
- 14. Selections from pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena, the Tain.
- ✓ 15. The Song of Roland.

- 16. Recommended: King Harald's Saga.
- 17. Selections from Anselm. Recommended: Selections from Joinville and ~~Chardin~~ Villehardouin: Chronicle of the Crusades.
- 18. Selections from Arabic philosophers and scientists.

- 19. Ywain. Recommended: Selections from Haskins.
- 20. Abelard's story.
- 21. Selections from Abelard.

- 25. Selections from Bonaventure.
- 26. Selections from Division and Method of the Sciences.
Recommended: Weisheipl's biography of Aquinas.

- 27. Selections from Introduction to Aquinas.
- 28. On Being and Essence, Selections from Introduction to Aquinas.
- 29. Selections from Introduction to Aquinas.
- 30. The condemned propositions, selections from Duns Scotus.
- 31. Selections from Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent.
- 32. Selections from Ockham.

Recommended Readings

I note here only more specialized recommended readings, for example additional primary texts that you might want to read, or secondary sources that are relevant to a particular point in the course.

I recommend that you regularly read some (at least one) secondary source for additional information about each period or thinker we discuss in class, and for information about events we do not cover in class. So try to keep up with, to name a few examples from the bibliography, on of Copleston's works, or Gilson's History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, or Knowles, or Leff. (You get the point.)

There are too many surveys of mediaeval history available for me to recommend a few in particular. Find one, and try to read it. On the literary side, I highly recommend Auerbach and Curtius. I shall fill you in about other works as we go along.

I have been with you throughout your entire career, and I have seen you grow from a young man to a man of great achievement. I have seen you face every challenge with courage and determination, and I have seen you emerge victorious every time.

I have seen you work long hours, sacrifice your personal life, and push yourself to the limit. I have seen you take risks, and I have seen you succeed. I have seen you lead others, and I have seen you inspire them. I have seen you become a man of great influence, and I have seen you become a man of great honor.

There are no words that can describe the greatness of the man you have become. You are a true leader, a true visionary, and a true hero. You are a man who has made a difference in the world, and you are a man who will be remembered for generations to come.

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

Schedule of Topics

Wed., June 10

1. 6:00-7:00 p.m.
Introduction: questions of methodology, sketch of scope:
chronological, thematic, geographic
2. 7-8 p.m.
Why begin with Augustine? Two necessary features of
mediaeval thought: a. the Greek heritage b. Christianity
3. 8-9
Main themes in Augustine

Thurs., June 11

4. 6-7
Augustine's life and times, the role of secular or
classical learning, faith, hope, love
5. 7-8
Augustine's autobiography? theory of divine ideas, theory
of perception, theory of illumination
6. 8-9
Manichaeism, evil, free will, omniscience

Fri., June 12

7. 6-7
Monasticism: the key to early mediaeval thought?
8. 7-8
Romans and barbarians: events around the empire
9. 8-9
Pagans and Christians, history and literature

Sat., June 13

10. 9:00-10:00 a.m.
Boethius' life and times, literary style
11. 10-11
Philosophical and theological themes in Boethius
12. 11-12 noon
The genesis of the Carolingian world, Charlemagne: a
legend in his own time, emperor or king?
- noon-1:00 p.m. Lunch Break
13. 1-2 p.m.
The Carolingian world: reform, renaissance, or ____?
14. 2-3
The contributions of the Irish, pseudo-Dionysius the
Areopagite, John Scottus Eriugena
15. 3-4
After Charlemagne: his successors, the Holy Roman Empire,
the rise of feudalism, the concept of chivalry

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
JAMES H. HARRIS
DECEASED
BY WILL
JAMES H. HARRIS

IN SENATE

1911, June 15

1. The first of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

2. The second of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

3. The third of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

4. The fourth of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

5. The fifth of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

6. The sixth of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

7. The seventh of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

8. The eighth of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

9. The ninth of the provisions of the will is that the executor of the will shall pay to the surviving spouse of the testator, for her life, an annuity of \$10,000 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, from the income of the principal of the estate, after the payment of the expenses of the estate and the taxes thereon.

Mon., June 15

16. 6-7 p.m.

The Vikings, renewed discussion of methodological considerations

17. 7-8

The eleventh century: the Crusades, the significance of the thought of Anselm

18. 8-9

The intellectual contributions of the Arabs

Sat., June 20

19. 9-10 a.m.

The renaissance of the twelfth century, schools and subjects

20. 10-11

A glance at the arts, survey of themes and thinkers of the twelfth century

21. 11-12

Abelard, Heloise, and Bernard of Clairvaux: philosophy, logic, theology, mysticism

noon-2 p.m. Lunch and Library Time

22. 2-3

The rise of universities

23. 3-4

Outline of the thirteenth century, the development of vernacular literature

Mon., June 22

24. 6-7 p.m.

Religious movements, heresies, Church reform

25. 7-8

Bonaventure, Aquasparta, and the Franciscans, theory of illumination

26. 8-9

Aquinas: life, outline of main themes

Sat., June 27

27. 9-10 a.m.

Aquinas: natural theology

28. 10-11

Aquinas: theory of separated substances, theory of the soul, other metaphysical issues

29. 11-12

Aquinas: theory of illumination and other epistemological considerations

noon-2 p.m. Lunch break and Library time

30. 2-3

The Condemnation of 1277 and its implications, introduction to the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus' metaphysics

31. 3-4

Rival epistemologies: John Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent

Mon., June 29

32. 6-7 p.m.

Terminists and other moderns of the fourteenth century,
main themes in William of Ockham

33. 7-8

The revolt against Aristotelianism: Nicholas of
Autrecourt, Nicholas of Cusa and other reactionaries?

34. 8-9

Concluding remarks

11. 2-3
Continuing results
The results against antisemitism: Bishop's at
12. 1-2
Main themes in William of Ockham
13. 2-3
Results and other material of the 14th century

GUIDE TO THE CONFESSIONS

What follows are some scattered comments and notes to guide you in extracting philosophical themes from the Confessions. It also contains some other points to note. It is not intended to be exhaustive. Note throughout such things as Augustine's relationship with his mother, what he says about her and how he describes her. Compare this with the same aspects about his mistress. Notice also how he describes his students in the various cities in which he teaches.

- Book I, chapter 3, section 3 What is the relationship of God to the world?
- Book I, chapter 5, section 6 God is truth itself.
- I,6,9 doctrine of rationes aeternae: God contains the causes or reasons of all existing things
- I,6,10 implications of eternity
- I,8,13 compare Wittgenstein's philosophy of language ➔
- I,12,19 Sin is its own punishment
- I,13,14 problems with Greek; what's the big deal about Dido?
- I,16,25 Problems with paganism
- I,18,29 Wrongdoing harms the wrongdoer. Compare Plato.
- II,4-10 discussion of evil, the pear tree episode. Socrates is wrong about evil - it can be done knowingly. The nature of pleasure - its addictive qualities
- III,4,3 note the influence of Cicero. This will be important for Augustine's conversion.
- III,5 First reading of Scriptures, problems with the language
- III,6,10 Distinguish the temporal, mutable objects of this world from the unchanging God.
- III,7,12 the true nature of evil. Why God cannot be material
- III,7,13 how justice is universal
- III,8,15 continued
- III,8,16 sin is its own punishment
- III,11,20 God is omnipresent. God exists within each person.
- IV,4-9 on friendship
- IV,11,17 the senses do not lead to truth
- IV,15,25 The mind is too weak to gain the truth by itself. This will be a very important theme.
- IV,16,29 God is God's greatness and God's beauty. Every attribute of God is God. God is a completely necessary being. He lacks accidents
- V,3-7 discussion of some of the failings of Manichaeism (3, A)
- V,10 What is wrong with skepticism and with materialism
- V,11 Scripture wins via arguments. It is philosophically superior.

- V,13-14 Ambrose and the introduction to immaterial entities
- VI,1,1 God = truth
- VI,3,3 Ambrose can read silently!
- VI,4,6 The certainty Augustine strives for is that of mathematics
- VI,5,7 Different truths susceptible of different proofs
- VI,5,8 The weakness of the human soul with regard to achieving truth, the role of authority (revelation)
- VI,6 On happiness
- VI,11,19 the role of immortality in religious belief
- VII,1,1 The corruptible is inferior
- VII,2,3 Two arguments against Manichaeism (3A)
- VII,3 the problem of evil and problems for the free will defense
- VII,4 God as the greatest possible being
- VII,5 God's omnipotence and evil
- VII,6,9 A refutation of astrology
- VII,9 What truth can be found in the Platonists' works
- VII,10 the theory of illumination; God is the Being par excellence
- VII,11 Degrees of reality, the hierarchy of being
- VII,12-13 the hierarchy of goodness, solution to the problem of evil
- VII,14 Vision of God is not empirical
- VII,16 More on the hierarchy
- VII,17 the mutability of the mind: only God is immutable
- VII,20-21 the deficiency of the Platonists
- VIII,2,3 Why the Platonists are superior to other philosophies
- VIII,3,6 God's knowledge is immutable
- VIII,5 Conflict of will
- VIII,7,17 Contains the famous "give me chastity and continence but not yet," which is expressed elsewhere, but not quite so directly
- VIII,8,20 to will and to act are not the same for most things; here we have an exception
- VIII,10 another refutation of the Manichaees (3A)
- VIII,12 At Last! "Mammy, mammy, guess what I did?"
- IX What more can there be to confess?
- IX,4,10 All good is internal
- IX,10 What happens in the tower?

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Required texts.

- ✓ St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. D.W. Robertson, Jr., trans. (Bobbs-Merrill).
- ✓ St. Augustine, Confessions, R.S. Pine-Coffin, trans. (Penguin Classics).
- ✓ St. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Anna S. Benjamin, trans. (Bobbs-Merrill).
- The Rule of St. Benedict, Anthony C. Meisel and M.L. del Mastro, trans. (Doubleday Image Books).
- ✓ Edward Peters, Monks, Bishops and Pagans. (University of Pennsylvania Press).
- ✓ Beowulf, Michael Alexander, trans. (Penguin).
- ✓ Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, V. Watts, trans. (Penguin Classics).
- ✓ Two Lives of Charlemagne, Lewis Thorpe, trans. (Penguin Classics).
- ✓ The Song of Roland, Frederick Goldin, trans. (W.W. Norton).
- Chretien de Troyes, Yvain: The Knight of the Lion, Burton Raffel, trans. (Yale University Press).
- Peter Abelard, The Story of Abelard's Adversities, J. T. Muckle, trans. (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies PIMS).
- Thomas Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, Armand Maurer, trans. (PIMS).
- ✓ Thomas Aquinas, Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, Anton C. Pegis, ed. (Modern Library, Random House).
- Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Armand Maurer, trans. (PIMS).
- ✓ John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, Allan Wolter, trans. (Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill).
- ✓ William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings, Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., trans. (Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill).

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17. General Policy, American Association of Librarians, etc., etc.

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Without doubt, women's education, the history, and the philosophy of women's education are the subjects of this book.

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Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
 MTS Program
 Summer 1987
 S. Katz, Instructor

from Peter Brown,
Augustine of Hippo

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE A

354	Augustine born at Thagaste.
361 Julian Emperor (to 363).	
364 Rogatist Schism.	
367 Ausonius tutor to Gratian at Trier.	
370	Returns to Thagaste from Madaura.
371	Goes to Carthage for first time.
372 Revolt of Firmus.	Patricius dies. Takes a concubine.
373 i.xii. Consecration of Ambrose.	Reading of <i>Hortensius</i> . ? Birth of Adeodatus.
374 Death of Firmus.	
375 17.xi. Death of Valentinian I.	Returns from Carthage to Thagaste to teach.
376	Death of friend; returns to Carthage.
378 9.viii. Defeat by Visigoths and death of Valens at Adrianople.	
379 Accession of Theodosius I. Consulship of Ausonius.	
380 ? Vindicianus Proconsul at Carthage.	Writes <i>De Pulchro et Apso</i> (not extant).
383 Revolt of Maximus (June). Faustus of Milevis arrives in Carthage. Ambrose in Trier (from Oct. to following Jan.). Famine in Rome.	Sails for Rome.
384 Symmachus Prefect of Rome. Altar of Victory controversy (summer). Dramatic date of Macrobius' <i>Saturnalia</i> .	Appointed Professor of Rhetoric in Milan (autumn).
385 Jerome (347?-420) sails from Ostia for the East, (August).	Monica arrives in Milan (late spring).

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE B

386 Affair of the Basilica in Milan (Feb.). 17.vi. Finding of St. Gervasius and Protasius. Ambrose in Trier (summer or autumn). Purge of Manichees at Carthage.	Reads the <i>libri Platonici</i> (June?). Visited by Ponticianus. Conversion (end of August). Goes to Cassiciacum (September). <i>Contra Academicos</i> (November). <i>De Beata Vita</i> . <i>De Ordine</i> (December). <i>Soliloquia</i> (winter).
387 Maximus invades Italy (autumn).	Returns to Milan (early March). 24.iv. Baptism. <i>De immortalitate animae</i> . Begins <i>De Musica</i> . Vision of Ostia. Death of Monica.
388 Returns to Carthage, then to Thagaste.	Goes to Rome from Ostia. Stays in Rome until latter part of year. <i>De quantitate animae</i> . <i>De libero arbitrio</i> (Bk. 1). <i>De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de vitiis Manichaeorum</i> . /90 Returns to Carthage, then to Thagaste. /89 <i>De Genesi contra Manichaeos</i> . /96 <i>De diversis questionibus</i> .
389 Baptism of Paulinus of Nola.	<i>De Magistro</i> . /91 <i>De vera religione</i> .
390 Arrives in Hippo to found monastery (spring). Ordained priest.	† Deaths of Adeodatus and Nebridius. /92 <i>De utilitate credendi</i> . /92 <i>De duobus animabus contra Manichaeos</i> . /95 <i>De libero arbitrio</i> (Bks. 2-3).
391 24.ii. General edict against paganism (<i>Cod. Theod.</i> xvi, 10, 10). Aurelius becomes bishop of Carthage.	28/29.viii. Debate in Hippo with Fortunatus. <i>Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum</i> . Writes to Jerome asking for Latin translations of Greek commentaries on the Bible. /420 <i>Enarrationes in Psalmos</i> (commentaries on the first 32 psalms had been written by 392).
392 15.v. Death of Valentinian II. Eugenius proclaimed Emperor (August). Donatist council at rusea; Maximian schism. Optatus, bishop of	3.xii. Council of Hippo. Preaches <i>De fide et symbolo</i> . <i>De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber</i> .

P.L. VOL. COL.	TRANSLATIONS
32 • 925	<i>Against the Academicians</i> , Milwaukee, 1942; <i>Answer to Sceptics</i> , NY., 1948; <i>St Augustine against the Academicians</i> , Ld., 1950.
32 • 919	<i>The Happy Life</i> , St Louis, 1939 & NY., 1948.
32 • 977	<i>Divine Providence and the problem of evil</i> , NY., 1948.
32 • 859	<i>Soliloquies of St Augustine</i> , Ld., 1910; <i>Soliloquies of St Augustine</i> , Edinburgh, 1912; <i>Soliloquies</i> , NY., 1948; (in) <i>Basic Writings of St Augustine I</i> , NY., 1948; (in) <i>Augustine: earlier writings</i> , Ld., 1953.
32 • 1021	<i>The immortality of the soul</i> , NY., 1938; <i>The immortality of the soul</i> , NY., 1947; (in) <i>Basic Writings I</i> , NY., 1948.
32 • 1081	<i>On Music</i> , NY., 1947.
32 • 1035	<i>The magnitude of the soul</i> , NY., 1947; <i>The greatness of the soul</i> , Ld., 1950.
32 • 1221	(in) <i>Augustine: earlier writings</i> , Ld., 1953; <i>The problem of free choice</i> , Ld., 1955.
32 • 1309	(in) <i>On the Manichaean Heresy</i> , Edinburgh, 1872; (in) <i>Basic Writings I</i> , NY., 1948 (only first part); <i>The Catholic and Manichaean ways of life</i> , NY., 1966.
34 • 173	
40 • 11	
32 • 1193	<i>Concerning the Teacher</i> , NY., 1938; <i>The teacher</i> , Ld., 1950; (in) <i>Augustine: earlier writings</i> , Ld., 1953; (in) <i>Basic Writings I</i> , NY., 1948.
34 • 121	<i>Augustine: earlier writings</i> , Ld., 1953.
42 • 65	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises of St Augustine</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>On the advantage of believing</i> , Oxford, 1885; <i>The advantage of believing</i> , NY., 1947; (in) <i>Basic Writings I</i> , NY., 1948.
42 • 93	(in) <i>Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</i> , 4, NY., 1901.
42 • 111	(in) <i>Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</i> , 4, NY., 1901.
36 • 67 & 37 • 1	<i>Expositions on the Book of the Psalms</i> (6 vols.), Oxford, 1847-57; <i>St Augustine on the Psalms</i> (2 vols. so far), Ld., 1960-.
40 • 181	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>On Faith and the Creed</i> , Edinburgh, 1873; <i>On Faith and the Creed</i> , Oxford, 1886; (in) <i>Augustine: earlier writings</i> , Ld., 1953; <i>Faith and the Creed</i> , NY., 1955.
34 • 219	

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE C

398 Death of Valerius. Romanianus returns to Italy (early summer).	<i>Ad Simplicianum de diversis questionibus.</i> <i>Contra epistolam quam vocant fundamenti.</i>
397-398 Revolt of Gildo, Count of Africa.	<i>De agone christiano.</i> <i>De doctrina christiana</i> (finished 426).
397 4.iv. Death of Ambrose. Succeeded by Simplicianus.	26.vi. II Council of Carthage. 28.viii. III Council of Carthage. Debates with Donatist Bishop Fortunius at Thubursicum Bure. /400 <i>Quaestiones evangeliorum.</i> /98 <i>Contra Faustum Manichaeum.</i> /401 <i>Confessiones.</i>
398 Defeat of Gildo. Execution of Optatus, Don. bp. of Timgad.	<i>Contra Felicem Manichaeum</i> (December).
399 19.iii. Imperial agents close the pagan shrines in Africa. Consulship of Manlius Theodorus.	27.iv. IV Council of Carthage. <i>De natura boni contra Manichaeos.</i> <i>Contra Secundinum Manichaeum.</i> <i>Adnotationes in Job.</i> /400 <i>De catechizandis rudibus.</i> /419 <i>De Trinitate.</i>
400	Preaches <i>De fide rerum quae non videntur.</i> <i>De consensu evangelistarum.</i> <i>Contra epistolam Parmeniani.</i> /01 <i>De baptismo contra Donatistas.</i> <i>Ad inquisitiones Januarii</i> (= <i>Epp.</i> 54-5). <i>De opera monachorum.</i>
401 Election of Pope Innocent I (401-March, 417). Crispinus, Donatist bishop of Calama, held responsible for attack on Possidius.	15.vi. V Council of Carthage. Goes to Assuras and Musti to investigate former Maximianist clergy. 13.ix. VI Council of Carthage. At Hippo Diarrhytus for election of Bishop (late September). <i>De bona conjugali.</i> <i>De sancta virginitate.</i> /05 <i>Contra litteras Petilian.</i> /14 <i>De Genesi ad litteram.</i>
402 Defeat of Goths in Italy. Death of Symmachus.	7.viii. In Milevis for the VII Council
403 Bishop of Bagal set upon by Donatists and badly wounded.	25.viii. VIII Council of Carthage. Preaches in Carthage at intervals until 8.xi.

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40 * 11 42 * 173	(in) <i>Augustine: earlier writings</i> , Ld., 1953, (Bk. 1 only). (in) <i>On the Manichaean Heresy</i> , Edinburgh, 1872.
40 * 189 34 * 15	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>The Christian Combat</i> , NY., 1947. <i>On Christian Doctrine</i> , Edinburgh, 1873; <i>Christian Instruction</i> , NY., 1947.
35 * 1321 42 * 207 32 * 659 42 * 519	(in) <i>On the Manichaean Heresy</i> , Edinburgh, 1872. (there are innumerable translations, but the best is:) <i>The Confessions of St Augustine</i> , translated by F. J. Sheed, Ld., & NY., 1943 (regularly reprinted).
42 * 551 42 * 577 34 * 815 40 * 309	(in) <i>Basic Writings</i> , I, NY., 1948; (in) <i>Augustine: earlier writings</i> , Ld., 1953. (in) <i>Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</i> , 4, NY., 1901. (in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>On catechizing</i> , Edinburgh, 1873; <i>Instruction the unlearned</i> , Oxford, 1885; <i>A treatise on the manner of catechizing the uneducated</i> , Ld., 1902; <i>A treatise on the catechizing of the uneducated</i> , Ld., 1912; <i>St Augustine's 'De catechizandis rudibus'</i> , Ld., 1913; <i>The first catechetical instruction</i> , Ld., 1946.
42 * 819	<i>On the Trinity</i> , Edinburgh, 1873; (in) <i>Basic Writings II</i> , NY., 1948 (selections only); (in) <i>Augustine: Later writings</i> , Ld., 1954; <i>The Trinity</i> , NY., 1963.
40 * 171 34 * 1041 41 * 33 42 * 107 33 * 199 40 * 147	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1874; <i>Concerning faith of things unseen</i> , Oxford, 1885; <i>On faith in things unseen</i> , NY., 1947. <i>The harmony of the evangelists</i> , Edinburgh, 1873. (in) <i>On the Donatist Controversy</i> , Edinburgh, 1872. (in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>The work of monks</i> , NY., 1952.
40 * 373 40 * 397 41 * 241 34 * 245	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>The good of marriage</i> , NY., 1955. (in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>Holy Virginity</i> , NY., 1955. (in) <i>On the Donatist Controversy</i> , Edinburgh, 1872.

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It should state the purpose of the study, the objectives, and the scope of the study. It should also mention the methods used and the results obtained.	1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It should state the purpose of the study, the objectives, and the scope of the study. It should also mention the methods used and the results obtained.
2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methods used in the study. This should include a description of the subjects, the materials, the procedures, and the data collection methods.	2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methods used in the study. This should include a description of the subjects, the materials, the procedures, and the data collection methods.
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE D

410 18.viii. Alaric enters Rome. Roman refugees to Africa. Pelagius passes through Hippo. 25.viii. Withdrawal of toleration for Donatists. 14.x. Edict summoning a <i>Collatio</i> at Carthage. Arrival of Marcellinus.	14.vi. XV Council of Carthage. In Carthage at intervals from 19.v, until he goes to Utica, 11.iv, and to Hippo Diarrhytus, 22.ix. Retires to a villa outside Hippo for the winter because of his health. <i>Epistola CXVIII ad Dioscurum</i> . <i>De unico baptismo contra Petilianum</i> (= Ep. 120).
411 18.v. Donatists come to Carthage for <i>Collatio</i> . 1.vi. Opening session of the <i>Collatio</i> . 9.vi. Judgement given against Donatists by Marcellinus.	Preaching regularly at Carthage from Jan. to March, and at Circa as well as at Carthage, from April to June, against the Donatists. 1,3,8.vi. <i>Collatio</i> at Carthage with Donatists. Affair of Pinianus at Hippo. Letter from Marcellinus late in year to say that Pelagian views were spreading in Carthage, and to tell him of the condemnation of Caecilius. 112 <i>Breviculus collationis contra Donatistas</i> . 112 <i>De peccatorum meritis et remissionis</i> .
412 30.i. Edict against the Donatists.	14.vi. Synod at Circa. Regularly preaching in Carthage, Sept.-Dec. <i>Post collationem contra Donatistas</i> . <i>De spiritu et littera</i> . <i>De gratia novi testamenti</i> (= ep. 140).
413 Revolt of Heraclian. Demetrias receives the veil from Aurelius. Pelagius, <i>Letter to Demetrias</i> . Defeat of Heraclian. 13.ix. Execution of Marcellinus.	In Carthage (mid-January). <i>De videndo Deo ad Paulinum</i> (= ep. 147). <i>De fide et operibus</i> . Carthage at end of June and again in August and September attempting to save Marcellinus. <i>De civitate Dei, I-III</i> (written before death of Marcellinus). 115 <i>De civitate Dei, IV-V</i> . 115 <i>De natura et gratia</i> .
414 Orosius goes to Jerusalem, to remain there two years.	<i>De bono viduitatis ad Julianam</i> . <i>De Trinitate</i> appears. 116-17 <i>Tractatus in Joannis evangelium</i> (begun, perhaps, 407-408).
415 20.xii. Synod at Diospolis (Ardea) examines	<i>Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas</i> . <i>De origine animae et de sententia Jacobi ad Hieronymum</i> (= Epp. 166-7). 116 <i>Tractatus in epistolam Joannis ad Parthos</i> (begun, perhaps, 407-408). 116 <i>De perfectione justitiae hominis</i> . 117 <i>De civitate Dei VI-X</i> .
	Council at Milevis (Sept.-Oct.) which condemns Pelagius Innocent.

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TRANSLATIONS

33 · 431
43 · 195

43 · 613
44 · 109

(in) *The anti-Pelagian writings of St Augustine, I*, Edinburgh, 1872.

43 · 651
44 · 201

(in) *The anti-Pelagian writings, I*, Edinburgh, 1872; *Three anti-Pelagian treatises of St Augustine, Ld.*, 1887; *Basic Writings, I*, NY., 1948; *Augustine, the later works, Ld.*, 1954; *On the spirit and the letter, Ld.*, 1925.

33 · 538

33 · 596

(in) *Seventeen short treatises*, Oxford, 1847; *Faith and works*, NY., 1955.

41 · 13

The city of God, (2 vols.), Edinburgh, 1871; (in) *Basic Writings, II* (selections only), NY., 1948; *City of God*, (7 vols.), Ld., 1912-; *City of God*, NY., 1962-; *City of God*, (abridged), Ld., 1963.

41 · 247

(in) *The anti-Pelagian writings, I*, Edinburgh, 1872; *Three anti-Pelagian treatises, Ld.*, 1887; *Basic Writings, I*, NY., 1948.

40 · 429

(in) *Seventeen short treatises*, Oxford, 1847; *The excellence of widowhood*, NY., 1952.

35 · 1379

Homilies on the Gospel according to St John, (2 vols.), Oxford, 1848/9; *On John*, (2 vols.), Edinburgh, 1873/4.

42 · 669
33 · 720

35 · 1977

(in) *Homilies on St John II*, Oxford, 1848; *Augustine: later works, Ld.*, 1954.

44 · 291

The anti-Pelagian writings, I, Edinburgh, 1872.

33 · 764

pH	Chromate ion concentration (M)
10.0	0.0010
9.0	0.0010
8.0	0.0010
7.0	0.0010
6.0	0.0010
5.0	0.0010
4.0	0.0010
3.0	0.0010
2.0	0.0010
1.0	0.0010
0.0	0.0010

pH	Chromate ion concentration (M)
10.0	0.0010
9.0	0.0010
8.0	0.0010
7.0	0.0010
6.0	0.0010
5.0	0.0010
4.0	0.0010
3.0	0.0010
2.0	0.0010
1.0	0.0010
0.0	0.0010

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE D (continued)

417 12.iii. Innocent condemns Pelagius and Caelestius. 18.iii. Election of Zosimus. Before Sept. Zosimus writes to African bishops: 'Magnum pondus...' Mid-Sept. Zosimus examines Pelagius. Writes to African bishops: 'Postquam...'	Receives Orosius's <i>History</i> . <i>De gestis Pelagii</i> . Preaching in Carthage in mid-September. <i>De correctione Donatistarum</i> (= Ep. 185). <i>De praesentia Dei ad Dardanum</i> (= Ep. 187). <i>De patientia</i> . /18 <i>De civitate Dei</i> , XI-XIII.
418 23.iii. Third letter of Zosimus: Caelestius and Pelagius still excommunicated. 30.iv. Expulsion of Pelagius and Caelestius from Rome. Death of Zosimus (Dec.) 29.xii. Election of Boniface.	i.v. XVI Council of Carthage. He remains in Carthage at least until middle of month. Receives letter from Pinianus in Jerusalem, who has just met Pelagius. Sends him <i>De gratia Christi et de peccato originali</i> . 20.ix. At Caesarea in Mauretania: <i>Gesta cum Emerito Donatistarum episcopo</i> . /19 <i>Contra sermonem Arianorum</i> . /20 <i>De civitate Dei</i> , XIV-XVI. <i>Ep.</i> 194 to Sixtus.
419 First work of Julian of Eclanum appears.	25.v. XVII Council of Carthage. <i>Locutiones in Heptateuchum</i> . <i>Quaestiones in Heptateuchum</i> . /21 <i>De nuptiis et concupiscentia</i> . /21 <i>De anima et ejus origine</i> . /21 <i>De conjugio adulterinis</i> .
420 Gaudentius of Timgad threatens to burn himself, his congregation and his basilica, on the arrival of the imperial agent Dulcinius.	<i>Contra mendacium</i> . /21 <i>Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum</i> . /21 <i>Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum</i> . /25 <i>De civitate Dei</i> , XVII. ? Interview with tribune Boniface at Tubunae (Tobna).

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TRANSLATIONS

44 · 319	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings</i> , I, Edinburgh, 1872; <i>Three anti-Pelagian treatises</i> , Ld., 1877.
33 · 792	(in) <i>On the Donatist controversy</i> , Edinburgh, 1872.
33 · 832	
40 · 611	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>Patience</i> , NY., 1952.
45 · 359	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings</i> , II, Edinburgh, 1874; <i>Basic Writings</i> , I, NY., 1948.
43 · 697	
42 · 683	
33 · 874	
34 · 485	
34 · 547	
44 · 413	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings</i> , II, Edinburgh, 1874.
44 · 475	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings</i> , II, Edinburgh, 1874.
40 · 451	<i>Adulterous marriage</i> , NY., 1955.
40 · 517	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>Against Lying</i> , NY., 1952.
42 · 603	
44 · 549	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings</i> , III, Edinburgh, 1876.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE E

421 Enquiry Into Manichees at Carthage, about the middle of the year.	/22 <i>Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum episcopum.</i> 13.vi. XVIII Council of Carthage. <i>Contra Julianum.</i> /23 <i>Enchiridion ad Laurentium.</i> /24 <i>De cura pro mortuis gerenda.</i>
422 4 ix. Death of Boniface. Election of Pope Celestine (-27.vii.432).	/25 <i>De VIII Dulcitii quaestionibus.</i>
423	Affair of Antonius of Fussala.
424 Eraclius builds memoria to S. Stephen at Hippo.	
425 Valentinian III becomes Emperor in the West. Bishops of Gaul face enquiry to detect Pelagian sympathizers.	<i>De civitate Dei XVIII.</i> /27 <i>De civitate Dei XIX-XXII.</i> Scandal at Hippo: Sermons 355-6 (Dec.-Jan.).
426	Death of Severus of Milevis. Visits Milevis to regulate succession. Nominates his successor, the priest Eraclius. /27 <i>De gratia et libero arbitrio.</i> /27 <i>De correptione et gratia.</i> /27 <i>Retractationes.</i>
427 Revolt of Boniface.	/28 <i>Collatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo.</i>
428	<i>Contra Maximinum Arianorum episcopum.</i> <i>De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum.</i> Receives letters from Prosper and Hilary. /29 <i>De praedestinatione sanctorum.</i> /29 <i>De dono perseverantiae.</i>
429 Vandals from Spain approaching along the coast of Mauretania (Summer). Darius comes to Africa to reconcile Boniface and the Empress.	/30 <i>Tractatus adversus Judaeos.</i> /30 <i>Contra secundam Juliani responsionem opus imperfectum.</i>
430 Ravaging of Numidia by Vandals.	28.viii. Death and burial of Augustine.

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TRANSLATIONS

43 · 707	
44 · 641	<i>Against Julian</i> , NY., 1957.
40 · 231	<i>The Enchiridion</i> , Edinburgh, 1873; <i>The Enchiridion to Laurentius</i> , Oxford, 1885; <i>Enchiridion of St Augustine</i> , addressed to Laurentius, Ld., 1887; <i>Faith, Hope and Charity</i> , NY., 1947; <i>Faith, Hope and Charity</i> , Ld., 1947; <i>St Augustine's Enchiridion</i> , Ld., 1953; <i>Enchiridion</i> , Ld., 1955; (in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>Basic Writings I</i> , NY., 1948.
40 · 591	(in) <i>Seventeen short treatises</i> , Oxford, 1847; <i>How to help the dead</i> , Ld., 1914; <i>The care to be taken for the dead</i> , NY., 1955.
40 · 147	<i>The eight questions of Dulcitius</i> , NY., 1952.
39 · 1568	
44 · 881	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings III</i> , Edinburgh, 1876; <i>Basic Writings I</i> , NY., 1948.
44 · 915	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings III</i> , Edinburgh, 1876; <i>Admonition and grace</i> , NY., 1947.
32 · 583	
42 · 709	
42 · 743	
42 · 21	
44 · 919	<i>The anti-Pelagian writings III</i> , Edinburgh, 1876; <i>Basic Writings I</i> , NY., 1948.
45 · 993	(in) <i>The anti-Pelagian writings III</i> , Edinburgh, 1876.
42 · 51	<i>An answer to the Jews</i> , NY., 1955.
45 · 1049	

Aristotle took the Forms out of
his platonic heaven and
implanted them on earth.

Form of the Good
↓
Forms
↑
Physical world

demerge

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
 MTS Program
 Summer 1987
 S. Katz, Instructor

Handout 1
 June 10, 1987

Elements From Greek Philosophy

1. Standards are observed in another world, separate and distinct from physical world.
2. Our minds or souls must exist in the other world, apart from our the body.
3. We have known the forms all our lives; knowledge is recollection. *(there is no learning - Meno)*
4. It is bad for the soul to be in the body.

Aug's epistemology:
 platonic. Knowledge
 is knowledge of Forms
 = Divine ideas.

5. Reality is intelligible.
6. Knowledge requires certainty. *[pragmatists & sceptics]*
7. The physical world is constantly changing.

8. The physical world cannot be known or understood, but only opined about.

9. The physical world does not really (fully) exist. *[Reality is intelligible - Real world is not intelligible]*
10. Forms are Being (3 & 5). *[Eternal] [unchanged]* *Things of this world participate in Forms.*
11. Forms are changeless, etc. (3 & 6).

12. Physical things participate in or imitate the Forms. *(metaphors)*

13. The demiurge is responsible for 12. *(Must create - necessity)*

14. Form of the Good. *if not a Form - not real - (Forms are level of reality)* *Plotinus - God is not real.*

15. Within the physical, changing world, there is a fixed, changeless core.

16. There are two components to change:
 - a. matter, which remains through the change
 - b. form, which changes.

Exist in physical world

17. There is a world of separated substances.

Form's matter - Immaterial realm.

18. Separated substances are changeless and fixed.

Thing in immaterial world do not have anything to do in this world.

*Sensory knowledge
 leads to the best
 knowledge.
 Thinking
 knowing beings who do not
 know this world*

Augustine's Hierarchy

Good - God = the One = Being = Son = H.S. (Logos) Philo the Jew
JUST BEAUTIFUL Alexandria

ANGELS - Eternal - Created at beginning

human souls

physical world

devils

NEOPLATONISM -

Soul - Moral Development -
(Immortal) Vision of the One -

Why is body bad?

(resurrection promise - resur. of the body)

Aristotle - soul is not immortal, mind does
not yield promise of immortality.

19. Separated substances are thinking beings, but they think only about themselves.

20. In knowing, the knower becomes the known.

Mind becomes formally what it knows.

21. The mind, as what knows, is separate from matter.

Mind must be able to take on any matter - have none of its own.

22. The soul is the form of the body. *Mind is immaterial.*

the soul is tied to matter, in the body, destroyed when the body is destroyed.
Summary, Notes, Cartoons

Mind survives.

World is eternal + necessary.

When you know something you become it.



|| matter Form

Essence: "Tree-ness"

*Sensation is of particulars
Knowledge is of universals.*

*logically
+ instabilities/dignity
One is prior to everything else
but not in time - Creation
is necessary; happens at some
time.
Process is spontaneous +
necessary.
emanation - flows forth.*

*Form of the Good (Father)
Soul - Psyche (H.S.)
Mind - Nous (Son)*

Aristotle - De Anima

*Plotinus (2nd Cent.)
Forms are the objects of knowledge
(they are what you know - when you know).*

Mind - minds - are what is known.

Demi-urge - World Soul. (supra-real)

One = Form of the Good - above being/reality

Prim. #5: Being is what is known (Minds) (Intelligences) Beings - Logos Intelligences = Nous

What is real is knowable.

World Soul - looks to being level to

*World Souls
Imposes order on chaos*

*human souls - miniatures of the world soul
our soul creates order on human body.*

*↓ tied to matter (not mind)
↓ physical world*

(God is best known by not knowing)

Rejects Principle #22.

*[no role for Grace]
[goal: union = One]*

Creation.

1. God creates everything ^{besides God.} - God is uncaused. [not self-caused]
(EX NIHILO)
2. Creation is a completely free act. [Greek word is necessitarian]
 - A. Freedom from external constraint.
 - B. Freedom from internal constraint.
(Loves have created nothing -
or could have created differently.)
[Genuine-alternatives + ability
to choose.]
3. God is omnipotent [God has nothing to limit his power.]

Creation is not a change in Aristotle's scheme, but it is a transition.

Principle of sufficient reason - contingent - God does not need a reason.
(PSR)

[Prime mover -
There is motion; something
causes it; God is the mover.]

Did God create Logic | Is God above logic?

4. Evil - matter - did God create evil?

Socratic dictum - "No one knowingly does evil." [Evil harms the evil-doer.]

Evil is not a problem for Greeks.


5. Out of evil comes potential for good.

Human Free will - ⁶Conflicts of predestination
foreknowledge
omniscience

7. What is the scope of omnipotence - [Mill denies God's omnipotence.]
[Berkeley ^{God} can create ideas in our heads.]

Patristic Chronology

Philo of Alexandria (the Jew), d. ca. 40 a.d.



A.D.	GREEKS	Fathers	LATINS	Pagans
400	Pseudo-Denis the Areopagite (perhaps mid 5c)		Augustine (d. 430)	Martianus Capella (mid 5c)
500	John Philoponus (d. ca. 580)		Boethius (ca. 480-525)	
600	Maximus the Confessor (ca. 580-662) (Commentator on Ps.-Denis)		Pope Gregory I the Great (ca. 540 - after 600)	
700	John Damascene (8th c)			

the next century that Boethius will give the standard theological definition of eternity (the total and simultaneous possession of unending life), but Augustine is quite clear on the utter unlikeness of eternity and time. With God are the eternal truths and principles, the *rationes aeternae*, which are like Platonic Forms residing in God's mind. They are actually the divine Ideas. Mutability, change, has no place on this highest level.

On the lowest level, all is subject to change. The created principles of vital changes, growth, reproduction and other biological activities, are certain infinitesimal "seeds" (*rationes seminales*), created by God in the very texture of matter. Seminal reasons are not bulky seeds, like beans or grains of wheat, but are hidden factors in beans, wheat, etc., which ensure that only beans grow from beans, and wheat from wheat. All such growths and changes take place in time, which is the duration (*manentia*) characteristic of creatures.

Other than principles of vital change, there would not seem to be any created, natural "forces" in the world of Augustine. He did not know the four-cause theory of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Causality meant efficient production to Augustine; in a very real sense, all efficacy in the inanimate universe of bodies is directly and immediately supplied by God. (See the section in Chapter V: "God Works Through-out Nature.") Of course, the teaching that divine Ideas are the eternal patterns of all created things is equivalent to a theory of exemplary causality; it is not treated as such by Augustine, however.

In a very important sense, Augustine's geography of being reduces to a two-level system: all natures are either Creator or creature, eternal or temporal, immutable or mutable, and so on. Yet man's soul must be fitted in between, as we have seen; it requires an intermediate sort of nature for its initial location.

All natures, from top to bottom, are good in themselves. Bodies are inferior to souls and infinitely below the divine—yet there is no suggestion in Augustinianism that corporeal things, or matter, are evil. Augustine saw evil as a real occurrence but not as a nature. Each instance of evil is like a wound in being, a lack or privation of some perfection that is expected to be present but is not. This privative explanation of evil should not be misunderstood. Augustine is not saying that evil is nothing, a mere negation, or an unreal abstraction. Few men have been more aware of the terrible importance of evil, both moral and physical. Reacting to

Manicheism which tried to assign a positive nature to evil, Augustine stressed the idea that evil is a hole or gap in nature, in order, or in goodness. Like any hole, it is there and one can fall into it and hurt oneself—but there is no stuff that holes are made of, nor are there evil natures.

CREATOR, HUMAN SOUL, BODY*

Now every creature of God is good [1 Tim. 4:4]

2.18. and every man, in so far as he is a man, is a creature—but not by virtue of the fact that he is a sinner. So, God is the Creator of both human body and soul. Neither of these is evil, nor does God hate either of them: for He hates none of the things that He has made. But the conscious soul (*animus*) is better than the body; while God, the Maker and Founder of both, is still more excellent and He hates nothing in man except sin. Sin for man is a disorder and perversion: that is, a turning away (*aversio*) from the most worthy Creator and a turning toward (*conversio*) the inferior things that He has created.

NATURES ON THREE LEVELS†

As I know you well, I ask you to accept and ponder the following brief sentences on a great theme. There is a nature which is susceptible of change with respect to both place and time, namely, the corporeal. There is another nature which is in no way susceptible of change with respect to place, but only with respect to time, namely, the spiritual. And there is a third Nature which can be changed neither in respect to place nor in respect to time: that is, God. Those natures of which I have said that they are mutable in some respect are called creatures; the Nature which is immutable is called Creator. Seeing, however, that we affirm the existence of anything only in so far as it continues and is one (in consequence of which, unity is the condition essential to beauty in every form), you cannot fail to distinguish, in this classification of natures, which exists in the highest possible manner, and which occupies the low-

* Questions for Simplicianus, I, 2.18; trans. V.J.B.

† Letter 18, to Coelestinus; trans. Doda.

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est place, yet is within the range of existence, and which occupies the middle place, greater than the lowest, but coming short of the highest. That highest is essential blessedness; the lowest, that which cannot be either blessed or wretched; and the intermediate nature lives in wretchedness when it stoops towards that which is lowest, and in blessedness when it turns towards that which is highest. He who believes in Christ does not sink his affections in that which is lowest, is not proudly self-sufficient in that which is intermediate, and thus he is qualified for union and fellowship with that which is highest; and this is the sum of the active life to which we are commanded, admonished, and by holy zeal impelled to aspire.

SOUL, RULED BY GOD, RULES ITS BODY*

These operations are either used with the preceding passions of the body—such as when forms break in upon the light of our eyes, or sound flows into our ears, or fumes to the nose, tastes to the palate and to the rest of the body whatever solid and corporeal things are moved toward it from the outside. Or these operations occur when in the body itself something migrates or moves from one spot to another spot, or the whole body itself is moved by its own or another's weight.

13. These are the operations which the soul uses in the preceding feelings of the body, which please the soul agreeing with them, offend the soul resisting them. When, however, the soul suffers anything from these feelings, its own operations, it suffers from itself, not from the body. Plainly this happens when it adjusts itself to the body. Therefore, it is less with itself because the body is always less than the soul itself.

And therefore the soul, being turned from its Lord to its slave, necessarily weakens; and again, being turned from its slave to its Lord, necessarily progresses and gives to this same slave a most easy life and therefore a life very little toilsome and troublesome; to which no attention is forced on account of its great quiet. Thus there exists that disposition of

* On Music, VI, 5, 12-13; trans. Tafford P. Maher, S.J., *The De Musica VI of St. Augustine*, Translated and Philosophically Annotated (St. Louis University Master's Thesis, 1939), pp. 87-89. Used with permission.

the body which is called health. Here again it has no need of our intention, not because then the soul does nothing in the body, but because it does nothing more easily. Now in all of our works we work in so far more attentively as we work with more difficulty. This health, moreover, will be more firm and certain when, in its own time and order, the body will have been restored to its former stability. (a) And this resurrection of the body, before it is most fully understood, is wholesomely believed. For it is necessary that the soul be ruled by a Superior and rule the inferior. That Superior is God alone; that inferior is the body alone—if you look to all in the whole and entire soul. Therefore, as the entire soul cannot be without its Lord, so it cannot excel without its slave. But, as the Lord is greater than the soul, so the slave is less. And so, intent upon its Lord, the soul understands His eternal things, and then more fully *is*. The more also its slave *is*, in its kind, through the soul. However, on the other hand, neglecting the Lord, the soul, intent upon its carnal slave by which it is led into concupiscence, feels its movements which the slave offers to it and it *is* less: not so much less, however, than its slave is less, even when it most is in its proper nature. But through the fault of its mistress, the body is less than it was since the soul was greater before its fall.

SOUL: ABOVE THE SENSIBLE, BELOW GOD*

But in spite of all those who cling tenaciously to 3.3. the writings of these philosophers, I will say most confidently that, in these Christian times, no one can doubt what religion ought to be embraced most readily, or which is the sure path to truth and happiness. Suppose that Plato himself were alive and did not disdain my questions, or, better still, suppose that one of his disciples during his actual life had addressed him somewhat as follows: "You have persuaded me that truth cannot be perceived by bodily eyes, but by the intelligence alone; that every soul which clings to the truth becomes happy and complete; that nothing keeps us farther from the truth than a life given over to the pleasures of the flesh and a mind

* *The True Religion*, 3.3; trans. C.A. Hangartner, S.J., *De vera religione* (Chapters 1-17) (St. Louis University Master's Thesis, 1945), pp. 9, 11. Used with permission.

crowded with the deceiving impressions of sensible objects, impressions which arise from the sensible world, are transmitted by the body, and give rise to the most varied beliefs and errors. We must try, therefore, to achieve perfect mental health, that we may attain to the vision of the immutable pattern of things, to the beauty which is always constant with itself and everywhere the same, beauty never distorted by changes of place or time, but standing out one and the same under all circumstances, the beauty whose very existence men discredit, but which in fact has the most true, the highest form of existence. All other things are born, die, pass in constant flux, and slip away—yet, in so far as they exist, they have certainly been produced by that eternal God in accordance with His truth. It is given only to the rational and intelligent souls among all these creatures to enjoy the contemplation of his eternal nature, to be moved and adorned by it, and to be able to merit eternal life.

GOD, MUTABLE SPIRITS, AND BODIES*

The highest good, than which there is no higher, is God, and consequently He is unchangeable good, hence truly eternal and truly immortal. All other good things are only from Him, not of Him. For what is of Him, is Himself. And consequently if He alone is unchangeable, all things that He has made, because He has made them out of nothing, are changeable. For He is so omnipotent, that even out of nothing, that is out of what is absolutely nonexistent, He is able to make good things both great and small, both celestial and terrestrial, both spiritual and corporeal. But because He is also just, He has not put those things that He has made out of nothing on an equality with that which He begot out of Himself. Because, therefore, no good things whether great or small, through whatever gradations of things, can exist except from God; but since every nature, so far as it is nature, is good, it follows that no nature can exist save from the most high and true God: because all things even not in the highest degree good, but related to the highest good, and again, because all good things, even those of most recent origin, which are far from the highest good, can have their existence only from the highest good. Therefore every spirit, though subject to

* The Nature of the Good, 1-25; trans. Dods.

change, and every corporeal entity, is from God, and all this, having been made, is nature. For every nature is either spirit or body. Unchangeable spirit is God, changeable spirit, having been made, is nature, but is better than body; but body is not spirit, unless when the wind, because it is invisible to us and yet its power is felt as something not inconsiderable, is in a certain sense called spirit.

But for the sake of those who, not being able to understand that all nature, that is, every spirit and every body, is naturally good, are moved by the iniquity of spirit and the mortality of body, and on this account endeavor to bring in another nature of wicked spirit and mortal body, which God did not make, we determine thus to bring to their understanding what we say can be brought. For they acknowledge that no good thing can exist save from the highest and true God, which also is true and suffices for correcting them, if they are willing to give heed.

For we Catholic Christians worship God, from whom are all good things whether great or small; from whom is all measure great or small; from whom is all form great or small; from whom is all order great or small. For all things in proportion as they are better measured, formed, and ordered, are assuredly good in a higher degree; but in proportion as they are measured, formed, and ordered in an inferior degree, are they the less good. These three things, therefore, measure, form, and order—not to speak of innumerable other things that are shown to pertain to these three—these three things, therefore, measure, form, order, are as if they were generic goods in things made by God, whether in spirit or in body. God is, therefore, above every measure of the creature, above every form, above every order, nor is He above by local spaces, but by ineffable and singular potency, from whom is every measure, every form, every order. These three things, where they are great, are great goods, where they are small, are small goods; where they are absent, there is no good. And again, where these things are great, there are great natures; where they are small, there are small natures; where they are absent, there is no nature. Therefore all nature is good.

When accordingly it is inquired, whence is evil, it must first be inquired, what is evil, which is nothing else than corruption, either of the measure, or the form, or the order, that belong to nature. Nature therefore which has been corrupted is called evil, for assuredly when

Value
Judgment

Creation not
co-equal =
God

how, by what?

12. All these things are so perspicuous, so assured, that if they who introduce another nature which God did not make, were willing to give attention, they would not be filled with so great blasphemies, as that they should place so great good things in supreme evil, and so great evil things in God. For what the truth compels them to acknowledge, namely, that all good things are from God alone, suffices for their correction, if they were willing to give heed, as I said above. Not, therefore, are great good things from one, and small good things from another; but good things great and small are from the supremely good alone, which is God.

13. Let us, therefore, bring before our minds good things however great, which it is fitting that we attribute to God as their author, and these having been eliminated let us see whether any nature will remain. All life both great and small, all power great and small, all safety great and small, all memory great and small, all virtue great and small, all intellect great and small, all tranquillity great and small, all plenty great and small, all sensation great and small, all light great and small, all suavity great and small, all measure great and small, all beauty great and small, all peace great and small, and whatever other like things may occur, especially such as are found throughout all things, whether spiritual or corporeal, every measure, every form, every order both great and small, are from the Lord God. All which good things whoever should wish to abuse, pays the penalty by divine judgment; but where none of these things shall have been present at all, no nature will remain.

14. But in all these things, whatever are small are called by contrary names in comparison with greater things; as in the form of a man because the beauty is greater, the beauty of the ape in comparison with it is called deformity. And the imprudent are deceived, as if the former is good, and the latter evil, nor do they regard in the body of the ape its own fashion, the equality of members on both sides, the agreement of parts, the protection of safety, and other things which it would be tedious to enumerate.

15. But that what we have said may be understood, and may satisfy those too slow of comprehension, or that even the pertinacious and those repugnant to the most manifest truth may be compelled to confess what is true, let them be asked, whether corruption can harm the body of an ape? But if it can, so that it may become more hideous,

what diminishes but the good of beauty? Whence as long as nature of the body subsists, so long something will remain. If, accordingly, good having been consumed, nature is consumed, the nature is therefore good. So also we say that slow is contrary to swift, but yet he who does not move at all cannot even be called slow. So we say that a heavy voice is contrary to a sharp voice, or a harsh to a musical; but if you completely remove any kind of voice, there is silence where there is no voice, which silence, nevertheless, for the simple reason that there is no voice, is usually opposed to voice as something contrary thereto. So also lucid and obscure are called as it were two contrary things, yet even obscure things have something of light, which being absolutely wanting, darkness is the absence of light in the same way in which silence is the absence of voice.

16. Yet even these privations of things are so ordered in the universe of nature, that to those wisely considering they not unfittingly have their vicissitudes. For by not illuminating certain places and times, God has also made the darkness as fittingly as the day. For if we by restraining the voice fittingly interpose silence in speaking, how much more does He, as the perfect framer of all things, fittingly make privations of things? Whence also in the hymn of the three children, light and darkness alike praise God, [Dan. 3:72] that is, bring forth praise in the hearts of those who well consider.

17. No nature, therefore, as far as it is nature, is evil; but to each nature there is no evil except to be diminished in respect of good. But if by being diminished it should be consumed so that there is no good, no nature would be left; not only such as the Manicheans introduce, where so great good things are found that their exceeding blindness is wonderful, but such as anyone can introduce.

18. For neither is that material; which the ancients called Hyle, to be called an evil. I do not say that which Manicheus with most senseless vanity, not knowing what he says, denominates Hyle, namely, the former of corporeal beings; whence it is rightly said to him, that he introduces another god. For nobody can form and create corporeal beings but God alone; for neither are they created unless there subsist with them measure, form, and order, which I think that now even they themselves confess to be good things,

and things that cannot be except from God. But by *Hyle* I mean a certain material absolutely formless and without quality, whence those qualities that we perceive are formed, as the ancients said. For hence also wood is called in Greek *hyle*, because it is adapted to workmen, not that itself may make anything, but that it is the material of which something may be made. Nor is that *Hyle*, therefore, to be called an evil which cannot be perceived through any appearance, but can scarcely be thought of through any sort of privation of appearance. For this has also a capacity of forms; for if it cannot receive the form imposed by the workman, neither assuredly may it be called material. Hence if form is some good, whence those who excel in it are called beautiful, (*forma-formosus*) as from appearance they are called handsome, (*species-speciosus*) even the capacity of form is undoubtedly something good. As because wisdom is a good, no one doubts that to be capable of wisdom is a good. And because every good is from God, no one ought to doubt that even matter, if there is any, has its existence from God alone.

20. Magnificently and divinely, therefore, our God said to his servant: "I am that I am," and "Thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me to you." [Exod. 3:14] For He truly is because He is unchangeable. For every change makes what was not, to be: therefore He truly is, who is unchangeable; but all other things that were made by Him have received being from Him each in its own measure. To Him who is highest, therefore, nothing can be contrary, save what is not; and consequently as from Him everything that is good has its being, so from Him is everything that by nature exists; since everything that exists by nature is good. Thus every nature is good, and every-thing good is from God; therefore every nature is from God.

20. But pain, which some suppose to be in an especial manner an evil, whether it be in mind or in body, cannot exist except in good natures. For the very fact of resistance in any being leading to pain, involves a refusal not to be what it was, because it was something good; but when a being is compelled to something better, the pain is useful, when to something worse, it is useless. Therefore in the case of the mind, the will resisting a greater power causes pain; in the case of the body, sensation resisting a more powerful body causes pain. But evils without pain are worse: for it is worse to rejoice in iniquity than to be-

wall corruption; yet even such rejoicing cannot exist save from the attainment of inferior good things. But iniquity is the desertion of better things. Likewise in a body; a wound with pain is better than painless putrescence, which is especially called the corruption which the dead flesh of the Lord did not see, that is, did not suffer, as was predicted in prophecy: "Thou shalt not suffer Thy Holy one to see corruption." [Ps. 15:10] For who denies that He was wounded by the piercing of the nails, and that He was stabbed with the lance? [John 19:18, 34] But even what is properly called by men corporeal corruption, that is, putrescence itself, if as yet there is anything left to consume, increases by the diminution of the good. But if corruption shall have absolutely consumed it, so that there is no good, no nature will remain, for there will be nothing that corruption may corrupt; and so there will not even be putrescence, for there will be nowhere at all for it to be.

21. Therefore now by common usage things small and mean are said to have measure, because some measure remains in them, without which they would no longer be moderate-sized, but would not exist at all. But those things that by reason of too much progress are called immoderate, are blamed for very excessiveness; but yet it is necessary that those things themselves be restrained in some manner under God who has disposed all things in extension, number, and weight. [Wisd. 11:21]

22. But God cannot be said to have measure, lest He should seem to be spoken of as limited. Yet He is not immoderate by whom measure is bestowed upon all things, so that they may in any measure exist. Nor again ought God to be called measured, as if He received measure from anyone. But if we say that He is the highest measure; by chance we say something, if indeed in speaking of the highest measure we mean the highest good. For every measure in so far as it is a measure is good; whence nothing can be called measured, modest, modified, without praise, although in another sense we use *measure* for *limit*, and speak of no *measure* where there is no *limit*, which is sometimes said with praise as when it is said: "And of His kingdom there shall be no limit." For it might also be said, "There shall be no measure," so that measure might be used in the sense of *limit*; for He who reigns in no measure, assuredly does not reign at all.

is, of what elements and realities is he made? Which of these do you expect to hear mentioned, when you ask: What is the origin of the soul? Do you want to know the district, if I may express it that way, or the country from which it came, or are you asking about its very substance?

E. As a matter of fact, I should like to know about both of these, but I prefer to leave it to you to decide which of the two I am to hear about first.

A. I believe that God, its Creator, is, so to speak, the soul's proper habitation and its home. As for its substance, I really cannot find a name. I certainly do not think that it belongs to those ordinary and familiar things of which we are aware through our senses. I do not think that the soul is composed either of earth or water or air or fire, or of all of these together, or of any combination of them. Now, if you were to ask me: What is a tree composed of?—I should mention those four well known elements¹ of which such things are supposed to consist. But, if you go on to ask: What does earth consist of or water or fire or air?—I should have no answer to make. In the same way, when you ask: What does man consist of?—I can reply: Of body and soul. If you were to ask further about the body, I shall fall back on those same four elements. However, since your question is about the soul, which appears to be simple and with a substance of its own, I am just as puzzled as though you were asking the previous question: What is earth composed of?

E. But I do not understand why you want to say that the soul has a substance of its own, since you said it was created by God.

¹ The Greek 'Physicists' of the Fifth Century B. C. taught that the universe is composed of four material principles, earth, air, fire and water. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I iii. At the time of Augustine this doctrine was still in vogue; cf. *De genesi ad litteram* 2.

A. Just as I cannot deny that earth was made by God and still I cannot say of what other elements, so to speak, earth is composed; for earth lacks parts in so far as it is earth,² and for that reason is said to be an element of all those bodies that are formed from the four elements. Therefore, there is no contradiction in my statement that the soul is made by God and has its own proper nature. God Himself is the author of the soul's peculiar nature, just as He is the maker of fire, air, water, and earth—the elements that make up all other things.

Chapter 2

(3) E. For the present I accept your explanation that the soul comes from God. I shall think it over carefully and, if I have any difficulty, I shall bring it up later. Now, please explain the nature of the soul.

A. It seems to me that the soul is like to God. For your question is about the human soul, if I mistake not.

E. That is exactly what I should like you to explain: how the human soul is like to God. For, although we believe that God has been made by no one, you said previously that the soul is made by God Himself.

A. Do you really think it difficult for God to make something like Himself, when you see from the great variety of images that such power has been granted even to us?

E. But, it seems that our creations some day come to an end, whereas God made the soul immortal, as I believe, unless, possibly, you have a different view.

A. Do you mean, therefore, that man's creations should have the same quality as those of God?

² As a primary element of bodies, earth, in the doctrine mentioned above, was regarded as not having parts.

has bestowed upon them. The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is not made, is God; but all other causes both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them.

DIVINE IDEAS AS PROTOTYPES*

Plato is known as the first to have named the
 46.1. Ideas. Not that if this name were nonexistent before he established it, the things that he called Ideas would not have existed, or would not have been understood by anyone—but they were probably called by different names by different people. It is permitted to give to any known thing that lacks an accepted name, whatever name one wishes. . . . But enough has previously been said about the name; let us examine the thing which is principally to be considered and understood, leaving each person free, as far as the terms are concerned, to give whatever name he wishes to the object of his knowledge.

So, in Latin we may call Ideas forms or species, to make it clear that we are translating word for word.

But, if we call them "reasons," we are departing somewhat from a strict translation; reasons are called *logoi* in Greek and not Ideas. However, if a person chose to use this term, he would not be far from the real meaning. In fact, Ideas are the primary forms, or the permanent and immutable reasons of real things, and they are not themselves formed; so they are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in themselves, and they are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they never come into being or go out of it, everything that can come into being and go out of it, and everything that does come into being and goes out of it, may be said to be formed in accord with them.

It is denied that the soul can look upon them, unless it be rational, in that part whereby it excels, that is, in its mind and reason, as it were in its face or interior and intellectual eye. And for this vision not everyone is suitable but only that rational soul which is holy and pure, that one

* *Eighty-three Different Questions*, q. 46, 1-2; trans. V.J.B.

which keeps the eye fit which such objects are seen, healthy, clear, serene and like unto those objects to which its view is directed. What religious man, infused with the true religion, even though not yet able to contemplate these objects, would nevertheless dare to deny and even refuse to confess that all things that are—that is, whatsoever things are constituted with a nature of their own in their proper kinds—were created by God as their source, so that they might exist? And that all living things are alive by virtue of the same source? And that the whole of things is preserved, and the very order in which they change, as they manifest their temporal courses according to a definite pattern, is maintained and governed, by the laws of the highest God? When this is established and admitted, who will dare to say that God established all things in an irrational manner? Now if this cannot be said or accepted in any proper sense, the conclusion remains that all things were founded by means of reason. Not that a man is based on the same reason as a horse; this would be an absurd notion. So, each one of these is created in accord with its own reason. Now, where would we think that these reasons are, if not in the mind of the Creator? For He did not look to anything placed outside Himself as a model for the construction of what he created; to think that He did would be irreligious.

Now, if these reasons for all things to be created, or already created, are contained in the divine mind, and if there can be nothing in the divine mind unless it be eternal and immutable, and if Plato called these primary reasons of things Ideas—then not only do Ideas exist but they are true because they are eternal and they endure immutably in this way; and it is by participation in these that whatever exists is produced, however its way of existing may be.

IDEAS ARE IMMUTABLE

GOD SET SPIRITUAL CREATION ABOVE THE CORPOREAL*

Living, then, in Immutable eternity, He has created
 20.39. all things together, and from them periods of time flow, places are filled, and the centuries unroll in the temporal and local motions of real things. Among these things, He has established some as spiritual and others as corporeal, giving form to the matter that He Himself created without

* *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, VIII, 20.39; 25.46; 26.48; trans. V.J.B.

celves that he does not see, he must also perceive that he sees when he does see; for the fact that when he sees a thing he does not move his eyes in search of it shows that he perceives both.

But whether this life that perceives that it perceives corporeal things perceives itself too, is not so clear; except that anyone who looks within himself finds that every living thing flees death. But since death is the opposite of life, it must be that life perceives itself, since it flees its own opposite. But if this be still not clear, let us pass it over, so that we may move on toward our goal only by evidence that is certain and manifest. For this much is clear: we perceive corporeal things by our bodily senses, but we cannot by the sense itself perceive a sense. By the interior sense we perceive both that we are perceiving corporeal things through the bodily sense, and also the bodily sense itself. But by reason all those other things and also reason itself become known and are held together in knowledge. Is this clear to you?

E. Perfectly clear.

SENSATION AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SOUL*

Master: Immediately I shall say what I think. But 5.9. you—you either follow or even precede, if you are able, when you notice me delay and hesitate. Now, I do not think that this body is animated by the soul unless by the intention of its Maker. Nor do I think that the soul suffers anything from the body, but acts with the body and in it, subjected divinely to its domination. Nevertheless, I think that the soul operates sometimes with ease, sometimes with difficulty, in so far as corporeal nature gives way, more or less, to it in accordance with its merits. Therefore, whatever corporeal things are put into or taken out of this body from without, produce something, not in the soul but in the body, which either is opposed to its work or agrees with it. And so, when the soul strives against the reluctant body and with difficulty molds the matter subjected to it for the ways of its working, it becomes more attentive to the activity on account of the difficulty—and this difficulty is called sensation on account of the attention (since it does

* On Music, VI, 5, 9-10; trans. T. P. Maher, *The De Musica VI of St. Augustine* (St. Louis University Master's Thesis, 1939), pp. 81-84. Used with permission.

not escape the notice of the soul). This perception is called pain or labor. But when that which is brought in or lies close, agrees, the soul easily brings the whole of it, or of it as much as it needs, into the journeyings of its working. And this action by which it joins its body extrinsically to a suitable object is not hidden, since the action is carried on more attentively on account of some adventitious circumstance and, moreover, on account of the suitability it is sensed with pleasure. But when those things by which it restores the losses of the body are absent, extreme want follows. When by that difficulty of action it becomes more attentive, and when such an operation of it does not lie hidden from the soul, it is called hunger or thirst or something similar. When, however, what has been eaten is above measure, and difficulty of working is born from the weight of the food, neither does this happen without attention. Further, when such an action is not hidden, sluggishness is felt. It even functions attentively when it ejects the superfluous—if gently, with delight; if roughly, with pain. The soul attentively acts in the morbid disturbance of the body, seeking to aid the body as it slips and disintegrates. Again, when this action is not hidden, the soul is said to feel illness and disease.

And lest I make it too long, it seems to me that the 10. soul, when it feels in the body, is not affected in anything from it but acts more attentively in its affections, and then these actions are either easy, on account of the agreeableness, or difficult on account of the disagreeableness, and they do not escape the soul. This is all that is called sensation. But that sense which, even when we do not sense still is present, is an instrument of the body, which is such a disposition that the soul be in it more prepared to direct the passions of the body with attention, so that it joins like things to like and repels what is harmful. Furthermore, as I think, it directs—in the eyes, something akin to light; in the ears, breezes, the most gentle and mobile; in the nose, something misty; in the mouth, moist; and in the touch, earthy and muddy. But whether by this or by some other distribution, these things are united—the soul acts quietly, when those inner components of its integrated health occur in some sort of intimate state of agreement. But when those are used which affect the body with some change, if I may speak thus, the soul then brings out more attentive actions as suited to the proper place and instrument. In that

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Instance it is said to hear, or to smell, or to taste, or to sense by touching, and by these actions it gladly associates the compatible things, with difficulty resists the incompatible. These operations the soul puts over against the passions of the body when it senses and itself does not receive the same feelings.

MEMORY, UNDERSTANDING, AND WILL*

Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things 11.17. of which the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially consider and discuss these three—memory, understanding, will. For we may commonly discern in these three the character of the abilities of the young also, since the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and the more acutely he understands, and the more ardently he studies, the more praiseworthy is he in point of ability. But when the question is about anyone's learning, then we ask not how solidly and easily he remembers, or how shrewdly he understands, but what it is that he remembers, and what it is that he understands. And because the mind is regarded as praiseworthy, not only as being learned, but also as being good, one gives heed not only to what he remembers and what he understands, but also to what he wishes; not how ardently he wishes, but first what it is he wishes, and then how greatly he wishes it. For the mind that loves eagerly is then to be praised, when it loves that which ought to be loved eagerly. Since then we speak of these three—ability, knowledge, use—the first of these is to be considered under the three heads, of what a man can do in memory, and understanding, and will. The second of them is to be considered in regard to that which any one has in his memory and in his understanding, whither he has attained by a studious will. But the third, viz. use, lies in the will, which handles those things that are contained in the memory and understanding, whether it refer them to anything further, or rest satisfied with them as an end. For to use is to take up something into the power of the will; and to enjoy is to use with joy, not any longer of hope, but of the actual thing. Accordingly, every one who enjoys, uses; for he takes up something into the power of the will, wherein he also is

* On the Trinity, X, 11.17-18; trans. Dods.

satisfied as with an end. But not everyone who uses, enjoys if he has sought after that which he takes up into the power of the will, not on account of the thing itself but on account of something else.

Since then these three, memory, understanding, will, 18. are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind, it follows certainly that neither are they three substances but one substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind, and substance, is so called in respect to itself, but it is called memory relatively to something. And I should say the same also of understanding and of will, since they are called understanding and will relatively to something, but each in respect to itself is life, and mind, and essence. And hence these three are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are severally called in respect to themselves, they are called also together not plurally but in the singular number. But they are three in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each but also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is each contained by each, but also all by each. For I remember that I have memory, and understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand; and I remember together my whole memory, and understanding, and will. For that of my memory which I do not remember is not in my memory; and nothing is so much in the memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole memory. Also, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; but whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember the whole of my understanding, and the whole of my will. Likewise, when I understand these three things, I understand them together as whole. For there is none of things intelligible which I do not understand, except what I do not know; but what I do not know, I neither remember, nor will. Therefore, whatever of things intelligible I do not understand, it follows also that I neither remember nor will. And whatever of things intelligible I remember and will, it follows that I understand. My will also embraces my whole understanding and my whole memory, whilst I use the whole that I understand and remember. And, therefore, while all are mutually comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is equal to each

what is good?

Meanwhile, I am confident that I shall find among the Platonists what is not in opposition to our Sacred Scriptures.

Reason & Authority TWO WAYS TO KNOWLEDGE*

It remains for me to declare how instruction is to be imparted to the studious youths who have resolved to live after the manner described above. Likewise, with regard to the acquiring of knowledge, we are of necessity led in a twofold manner: by authority and by reason. In point of time, authority is first; in the order of reality, reason is prior. What takes precedence in operation is one thing; what is more highly prized as an object of desire is something else. Consequently, although the authority of upright men seems to be the safer guide for the uninstructed multitude, reason is better adapted for the educated. Furthermore, since no one becomes learned except by ceasing to be unlearned, and since no unlearned person knows in what quality he ought to present himself to instructors or by what manner of life he may become docile, it happens that for those who seek to learn great and hidden truths authority alone opens the door. But, after one has entered, then without any hesitation he begins to follow the precepts of the perfect life. When he has become docile through these precepts, then at length he will come to know: (a) how much wisdom is embodied in those very precepts that he has been observing before understanding; (b) what reason itself is, which he—now strong and capable after the cradle of authority—follows and comprehends; (c) what intellect is, in which all things are, or rather, which is itself the sum total of all things; (d) and what, beyond all things, is the source of all things. To this knowledge, few are able to arrive in this life; even after this life, no one can exceed it.

As to those who are content to follow authority alone and who apply themselves constantly to right living and holy desires, while they make no account of the liberal and fine arts, or are incapable of being instructed in them—I know not how I could call them happy as long as they live among men. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that, upon leaving the body, they will be liberated with greater facility or difficulty according as they have lived the more virtuously or otherwise.

* *On Order*, II, 9.26-27; trans. FOC 1 (1948) 303-305.

27. Authority is, indeed, partly divine and partly human, but the true, solid and sovereign authority is that which is called divine. In this matter there is to be feared the wonderful deception of invisible beings that, by certain divinations and numerous powers of things pertaining to the senses, are accustomed to deceive with the utmost ease those souls that are engrossed with perishable possessions, or eagerly desirous of transitory power, or overawed by meaningless prodigies.

We must, therefore, accept as divine that Authority which not only exceeds human power in its outward manifestations, but also, in the very act of leading a man onward, shows him to what extent It has debased Itself for his sake, and bids him not to be confined to the senses, to which indeed those things seem wondrous, but to soar upward to the intellect. At the same time It shows him what great things It is able to do, and why It does them, and how little importance It attaches to them. For, it is fitting that by deeds It show Its power; by humility, Its clemency; by commandment, Its nature. And all this is being delivered to us so distinctly and steadily by the sacred rites into which we are now being initiated: therein the life of good men is most easily purified, not indeed by the circumlocution of disputation, but by the authority of the mysteries.

But human authority is very often deceiving. Yet it rightly seems to show itself at its best in those men who propose various proofs for their teachings, insofar as the mind of the unlearned can grasp them, and who do not live otherwise than how they prescribe that one ought to live. If certain goods of fortune accrue to these men, they reveal themselves great men in the use of those things, but still greater in their contempt of them; and then it is most difficult to lay blame on anyone who puts trust in those men when they enunciate principles of right living.

REASON AND AUTHORITY IN MANICHEISM*

If, Honoratus, a heretic, and a man trusting heretics seemed to me one and the same, I should judge it my duty to remain silent both in tongue and pen in this matter. But now, whereas there is a very great difference

* *The Value of Believing*, 1-4; trans. Dods.

renuntiarunt; nihil ad eos, quid sibi animus dormientis insanientisque confingat.¹

26. Restat ut quaeratur, utrum cum ipsi renuntiant, verum renuntient. Age, si dicat Epicureus quispiam, nihil habeo quod de sensibus conquerar: injustum est enim ab eis exigere plusquam possunt; quidquid autem possunt videre oculi, verum vident. Ergone verum est quod de remo in aqua vident? Prorsus verum. Nam causa accedente quare ita videretur, si demersus unda remus rectus appareret, magis oculos meos falsae renuntiationis arguerem. Non enim viderent quod talibus existentibus causis videndum fuit. Quid multis opus est? Hoc de turrium motu, hoc de pinnulis avium, hoc de caeteris innumerabilibus dici potest. Ego tamen fallor, si assentiar, ait quispiam. Noli plus assentiri, quam ut ita tibi apparere persuadeas; et nulla deceptio est. Non enim video, quomodo refellat Academicus eum qui dicit: Hoc mihi candidum videri scio; hoc auditum meum delectari scio; hoc mihi jucunde olere scio; hoc mihi sapere dulciter scio; hoc mihi esse frigidum scio. Dic potius, utrum per se amarae sint oleastri frondes, quas caper tam pertinaciter appetit. O hominem improbum! nonne est caper ipse modestior? Nescio quales pecori sint, mihi tamen amarae sunt: quid quaeris amplius? Sed est fortasse aliquis etiam hominum, cui non sint amarae. Tendisne in molestiam? Numquidnam ego amaras esse

¹ Editio Par. qui sibi animum . . . confingant.

senses correctly intimate things to the vigilant and the sane, it is no affair of theirs what the mind of a sleeping or an insane person may fancy for itself.⁴

26. Inquiry is still to be made as to whether the senses report the truth whenever they report anything. Well, suppose that some Epicurean would say: "I have no complaint to make about the senses; for it would be unfair to demand of them anything beyond their power. And whatever the eyes can see, they see that which is true." Therefore, as to what they see with regard to an oar in the water—is that true?⁵ It is absolutely true. In fact, since there is a special reason for the oar's appearing that way, I should rather accuse my eyes of deception if it appeared to be straight when it is dipped in the water; for, in that case, they would not be seeing what ought to be seen. But what is the need of many examples? The same can be said about the motion of towers, the wings of birds, and countless other things. "Nevertheless," says some one or other, "I am deceived if I give assent." Restrict your assent to the mere fact of your being convinced that it appears thus to you. Then there is no deception; for I do not see how even an Academic can refute a man who says: "I know that this appears white to me. I know that I am delighted by what I am hearing. I know that this smells pleasant to me. I know that this tastes sweet to me. I know that this feels cold to me."⁶ Tell me, rather, whether the oleaster leaves—for which a goat has a persistent appetite—are bitter *per se*. O, shameless man! Is not the goat more moderate? I know not how the oleaster leaves may be for flocks and herds; but as to myself, they are bitter. What more do you wish to know? And perhaps there is even some man for whom they are not bitter. Are you contending

⁴ Cf. *id.*, *ibid.*, II, xxvii, 88; vii, 19-22.

⁵ Cf. *id.*, *ibid.*, II, cc. vii, xxv.

⁶ Cf. *id.*, *ibid.*, II, xxiv, 76.

est, ubi et ipsi habent quod dicant. Quid enim faciam, quem de castris meis foras truditis, num implorabo auxilia doctiorum, cum quibus si superare nequeo, minus pudebit fortasse superari? Jaciam igitur quibus viribus possum fumosum quidem jam et scabrum, sed nisi fallor, validissimum telum. Qui nihil approbat, nihil agit. O hominem rusticum! Et ubi est probabile? ubi est verisimile? Hoc volebatis. Auditisne ut sonent scuta graecanica? Exceptum est quod robustissimum quidem:¹ sed qua manu jaculati sumus? Et nihil mihi potentius isti mei suggerunt; nec aliquid, ut video, vulneris fecimus. Convertam me ad ea quae villa et ager ministrat: onerant me potius majora quam praeparant.

34. Nam cum otiosus diu cogitassem in isto rure, quoniam modo possit istuc probabile ac veri simile actus nostros ab errore defendere; primo visum est mihi, ut solet videri cum ista vendebam, belle tectum et munitum. Deinde ubi totum cautius circumspexi, visus sum mihi vidisse unum aditum, qua in securos error irrueret. Non enim solum puto eum errare, qui falsam viam sequitur; sed etiam eum qui veram non sequitur. Faciamus enim duos viatores ad unum locum tendentes, quorum alter instituerit nulli credere, alter nimis credulus sit. Ventum est ad aliquod bivium: hic ille credulus pastori qui aderat, vel cuipiam rusticano: Salve, frugi homo; dic quaesio, qua

¹ Ed. Par. *quod robustissimum quidem est.*

have to mention the source of the Academics' arguments, even though it be an ancient source. But since you are pushing me forth from my own camp, what shall I do? Shall I implore the aid of more learned men, so that—if I am unable to gain the victory—it will be less shameful to be overcome together with them? So, I shall hurl a spear with all my might, a jagged and a blackened spear, to be sure, but—if I am not mistaken—a very effective one, namely: "Whoever accepts nothing as true, can perform no act." O, loutish fellow! And where is the probable? Where is the truth-like? That is what you were expecting. Do you hear how those Grecian shields resound? We have taken up something very weighty indeed. But with what force have we hurled it? Insofar as I can see, we have inflicted no wound, although these helpers of mine furnish me with nothing more effective. So, I shall turn my attention to whatever aid the villa and the farm may afford, because those rather weighty weapons are more burdensome than helpful.

34. I have long and leisurely pondered how the probable and the truth-like could defend our acts from error within the confines of this villa. At first it seemed to me to be neatly protected and fortified, just as it used to seem when I myself was vending those arguments.² But when I had inspected it more carefully, I came to believe that I had discovered an entry where error might rush upon the unwary; for I believe that a man is in error, not only when he is following the wrong path, but also when he is not following the right one. Accordingly, let us suppose that two travelers are journeying to the same place; that one of them is very credulous, and that the other has resolved to believe nobody. When they arrive at a crossroad, the credulous man says to a shepherd or a rustic of some kind,

¹ Cf. *id.*, *ibid.*, II, xxxiii, 108; xlvii, 146.

² Cf. *Conf.* IX, ii, 2, 4.

bene in illum locum pergatur. Respondetur: Si hac ibis, nihil errabis. Et ille ad comitem: Verum dicit, hac eamus. Ridet vir cautissimus, et tam cito assensum facitissime illudit, atque interea illo discedente in bivio figitur: et jam incipit videri turpe cessare, cum ecce ex alio viae cornu lautus quidam et urbanus equo insidens eminet, et propinquare occipit: gratulatur iste. Tum advenienti, et salutato indicat propositum, quaerit viam; dicit etiam remansionis suae causam, quo benevolentiores reddat, pastori eum praeferens. Ille autem casu planus erat de iis quos Samardacos² jam vulgus vocat. Tenuit suum morem homo pessimus etiam gratis. Hac perge, ait: nam ego inde venio. Decepit, atque abiit. Sed quando iste deciperetur? Non enim monstrationem istam tanquam veram, inquit, approbo; sed quia est veri similis. Et hic otiosum esse nec honestum nec utile est; hac eam. Interea ille qui assentiendo erravit, tam cito existimans vera esse verba pastoris, in loco illo quo tendebant, jam se reficiebat: iste autem non errans, siquidem probabile sequitur, circumit silvas nescio quas, nec jam cui locus ille notus sit, ad quem venire proposuerat, invenit. Vere vobis dicam, cum ista cogitarem, risum tenere non potui, fieri per Academicorum verba

² Ita scribitur in editione Bad. et in pluribus mss. In antiquis etiam editionibus Chrysostomi, Homilia 17, in Epist. ad Ephes. legitur *Samardakous*. Nec multum aliter apud Am. et tres mss. qui habent, *Samardacos*. At Er. et Lov. *Sarmadacos*; uti etiam scribit vetus commentator Horatii, ad illud lib. I, Satir. 6, "*Sarmadacos et sortilegos mathematicos* . . ."

who happens to be there: "Hey, my good man, which is the right road to that place?" He receives this answer: "If you travel by this road, you will not go astray." Then he says to his companion: "This man is telling the truth: let us go this way." The latter smiles, and very facetiously ridicules him for having assented so readily. Then, while the one proceeds on his journey, the other stands still at the crossroad until his prolonged delay begins to occasion him embarrassment. Now, behold! from another branch of the highway a neatly dressed and urbane man on horseback comes into view; and our man rejoices because this stranger is approaching. He greets the new arrival, informs him of his purpose, and makes inquiry about the road. Esteeming this man more highly than the shepherd, and wishing to win his favor, he tells him the reason of his delay. But the horseman happened to be one of those who are commonly called *Samardacs*,³ and the rascal spontaneously followed his usual practice: "Go this way," he said, "for I am now coming from that place." He deceived his inquirer, and went away. But how could that inquirer be deceived? "I do not," he says, "accept that information as something true: I accept it as truth-like. And since it is neither fitting nor profitable to be here idle, I shall take that road." Meanwhile the other traveler has been already refreshed at the place for which they had set out, although he had erred by giving assent when he so readily believed that the words of the shepherd were true. But this one is now wandering around a forest of some kind, although he has avoided error by following the probable. In fact, he has not yet found anyone who even knows the place to which he had purposed to go. Let me tell you truly that when I was pondering those arguments of theirs, I could not refrain

³ *Samardac* is a word of unknown origin. It was of common usage in Africa, and was incorporated into Greek and Latin. Saint John Chrysostom uses it at least once, and immediately gives its Greek equivalent. (Hom. 17, in Epist. ad Ephes.). It means a juggler.

nescio quomodo, ut erret ille qui veram viam vel casu tenet; ille autem qui per avios montes probabiliter ductus est, nec petitam regionem invenit, non videatur errare. Ut enim temerariam consensionem jure condemnem, facilius ambo errant, quam iste non errat. Hinc jam adversum ista verba vigilantior, ipsa facta hominum et mores considerare coepi. Tum vero tam multa mihi et tam capitalia in istos venerunt in mentem, ut jam non riderem, sed partim stomacharer, partim dolerem homines doctissimos et acutissimos in tanta scelera sententiarum et flagitia devolutos.

XVI

35. Certe enim, non fortasse omnis qui errat, peccat; omnis tamen qui peccat, aut errare conceditur, aut aliquid pejus. Quid si ergo aliquis adolescentium cum hos audierit dicentes: Turpe est errare, et ideo nulli rei consentire debemus; sed tamen cum agit quisque quod ei videtur probabile, nec peccat,¹ nec errat: illud tantum meminerit, quidquid occurrit vel animo vel sensibus, non pro vero esse approbandum. Id igitur audiens adolescens, insidiabitur pudicitiae uxoris alienae. Te, te consulo, M. Tulli; de adolescentium moribus vitaeque tractamus, cui educandae atque instituendae omnes illae litterae tuae vigilaverunt. Quid

¹ Bad. et mss. undecim, *quod ei videtur probabile, nec cessat, nec errat.*

from laughter. According to the Academics' own words it happens somehow or other that a man is in error when he follows the right path by mere chance; but that a man who was led by probability, seems to be free from error, even though he was led through trackless mountains and never found the place he was seeking. To censure the practice of assenting rashly, it is more fitting to say that both those men were in error than to say that the latter avoided it. Consequently, I became more wary with regard to the assertions of the Academics, and I began to reflect on the actions and customs of men. Then I discovered so many capital arguments against the Academics, that I was no longer laughing at them: I was loathing them and bewailing the fact that such learned and ingenious men had fallen headlong into such abominable and shameful opinions.⁴

⁴ See note 10, page 256.

CHAPTER XVI

35. Although perchance not every one who falls into error, commits a sin; yet it is conceded that every one who sins, falls into error or something worse. Therefore, when some young man hears those men saying: "To err is shameful; and therefore we ought not to give assent to anything. But when one follows what seems probable¹ to him, he commits neither a sin nor an error. Let each one remember this only: that we are not to accept the truth of anything that presents itself to the mind or to the senses"—when the young man hears this, suppose he plots against the chastity of another's wife? Now, I am consulting you—you, Marcus Tullius. We are dealing with the life and morals of young men: and all those writings of yours have been diligently directed towards the in-

impart through historical data and through prophetic faith in temporal matters, whether they be past or future, is based more on belief than on knowledge. But we consider what men and what books we should ensure the proper worship of God, our only salvation. In this matter our first consideration is that we should believe those who call us to the worship of God, or those who call us to worship one God. Who is it that he should certainly believe those who call us to worship one God, since even the worshipers of many gods upon one Supreme God and Ruler of all things. Only, enumeration begins with the number one. Then, we should believe those who hold that there is one God, that He is supreme, the only, the true God, and that He alone is worthy of adoration. Only if the truth is shown forth among these must we look elsewhere. Nature itself the wider influence lies with the one God, all things to unity, and just as among men in a large group has any strength without mutual consent, unity of belief; so in religion we should yield completely and with deeper trust to the influence of God call us to the worship of one God.

Our second consideration has to do with the dissension among men about the worship of the one God. We are told that our forefathers, showing that deity by which one mounts from the temporal to the eternal, were led along by visible miracles (of course, cannot be otherwise). Through their experience we were made unnecessary for the following generations. For the Catholic Church has scattered its foundations throughout the whole world. Therefore, firstly, those are not permitted to continue into our own day, that our souls should be constantly in search of things, and that mankind would grow cold through its contact with the very things whose novelty warmed it. We should no longer doubt that we are to believe in God, who, in spite of the fact that they were preaching and were followed by a minority, could nevertheless persuade others to follow them. For at present the question is not what we should believe; later it will be proper to start talking about the divine and the invisible. Of course, the faculty of a purer soul, one that has attained to the divine, is in no way subordinate to human authority; the stage is reached only with the absence of all pride.

If this were not the case there would be no heretics, no schismatics, no circumcised in the flesh, no creature- and icon-worshippers. And if these did not exist before the promised perfecting of men, there would be much less effort expended in seeking the truth.

Skepticism

IF I AM DECEIVED, I EXIST*

For we both are, and know that we are, and take delight in our being and knowing. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside us—colors, e.g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft objects by touching—of all which sensible objects it is the images resembling them, but not themselves, that we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the objects. However, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, that I know, and that I delight in this. On none of these points do I fear the arguments of the skeptics of the Academy who say: what if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am. For he who does not exist cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am, if I am deceived. Since therefore I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. Consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two [being and knowing], I add to them a third, that is, my love, which is of equal importance. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? Since these facts are true and real, who doubts that, when these things are loved, the love of them is itself true and real?

* *City of God*, XI, 26; trans. Dods, revised by V.J.E.

to it. For none the more does this fleshly eye, which sees black things from white without a teacher, and already known them before it was created. Why, lastly, is it possible only in intelligible things that anyone properly questioned should answer according to any branch of learning, although ignorant of it? Can one do this with things sensible, except those which are seen in this his present body, or has believed in the opinion of others who knew them, whether by words or by things? For we must not acquiesce in what others assert that the Samian Pythagoras recollected of this kind, which he had experienced when he was previously here in another body; and others tell yet that they experienced something of the same sort of things: but it may be conjectured that these were false collections, such as we commonly experience in our dreams. We fancy we remember, as though we had done what we never did or saw at all; and that the same persons, even though awake, were affected by the suggestion of malignant and deceitful suggestions. We care it is to confirm or to sow some false opinion concerning the changes of souls, in order to deceive. I say, may be conjectured from this, that if they remembered those things which they had seen here while occupying other bodies, the same thing would happen to many, nay to almost all; since they suppose that, and from the living, so, without cessation and continually the living are coming into existence from the dead, leapers from those that are awake, and those that are asleep from them that sleep.

Therefore this is the right distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things belongs to wisdom, but the rational cognizance of temporal things to knowledge. It is not difficult to see which is to be preferred or postponed to which. We must employ some other distinction by which we may separate these two apart, which without doubt the apostle Paul is aware of, saying, "To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge, the same Spirit"; still the difference between those which we have laid down is a most evident one. In the intellectual cognizance of eternal things is one thing, in the rational cognizance of temporal things another, and no doubt but that the former is to be preferred to the latter.

Skepticism

ERROR AND IGNORANCE*

For although we ought with the greatest possible care to avoid error, not only in great but even in little things, and although we cannot err except through ignorance, it does not follow that, if a man is ignorant of a thing, he must forthwith fall into error. That is rather the fate of the man who thinks he knows what he does not know. For he accepts what is false as if it were true, and that is the essence of error. But it is a point of very great importance what the subject is in regard to which a man makes a mistake. For on one and the same subject we rightly prefer an instructed man to an ignorant one, and a man who is not in error to one who is. In the case of different subjects, however—that is, when one man knows one thing, and another a different thing, and when what the former knows is useful, and what the latter knows is not so useful, or is actually hurtful—who would not, in regard to the things the latter knows, prefer the ignorance of the former to the knowledge of the latter? For there are points on which ignorance is better than knowledge. And in the same way, it has sometimes been an advantage to depart from the right way—in traveling, however, not in morals. It has happened to myself to take the wrong road where two ways met, so that I did not pass by the place where an armed band of Donatists lay in wait for me. Yet I arrived at the place whither I was bent, though by a roundabout route; and when I heard of the ambush, I congratulated myself on my mistake, and gave thanks to God for it. Now, who would not rather be the traveler who made a mistake like this, than the highwayman who made no mistake? And hence, perhaps, it is that the prince of poets puts these words into the mouth of a lover in misery: [Virgil, *Eclog.* 8.41] "How I am undone, how I have been carried away by an evil error!" for there is an error which is good, as it not merely does no harm, but produces some actual advantage. But when we look more closely into the nature of truth, and consider that to err is just to take the false for the true, and the true for the false, or to hold what is certain as uncertain, and what is uncertain as certain, and that error in the soul is hideous and repulsive just in proportion as it appears fair and plausible

* *Enchiridion*, 17; trans. Dods.

when we utter it, or assent to it, saying, "Yea, yea; Nay, nay"—surely this life that we live is wretched indeed, if only on this account, that sometimes, in order to preserve it, it is necessary to fall into error. God forbid that such should be that other life, where truth itself is the life of the soul, where no one deceives, and no one is deceived. But here men deceive and are deceived, and they are more to be pitied when they lead others astray than when they are themselves led astray by putting trust in liars. Yet so much does a rational soul shrink from what is false, and so earnestly does it struggle against error, that even those who love to deceive are most unwilling to be deceived. For the liar does not think that he errs, but that he leads another who trusts him into error. And certainly he does not err in regard to the matter about which he lies, if he himself knows the truth; but he is deceived in this, that he thinks his lie does him no harm, whereas every sin is more hurtful to the sinner than to the sinned against.

III. THREE LEVELS OF REALITY

While Augustine has no metaphysics in the sense of a discipline that transcends the concrete physics, he does offer a general view of reality distinctive and important. All natures are placed on God is at the top; the human soul stands in the middle; bodies are on the lowest level. God is wholly immortal, can suffer no change, either in time or place. Creatures, on the contrary, are completely mutable: they grow and are buffeted about in place. Souls are immortal but immutable in place. It might be noted that created and finite spirits, belong on the same level as that is one reason why Augustine makes angels deal with men, in the two "Cities" which we shall discuss in Chapter IX. There are only these three kinds of reality: divine, psychic and corporeal.

As an intermediary nature between the divine and the corporeal, the human soul is initially in a position of instability, or tension, between what lies below and what lies above. We have noted in Chapter II how man's mental state can turn upward or downward. Such "turning" is a key source of the idea of religious conversion. If man turns his attention up to God, this is *conversio*; if he turns away from God, it does not matter how far, this is *aversio* or *perversio*. It is not morally evil, but simply that Augustine thinks one cannot look both ways at once and with equal interest in God or against Him. Those who are concerned with temporal, earthly matters are most important to Augustine in a position of secondary value. There will be but two kinds of men: those who love God and those who love something else. This is the theme of Chapters IX and X. For the purpose of this study, to situate it in terms of the threefold hierarchy of reality, God, on the highest level, dwells in eternity.

City of God (*De civitate Dei*), and the *Enchiridion*. Of special interest are his two books of *Retractations* (*Retractationes*), which contain Augustine's critical review of his writings and which are important for fixing the chronology of his works. To this impressive list must be added his numerous shorter works, his biblical commentaries, his sermons, and his letters.

The following selections aim at presenting a cross section of Augustine's philosophic views. The first, from *On the Teacher*, contains his account of signification and one of the statements of his doctrine of illumination. The second selection, which is from *On Free Will*, deals with his theory of knowledge and his early doctrine of the will. Of special interest in it are his proof of the existence of God from truth and his account of the relation of divine foreknowledge to the freedom of the human will. This selection is neatly balanced by one from the *Retractations* in which he defends himself against the charge of the Pelagians that the views that he expressed in *On Free Will* put him on their side. The next selection, from *On the Trinity*, contains a brief statement of Augustine's doctrine of the soul. The section which follows, from the *Confessions*, contains a brief account of creation and after that his famous discussion concerning the nature of time. Finally, selections from the *City of God* contain some of the major aspects of his ethical and political doctrines. Marcus Varro (116-27 B.C.), who is mentioned in these selections, composed a now no longer extant *On Philosophy* which Augustine used.

THE TEACHER

A Dialogue Between Augustine and His Son Adeodatus

i, 1. *Augustine*.—What do you suppose is our purpose when we use words? *Adeodatus*.—The answer that occurs to me at the moment is, we want to let people know something, or we want to learn something. *Augustine*.—I agree at once with the former, for it is clear that when we use words we want to let somebody know something. But in what way do we show that we wish to learn? *Adeodatus*.—When we ask questions, of course. *Aug*.—Even then, as I understand it, we want to let somebody know something. Do you ask a question for any other reason than to show the person questioned what you want to know? *Ad*.—No. *Aug*.—You see, then, that when we use words we desire nothing but to let someone know something. *Ad*.—Not quite, perhaps. If speaking means using words, I see that we do so when we sing. Now we often sing when we are alone, with no one present to

AUGUSTINE

hear us; and then I cannot think why I think there is a kind of teaching, reminding people of something. I am satisfied. Proceeds. If, however, you do not think that he who reminds us of something is teaching, then I must assert that there are two reasons for our using words: either to let others or, it may be, ourselves. And

Ad.—Well, hardly. For I very rarely use words always simply to give myself pleasure. I notice that what pleases you in singing is the words or not added, so that singing and harps make melody. Birds sing words. All these things may be called words. *Ad*.—No. Not at all.

2. *Aug*.—You agree, then, that I am either to teach or to call something to mind, pressed by the fact that we use words to let others know that we teach God anything or remember that we have been commanded. Our inmost mind, for no other reason, is minded or taught by our speech in which who speaks gives by articulate sound what is to be sought and prayed to in the "inner man." This he wants to know. "Know ye not that ye are the temple of the living God?" (1 Cor. 3:16) and "that Christ in you be glorified." Have you not observed in the prophets that they are stricken on your beds. Offer the temple of the mind and on the bed there is prayer to be made. Where that is of articulate words, except in the mind, what is in their minds, not that God put in remembrance, may with some reason be said. What do you think? *Ad*.—I enter into the fact that our great Master, in using words, so that it looks as if he were praying, so that it does not seem merely, but by words, by means of remembrance, he taught them whom, when they prayed in the temple, he understood the point. And it might be contended that, though in thinking and therefore use speech, but a calling to remembrance of the memory, which retains the realities to come to mind. *Ad*.—

ii, 3. *Aug*.—We agree, then,

Medieval Christian Philosophy

iridion. Of special interest are his which contain Augustine's criticism for fixing the chronology. He added his numerous shorter ones, and his letters.

ing a cross section of Augustine's *Teacher*, contains his account of his doctrine of illumination. The *Will*, deals with his theory of will. Of special interest in it are truth and his account of the re-freedom of the human will. This *Retractions* in which he defends that the views that he expressed. The next selection, from *On* of Augustine's doctrine of the soul, *Confessions*, contains a brief account of vision concerning the nature of time. contain some of the major aspects of Varro (116-27 B.C.), who is mentioned no longer extant *On Philosophy*

ACHER

Augustine and His Son Adeodatus

ose is our purpose when we use words? ne at the moment is, we want to let people something. *Augustine*.—I agree at once with use words we want to let somebody know now that we wish to learn? *Adeodatus*.—Even then, as I understand it, we want you ask a question for any other reason than u want to know? *Ad*.—No. *Aug*.—You see, ire nothing but to let someone know some-aking means using words, I see that we do when we are alone, with no one present to

(I. S. Burleigh, Vol. VI, LCC. Published 1953, The don: SCM Press, Ltd.

hear us; and then I cannot think we want to tell anyone anything. *Aug*.—And yet I think there is a kind of teaching, and a most important kind, which consists in reminding people of something. I believe this will be made clear as our conversation proceeds. If, however, you do not think that we learn by remembering, or that he who reminds us of something really teaches us, I do not press the point. I assert that there are two reasons for our using words, either to teach, or to remind others or, it may be, ourselves. And we do this also when we sing. Don't you agree?

Ad.—Well, hardly. For I very rarely sing to remind myself of anything, almost always simply to give myself pleasure. *Aug*.—I see what you mean. But don't you notice that what pleases you in singing is the melody? Now this can be added to the words or not added, so that singing is not the same thing as speaking. Flutes and harps make melody. Birds sing. Sometimes we hum a bit of music without words. All these things may be called singing but not speaking. Do you disagree?

Ad.—No. Not at all.

2. *Aug*.—You agree, then, that there is no other reason for the use of words than either to teach or to call something to mind? *Ad*.—I would agree were I not impressed by the fact that we use words when we pray; and it is not proper to believe that we teach God anything or remind him of anything. *Aug*.—I dare say you do not know that we have been commanded to pray in closed chambers, by which is meant our inmost mind, for no other reason than that God does not seek to be reminded or taught by our speech in order that he may give us what we desire. He who speaks gives by articulate sounds an external sign of what he wants. But God is to be sought and prayed to in the secret place of the rational soul, which is called "the inner man." This he wants to be his temple. Have you not read in the Apostle: "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" (1 Cor. 3:16) and "that Christ may dwell in the inner man" (Eph. 3:17)? Have you not observed in the Prophet: "Commune with your own hearts and be stricken on your beds. Offer the sacrifice of righteousness and hope in the Lord" (Ps. 4:4-5)? Where do you think the sacrifice of righteousness is offered save in the temple of the mind and on the bed of the heart? Where sacrifice is to be offered, there is prayer to be made. Wherefore when we pray there is no need of speech, that is of articulate words, except perhaps as priests use words to give a sign of what is in their minds, not that God may hear, but that men may hear and, being put in remembrance, may with some consent be brought into dependence on God. What do you think? *Ad*.—I entirely agree. *Aug*.—And you are not disturbed by the fact that our great Master, in teaching his disciples to pray, taught them certain words, so that it looks as if he had taught them actually what words to use in prayer? *Ad*.—No. That does not disturb me. For he did not teach them words merely, but by words, by means of which they could keep themselves in constant remembrance, he taught them realities—what they should pray for, and from whom, when they prayed in their inmost mind, as we said. *Aug*.—You have correctly understood the point. And I believe you have also noticed a further point. It might be contended that, though we utter no sound, we nevertheless use words in thinking and therefore use speech within our minds. But such speech is nothing but a calling to remembrance of the realities of which the words are but the signs, for the memory, which retains the words and turns them over and over, causes the realities to come to mind. *Ad*.—I understand and follow.

ii, 3. *Aug*.—We agree, then, that words are signs. *Ad*.—We do. *Aug*.—That

alone can be a sign which signifies something? *Ad.*—Certainly. *Aug.*—How many words are there in this verse?

Si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui
[If it pleases the gods that nothing be left of so great a city]

Ad.—Eight. *Aug.*—Then there are eight signs? *Ad.*—There are. *Aug.*—I suppose you understand the meaning of the verse. *Ad.*—Yes, I think so. *Aug.*—Tell me what each word signifies. *Ad.*—I know what *si* signifies, but I can think of no other word to explain it. *Aug.*—At least you can explain the state of mind signified by that word. *Ad.*—It seems to me to signify doubt, and doubt is found in the mind. *Aug.*—I accept that in the meantime. Go on to the next word. *Ad.*—*Nihil* signifies simply what is not. *Aug.*—Perhaps you are right. But I am prevented from giving my assent by what you admitted a moment ago. You agreed that only that can be a sign which signifies something. Now, what is not cannot be something. So the second word in the verse is not a sign, because it does not signify something. We were wrong, therefore, in laying it down that all words are signs, or that all signs must signify something. *Ad.*—You press me sore. But surely it is utterly foolish to use a word if we have no meaning to attach to it. When you are speaking with me I believe that you do not utter any merely empty sound, but that in everything that proceeds from your mouth you are giving me a sign by which I may understand something. So you ought not in speaking to pronounce these two syllables unless by them you mean something. If you see that they are necessary to set forth some idea and to teach and remind us of something when they sound in our ears, you assuredly also see what I wish to say but cannot clearly explain. *Aug.*—What then are we to do? Shall we say that the word, *nihil*, signifies a state of mind rather than a thing which is nothing; the state of a mind, I mean, which does not see an object, and discovers or thinks it has discovered nonentity? *Ad.*—Perhaps that was what I was trying to explain. *Aug.*—However it may be, let us go on to the next point lest something most absurd happen to us. *Ad.*—What do you mean? *Aug.*—If “nothing” should detain us, and yet we should suffer delay. *Ad.*—It is indeed ridiculous, and yet somehow I see it can happen and indeed has happened.

4. *Aug.*—At the proper time we shall understand more clearly this kind of difficulty, if God will. Now go back to the verse and do your best to unfold what the other words signify. *Ad.*—The third word is the preposition *ex* for which I think we can substitute *de*. *Aug.*—But I am not asking you to substitute for one well-known word another equally well-known word which you say means the same thing, if indeed it does mean the same thing. But let that pass meantime. If the poet had written not *ex tanta urbe* but *de tanta urbe*, and I asked what *de* signified, you would say *ex*, since these two words, that is, signs, signify, you think, one and the same thing. But I am looking for the one thing which is signified by these two signs. *Ad.*—I think they mean a separation of a thing A. from a thing B, in which it had formerly existed. A is said to be “of” or “out of” B. And this in one or other of two ways. Either B does not remain, as in this verse. For Troy has been destroyed but some Trojans could still exist. Or B remains, as when we say that business-men of the City of Rome are in Africa. *Aug.*—I shall concede your point, and not seek to enumerate the many exceptions that can be found to your rule. But you can at least observe that you have been explaining words by means of words, that is, signs by means of signs, well-known words and signs by words and

signs also well-known. But I want of which these are the signs.

iii, 5. *Ad.*—I am surprised that to know, that what you ask cannot answer questions except by means of words may be, are certainly not words, and your questions without using words admit your challenge is just. But three syllables, *par-i-es*, are pronounced that I should immediately see the sign? You would be pointing it out if possible, but only in the case of words were at hand. *Aug.*—But surely not rather a quality of a corporeal object, too, be pointed out with the finger among corporeal objects, at least without words? *Ad.*—When I say that I can be understood, that is, all the qualities of perception. *Aug.*—Considering, however, that I can be understood by visible objects. For I admit that signs are visible to the other senses, though they are therefore corporeal, cannot, nevertheless. Have you never seen how men can be understood by means of gesture, and how they can reply, teach and indicate all their visible things are pointed out with other such things. Actors, too, tell their stories by dancing simply and without comment to make except that they point out to you what the preposition

6. *Aug.*—Perhaps you are right. I have no hesitation in saying that I want to show me the thing signified by the thing itself. Therefore, though I would, none the less, explain a sign and his gesture would signify to me without a sign, directly. The way a wall does it. *Ad.*—It can be shown without a pointing finger, but the sign by means of which is nothing which can be shown without what walking is, and you were pointing itself to show me, not was ashamed that I did not notice signs to my mind of things which are such as eating, drinking, sitting. *Aug.*—Well then, tell me this word “walking,” and I were to

means, how would you teach me? *Ad.*—I should walk a little more quickly. The change in speed would give notice that I was replying to your question, and I should still be doing what I was asked to demonstrate. *Aug.*—But you know there is a difference between walking and hastening. He who walks does not suddenly hasten, and he who hastens does not necessarily walk. We speak of hastening in writing, reading and very many other things. Consequently, if, after my query, you did what you had been doing, only a little more quickly, I should conclude that walking was the same thing as hastening, for the acceleration was the new feature of your behaviour. So I should be misled. *Ad.*—I admit that a thing cannot be demonstrated without a sign, at any rate if the thing is an action in which we are engaged when we are questioned. If we add nothing new to what we are doing, our questioner will think that we don't want to show him, but are continuing in what we were doing without paying any attention to him. But if his inquiry is about actions which we can perform, and if we are not doing them when he inquires, by doing it after he has inquired we can demonstrate what he asks by the actual thing and not merely by a sign. A special case would arise if, while I was speaking, someone asked me what "speaking" was. In order to let him know I must speak, whatever I actually may say. And I shall continue to show him until I make plain to him what he wants to know, not departing from the actual thing which he wished to have demonstrated to him, and yet not seeking signs apart from the thing itself wherewith to demonstrate it.

iv, 7. *Aug.*—Most acutely stated. Are we, now, agreed that there are two classes of things that can be demonstrated without signs; those which we are not engaged in doing when we are asked and can immediately start doing, and those in which the action consists in simply giving signs? For when we speak we make signs, whence is derived the verb, *to signify*. *Ad.*—Agreed. *Aug.*—When the question concerns signs merely, signs can be demonstrated by signs. But when the question is about things which are not signs, they can be demonstrated by carrying out the action, if possible, after the question has been asked, or by giving signs by means of which the things can be brought to mind. *Ad.*—That is so. *Aug.*—Here, then, we have a threefold classification. Let us first consider, if you please, the case of signs being demonstrated by signs. Words are not the only signs? *Ad.*—No. *Aug.*—It seems to me that in speaking we use words to signify words or other signs, as when we say "gesture" or "letter"; for these two words also signify signs. Or we may express in words something which is not a sign, as for example when we say the word "stone." The word is a sign for it signifies something, but what it signifies is not a sign. But this kind of case where words signify things that are not signs does not concern our present discussion. For we undertook to consider those cases where signs are demonstrated by signs, and we found that they fall into two classes; those in which we teach or call to remembrance by signs similar signs, and those in which we teach or call to remembrance different signs. Do you agree? *Ad.*—Clearly.

8. *Aug.*—Tell me, to what sense do verbal signs pertain? *Ad.*—To the sense of hearing. *Aug.*—And gesture? *Ad.*—To sight. *Aug.*—What about written words? Surely they are words? Or are they better understood as signs of words? A word is a meaningful articulate sound, and sound is perceived by no other sense than hearing. When a word is written, a sign is given to the eyes whereby something that properly belongs to the ears is brought to mind. *Ad.*—I agree entirely. *Aug.*—You will also agree, I imagine, that when we pronounce the word, *nomen* [name],

we signify something. *Ad.*—True, something or somebody is called; etc., etc. *Aug.*—These four names: Is there a difference between these great difference. *Aug.*—I should like to know. In the first place, the names are things which can be signified by signs; things that can be seen visible? It well. *Aug.*—Can these four signs be other sign? *Ad.*—I am surprised that we found that written words sign. *Aug.*—What is the difference between words are audible. Why should words be "audible"? *Aug.*—I allow it at once again whether these four signs can be as well as by the visible signs you have said recently in our discussion. I recognize these four examples. I recognize all audible when spoken. *Aug.*—Sign and other audible signs signify between the word "name" and the audible signs; they are the audible like Romulus, Rome, River, part.

9. *Aug.*—I understand and am pronounced with some meaning; therefore, is a word when it is pronounced by a fluent man that he uses. When the slave in Terence said, "I used many names." *Ad.*—I agree. *verbum*, we also signify a name. I agree. *Aug.*—Here is another question: that "word" is a sign pointing to and "river" is the sign of a thing; difference between this "thing" and "name," which is the sign between the sign of a name, that is, sign? *Ad.*—I understand the difference is also signified by "word." A thing that has a verbal sign does the verse you quoted, and *ex*, words but they are not names. They are words, but all words are names. I think, clear, that is, signs, and the sign of a sign to an animal, but every animal is not the same difference between "name" perhaps you are prevented from in a special sense to signify that I read, I have read. Clearly these

should walk a little more quickly. The was replying to your question, and I demonstrate. *Aug.*—But you know there is no one who walks does not suddenly cease to walk. We speak of hastening in signs. Consequently, if, after my query, a little more quickly, I should conclude nothing, for the acceleration was the new sign. *Ad.*—I admit that a thing cannot be if the thing is an action in which we add nothing new to what we are doing, want to show him, but are continuing in attention to him. But if his inquiry is if we are not doing them when he inquires can demonstrate what he asks by the special case would arise if, while I was signing was. In order to let him know I and I shall continue to show him until now, not departing from the actual thing in, and yet not seeking signs apart from it.

Now, agreed that there are two classes of signs; those which we are not engaged in immediately start doing, and those in which we are not. For when we speak we make signs. *Ad.*—Agreed. *Aug.*—When the question is demonstrated by signs. But when the question is, they can be demonstrated by carrying out what has been asked, or by giving signs by which we can have in mind. *Ad.*—That is so. *Aug.*—Here, let us first consider, if you please, the case of words. Are not the only signs? *Ad.*—No. We use words to signify words or other things; for these two words also signify signs. A sign is not a sign, as for example when we use a word for it signifies something, but what we use where words signify things that are in question. For we undertook to consider signs, and we found that they fall into two classes: signs of remembrance by signs similar signs, and signs of remembrance different signs. Do you agree?

What signs pertain? *Ad.*—To the sense of the sign. *Aug.*—What about written words? Are they understood as signs of words? A word is perceived by no other sense than by being given to the eyes whereby something is put in mind. *Ad.*—I agree entirely. *Aug.*—We pronounce the word, *nomen* [name],

we signify something. *Ad.*—True. *Aug.*—What, then? *Ad.*—That by which something or somebody is called; for example, Romulus, Rome, Virtue, a River, etc., etc. *Aug.*—These four names signify something. *Ad.*—Indeed they do. *Aug.*—Is there a difference between these names and the things they signify? *Ad.*—A great difference. *Aug.*—I should like you to tell me what is the difference. *Ad.*—In the first place, the names are signs; the things are not. *Aug.*—Shall we call things which can be signified by signs but are not signs "significables," as we call things that can be seen visible? It will simplify our discussion of them. *Ad.*—Very well. *Aug.*—Can these four signs you have just mentioned be signified by no other sign? *Ad.*—I am surprised that you should think I have already forgotten that we found that written words are signs of spoken words, signs, therefore, of signs. *Aug.*—What is the difference? *Ad.*—Written words are visible. Spoken words are audible. Why should we not use the word, audible, if we allow "significable"? *Aug.*—I allow it at once, and am grateful for your suggestion. But I ask again whether these four signs cannot be signified by any other audible sign as well as by the visible signs you have called to mind. *Ad.*—I recall that this too was said recently in our discussion. I said that a name signified some thing and I gave these four examples. I recognize that the word "name" and these four names are all audible when spoken. *Aug.*—What, then, is the difference between an audible sign and other audible signs signified by it? *Ad.*—So far as I can see the difference between the word "name" and the four examples is this; it is the audible sign of audible signs; they are the audible signs not of signs but of things, partly visible, like Romulus, Rome, River, partly intelligible, like Virtue.

9. *Aug.*—I understand and approve. But you know that every articulate sound pronounced with some meaning is called a word. *Ad.*—I do. *Aug.*—A name, therefore, is a word when it is pronounced articulately with a meaning. When we say of a fluent man that he uses good words, we mean also that he uses names. When the slave in Terence said to his aged master, "Good words, I pray you," he used many names. *Ad.*—I agree. *Aug.*—So when we pronounce these two syllables, *ver-bum*, we also signify a name, and the one word is the sign of the other. *Ad.*—I agree. *Aug.*—Here is another question I should like you to answer. You have said that "word" is a sign pointing to "name," and "name" is a sign pointing to "river," and "river" is the sign of a thing which can be seen. Also you have explained the difference between this "thing" and "river," which is its sign, and between "river" and "name," which is the sign of a sign. What do you think is the difference between the sign of a name, that is a word, and the name itself of which it is the sign? *Ad.*—I understand the difference to be this. What is signified by "name" is also signified by "word." A name is a word, and "river" is a word. But everything that has a verbal sign does not have a nominal sign. For *si* at the beginning of the verse you quoted, and *ex*, where this long course of reasoning started, are words but they are not names. And there are many other such words. All names are words, but all words are not names. So the difference between a word and a name is, I think, clear, that is, between the sign of a sign which signifies no other signs, and the sign of a sign that points to other signs. *Aug.*—Every horse is an animal, but every animal is not a horse? *Ad.*—Indubitably. *Aug.*—There is the same difference between "name" and "word" as between horse and animal. Unless perhaps you are prevented from assenting by the fact that we use the word "verb" in a special sense to signify those things which have tenses—I write, I wrote; I read, I have read. Clearly these are not names. *Ad.*—You have mentioned exactly

stand that things signified are of greater
exists on account of something else must
account of which it exists. Do you agree?
agree to that statement. The word *caenum*
able to the thing it signifies. What offends
do with the sound of the word. Change
heard), but what a difference there is
words! I should not, therefore, attribute
ing signified. We prefer to hear the word
ing with our other senses. Accordingly
ug.—You are most observant. It is false,
be preferred to their signs. *Ad.*—So it
think people wanted to achieve when they
and revolting. Do you approve of what
approve or to disapprove, nor do I know
you can know what you intend to do
ainly. I want to give a sign to the man
which I may let him know what I think
, then, conveyed by this word from you
able than the word itself? *Ad.*—I agree
is more important than the sign itself.
ified is better than its sign.
that things universally are to be preferred
whatever exists on account of something

28. *Aug.*—I see you have a wonderful memory for retaining your admissions and an excellent way of expounding your views. But take the word “vice” (*vitium*). When we pronounce the word *vi-ti-um* you know that it is better than the thing it signifies. And yet mere knowledge of the word is much inferior to knowledge of the vices. Let us consider your four terms: the name, the thing, knowledge of the name, knowledge of the thing. We rightly prefer the first to the second. When Persius used the name in his poem—“This man is stupefied by vice”—he committed no fault of versification, indeed he added an ornament. And yet the thing signified by the word makes the man in whom it is found necessarily vicious. But there is not the same relation between your third and fourth terms. The fourth is obviously better than the third. Knowledge of the word vice is inferior to knowledge of the vices. *Ad.*—Do you think that knowledge is preferable even when it makes us more miserable? For above all the penalties thought of by the cruelty

of tyrants or calculated by their greed, Persius sets this one penalty which tortures men who are compelled to acknowledge vices which they cannot avoid. *Aug.*—In the same way you could deny that knowledge of the virtues is preferable to knowledge of the word "virtue," for to see and not to possess virtue was the punishment which the satirist wished tyrants to suffer. *Ad.*—May God avert such madness! Now I understand that the knowledge imparted to the mind by a good education is not to be blamed, but those are to be judged most miserable of all who are affected by a disease which no medicine can cure. This, I think, was Persius' view too. *Aug.*—Quite right. But it does not matter to us what Persius thought. In such matters we are not subject to the authority of such as he. It is not easy to explain how one kind of knowledge is preferable to another. It is enough for my present purpose that we agree that knowledge of things signified is better than the signs even if not better than knowledge of the signs. Now let us discuss the greater problem. What kind of things, as we said, can be pointed out by themselves without signs such as speaking, walking, lying, and suchlike? *Ad.*—I remember the problem.

x, 29. *Aug.*—Do you think that all actions which we can perform on being interrogated can be demonstrated without a sign? Or is there any exception? *Ad.*—Considering this whole class of things I find none which can be shown without a sign, except perhaps speaking or possibly teaching. For whatever I do by way of demonstration when someone has asked a question, I see that he cannot learn immediately from the action which he wants to have demonstrated to him. Even if I am doing nothing, or am doing something else, when I am asked what walking is, and if I immediately set about walking, and try to give an answer to the question without a sign, how am I to make sure that "walking" is not taken to mean walking the exact distance that I actually walked. In that case my questioner would be deceived, and would imagine that anyone who walked further or less far than I had walked, had not in fact walked at all. And what I have said of this one action applies to all those which I thought could be demonstrated without a sign, except the two I have mentioned.

30. *Aug.*—I grant that. But now, don't you think speaking and teaching are different things? *Ad.*—Certainly. if they were the same, no one could teach without speaking. Who can doubt there is a difference, seeing that, in fact, we can teach many things with other signs besides words? *Aug.*—Is there any difference between teaching and giving signs? *Ad.*—I think they are the same thing. *Aug.*—So it is correct to say that we give signs in order to teach? *Ad.*—Quite correct. *Aug.*—If anyone says that we teach in order to give signs, he can easily be refuted by the previous sentence? *Ad.*—That is so. *Aug.*—If we give signs in order that we may teach, and do not teach in order that we may give signs, teaching and giving signs are different things. *Ad.*—You are right, and I was wrong when I said they were the same. *Aug.*—Now does he who shows us what teaching is do it by giving signs or otherwise? *Ad.*—I do not see how he can do it otherwise. *Aug.*—So you were wrong in saying a moment ago that, when the question is what teaching is, the true answer can be given without signs. Even this, we see, cannot be done without signs, and you have agreed that giving signs is a different thing from teaching. If, as now appears, they are different, teaching cannot be demonstrated without signs and by itself alone, as you thought. So up to this point we have discovered nothing that can be demonstrated by simply performing the action except speaking, which consists in giving signs. But even speaking is itself a sign, so that

it seems there is absolutely nothing have no reason for refusing my asse

31. *Aug.*—It is established then that knowledge should be more precious acquire it; though (c) possibly not the signs which indicate them. *Ad.*—result has been reached by so long a conversation which has now continued answers to three questions: (a) whether whether some signs are to be preferred whether the knowledge of things is there is a fourth question to which I our results now stand beyond all doubt after all these turnings and twisting question makes me anxious, and doubt it seems to me that you would not difficulty in mind. The complexity of the whole field or to answer with something hidden in these complexities, enough. *Aug.*—I am not at all uncautious mind. And caution is the best thing in the world not to be upset we have given a too ready and too violent answers and are, as it were, weapons in calmly to arguments that are well to hold as known what in fact we do when things are frequently undermined, we fall into such hatred or even the most clearly manifest truth.

32. But come, let us consider even about our conclusions. Suppose some twigs and birdlime should meet a bird merely travelling and not actually a birdcatcher step by step and wonder the purpose of the man's equipment attention, and eager to display his and caught a bird, would he not to the action itself and without any sign arise as I described in the case of far as I see the whole art of birdcatching trouble can easily be removed by a spectator were sufficiently intelligent. It is sufficient for our present purpose things without a sign. *Ad.*—I can other case. A man who is sufficient "walking" when the action has been no objection to your doing so, as shown that some men can be taught previous view was wrong, that not

The following table shows the number of persons who were employed in the various occupations in the United States in 1870. The total number of persons employed was 1,100,000. The occupations were divided into three classes: agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce. The number of persons employed in agriculture was 400,000, in manufacturing 400,000, and in commerce 300,000. The following table shows the number of persons employed in each of these occupations in 1870.

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31. *Aug.*—It is established then that: (a) nothing is taught without signs, (b)
knowledge should be more precious to us than the signs by means of which we
acquire it; though (c) possibly not all things which are signified are better than
the signs which indicate them. *Ad.*—So it seems. *Aug.*—Just think what a tiny
result has been reached by so long and circuitous a path. Since we began our con-
versation which has now continued for a long time, we have laboured to find an-
swers to three questions: (a) whether anything can be taught without signs, (b)
whether some signs are to be preferred to the things which they signify, (c)
whether the knowledge of things is better than the knowledge of their signs. But
there is a fourth question to which I should like to hear your answer. Do you think
our results now stand beyond all doubt? *Ad.*—I should dearly like to think that
after all these turnings and twistings we have indeed reached certainty. But your
question makes me anxious, and deters me from answering in the affirmative. For
it seems to me that you would not have asked the question unless you had some
difficulty in mind. The complexity of our problems does not allow me to examine
the whole field or to answer with complete confidence. I am afraid there is some-
thing hidden in these complexities, to penetrate to which my mind is not sharp
enough. *Aug.*—I am not at all unhappy about your hesitation, for it indicates a
cautious mind. And caution is the best guard of tranquillity. It is the most difficult
thing in the world not to be upset when opinions which we hold, and to which
we have given a too ready and too wilful approval, are shattered by contrary argu-
ments and are, as it were, weapons torn from our hands. It is a good thing to give
in calmly to arguments that are well considered and grasped, just as it is dangerous
to hold as known what in fact we do not know. We should be on our guard lest,
when things are frequently undermined which we assumed would stand firm and
abide, we fall into such hatred or fear of reason that we think we cannot trust
even the most clearly manifest truth.

32. But come, let us consider expeditiously whether you do right to hesitate
about our conclusions. Suppose someone ignorant of how birds are deceived by
twigs and birdlime should meet a birdcatcher equipped with his instruments but
merely travelling and not actually engaged in his work. Suppose he followed the
birdcatcher step by step and wonderingly thought and inquired what could be
the purpose of the man's equipment. Suppose the birdcatcher, seeing him all
attention, and eager to display his skill, got ready his twigs and tubes and hawk
and caught a bird, would he not teach the spectator what he wanted to know by
the action itself and without any signs? *Ad.*—I suspect the same trouble would
arise as I described in the case of the man who asked what "walking" was. So
far as I see the whole art of birdcatching has not been demonstrated. *Aug.*—That
trouble can easily be removed by adding a further supposition. Suppose the
spectator were sufficiently intelligent to learn the whole art from what he saw.
It is sufficient for our present purpose that some men can be taught some, not all,
things without a sign. *Ad.*—I can make the same additional supposition in the
other case. A man who is sufficiently intelligent will learn the exact meaning of
"walking" when the action has been shown by taking a few paces. *Aug.*—I have
no objection to your doing so, and indeed I approve. Both of us have now
shown that some men can be taught some things without signs, and that our
previous view was wrong, that nothing at all can be shown without signs. Hence

not one or two things but thousands of things occur to my mind which can be shown by themselves and without any sign. Why should we doubt it? I need not mention the innumerable spectacles which men exhibit in the theatres, showing them without any sign and just as they are. Think of the sun, the light that suffuses and clothes all things, the moon and the stars, earth and sea, and the innumerable things they bear. Does not God exhibit them in themselves to those who behold them?

✓ 33. If we consider this a little more closely, perhaps you will find that nothing is learned even by its appropriate sign. If I am given a sign and I do not know the thing of which it is the sign, it can teach me nothing. If I know the thing, what do I learn from the sign? When I read (Dan. 3:27: LXX Dan. 3:94): "Their *saraballae* were not changed," the word, *saraballae*, does not indicate what it means. If I am told that some covering of the head is so called, would I know what a head is, or a covering, unless I knew already? Knowledge of such things comes to me not when they are named by others but when I actually see them. When these two syllables first struck my ear, *ca-put*, I was as ignorant of what they meant as I was of the meaning of *saraballae* when I first heard or read it. But when the word, *caput*, was frequently repeated, observing when it was said, I discovered it was the name of a thing well known to me from my having seen it. Before I made that discovery the word was merely a sound to me. It became a sign when I had learned the thing of which it was the sign. And this I had learned not from signs but from seeing the actual object. So the sign is learned from knowing the thing, rather than vice versa.

34. To understand this better, suppose we hear the sound, *caput*, for the first time, not knowing whether it is merely a sound or whether it has some meaning. We ask what *caput* is. Remember we want to know not the thing signified but the sign, although we cannot have that knowledge so long as we do not know what it is a sign of. If, then, in answer to our question the thing is pointed out with a finger, we look at it and learn that that was a sign which we had heard but had not known before. In a sign there are two things, sound and meaning. We perceive the sound when it strikes our ear, while the meaning becomes clear when we look at the thing signified. The pointing with the finger can indicate nothing but the object pointed out, and it points not to a sign but to a part of the body which we call *caput*. In that way, accordingly, I cannot learn the thing, because I knew it already, nor can I learn the sign because it is not pointed to. I am not greatly interested in the act of pointing. As a gesture it is a sign of something being pointed out rather than of the object pointed out. It is as when we say, "Lo"; for we are accustomed to use that adverb when we point with the finger in case one sign is not sufficient. What I am really trying to convince you of, if I can, is this. We learn nothing by means of these signs we call words. On the contrary, as I said, we learn the force of the word, that is the meaning which lies in the sound of the word, when we come to know the object signified by the word. Then only do we perceive that the word was a sign conveying that meaning.

35. The same is true of the word "coverings," and all the rest. But even when I have come to know them all, I still do not know what *saraballae* are. If someone points them out, or makes a drawing of them, or shows me something like them, I shall not say that he did not teach me what they were, though I could easily prove that that is true with a little more argument. I

content myself with saying what I saw them when I was present "Lo, there are *saraballae*," I should say any words spoken but by looking should learn and remember the learning the thing I did not trust the words simply so far as out, that is, to find my answer by

xi, 36. The utmost value I can for things, but they do not show alone teaches me anything of the senses, or my mind, the things we learn only words. Indeed we can words, in order to be words read any sound I may hear is a word of words is completed by knowledge even words are learned. We learn already, and when we don't know anything unless we also learn it not from hearing their sound while the things they signify. It is sound spoken we either know or do not learn, but are rather reminded we are not even reminded, but are

37. But you may say: granted sound of whose name we remember fully know the name until we learn men of whom we have heard (I nezzar and his fiery furnace sang praises to God, and won't about them otherwise than by name knew the meaning of all these youths," "furnace," "fire," "kins names, Ananias, Azarias and Michael the names did not help me to we read of in that story happened that I have to confess I must believe we were not ignorant of believe ye shall not know" (Is if he had thought there was no do not know everything that I believe do not know all that I believe. And which I do not know, among things how useful it is to believe many

38. Concerning universals of value to anyone speaking and making which presides over our minds value to listen by someone using words who is said to dwell in the inner

things occur to my mind which can be signified. Why should we doubt it? I need not think men exhibit in the theatres, showing they are. Think of the sun, the light that is on and the stars, earth and sea, and the God exhibit them in themselves to those

especially, perhaps you will find that nothing. If I am given a sign and I do not know what it can teach me nothing. If I know the sign when I read (Dan. 3:27: LXX Dan. 3:94): the word, *saraballae*, does not indicate covering of the head is so called, would I know it unless I knew already? Knowledge of such things named by others but when I actually struck my ear, *ca-put*, I was as ignorant of the meaning of *saraballae* when I first heard it as when it was frequently repeated, observing when I heard of a thing well known to me from discovery the word was merely a sound to me of the thing of which it was the sign. I know it not but from seeing the actual object. So I know the thing, rather than vice versa.

When we hear the sound, *caput*, for the thing, it is merely a sound or whether it has some meaning we want to know not the thing itself but have that knowledge so long as we know it. If, then, in answer to our question the sign is a sound, it and learn that that was a sign of the thing before. In a sign there are two things: the sound when it strikes our ear, and the thing which we call *caput*. In that sign, because I knew it already, nor can I know it. I am not greatly interested in the sign of something being pointed out to me as when we say, "Lo"; for we are not pointing with the finger in case one is trying to convince you of, if I can, is the sign we call words. On the contrary, I know that is the meaning which lies in the word, the object signified by the word. I know the sign conveying that meaning.

coverings," and all the rest. But even I still do not know what *saraballae* are. I am drawing of them, or shows me something I did not teach me what they were, is true with a little more argument. I

content myself with saying what is obvious; he did not teach me by words. If he saw them when I was present and called my attention to them by saying: "Lo, there are *saraballae*," I should learn something I did not know, not from any words spoken but by looking at the object pointed out to me. In this way I should learn and remember the thing that gives meaning to the word. In learning the thing I did not trust the words of another but my own eyes. I trusted the words simply so far as to direct my attention to what was pointed out, that is, to find my answer by looking at a visible object.

xi, 36. The utmost value I can attribute to words is this. They bid us look for things, but they do not show them to us so that we may know them. He alone teaches me anything who sets before my eyes, or one of my other bodily senses, or my mind, the things which I desire to know. From words we can learn only words. Indeed we can learn only their sound and noise. Even if words, in order to be words really, must also be signs, I do not know that any sound I may hear is a word until I know what it means. Knowledge of words is completed by knowledge of things, and by the hearing of words not even words are learned. We learn nothing new when we know the words already, and when we don't know them we cannot say we have learned anything unless we also learn their meaning. And their meaning we learn not from hearing their sound when they are uttered, but from getting to know the things they signify. It is sound reasoning and truly said that when words are spoken we either know or do not know what they mean. If we know, we do not learn, but are rather reminded of what we know. If we do not know, we are not even reminded, but are perhaps urged to inquire.

37. But you may say: granted we cannot know those headcoverings, the sound of whose name we remember, unless we see them, and that we cannot fully know the name until we know the thing. But what about those young men of whom we have heard (Dan. 3) how they vanquished King Nebuchadnezzar and his fiery furnace by their faithfulness and religion, how they sang praises to God, and won honours from their enemy? Have we learned about them otherwise than by means of words? I reply, Yes. But we already knew the meaning of all these words. I already knew the meaning of "three youths," "furnace," "fire," "king," "unhurt by fire" and so on. But the names, Ananias, Azarias and Misael, are as unknown to me as *saraballae*, and the names did not help me to know them and could not help me. All that we read of in that story happened at that time and was written down, so that I have to confess I must believe rather than know. And the writers whom we believe were not ignorant of the difference. For the prophet says: "Unless ye believe ye shall not know" (Isa. 7:9:LXX). This he would not have said if he had thought there was no difference. What I know I also believe, but I do not know everything that I believe. All that I understand I know, but I do not know all that I believe. And I know how useful it is to believe many things which I do not know, among them this story about the three youths. I know how useful it is to believe many things of which knowledge is not possible.

38. Concerning universals of which we can have knowledge, we do not listen to anyone speaking and making sounds outside ourselves. We listen to Truth which presides over our minds within us, though of course we may be bidden to listen by someone using words. Our real Teacher is he who is so listened to, who is said to dwell in the inner man, namely Christ, that is, the unchangeable

Illustration
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power and eternal wisdom of God. To this wisdom every rational soul gives heed, but to each is given only so much as he is able to receive, according to his own good or evil will. If anyone is ever deceived it is not the fault of Truth, any more than it is the fault of the common light of day that the bodily eyes are often deceived. Confessedly we must pay heed to the light that it may let us discern visible things so far as we are able.

xii, 39. On the one hand we need light that we may see colours, and the elements of this world and sentient bodies that we may perceive things of sense, and the senses themselves which the mind uses as interpreters in its search for sense-knowledge. On the other hand, to know intelligible things with our reason we pay attention to the interior truth. How, then, can it be shown that words teach us anything besides the sound that strikes the ear? Everything we perceive we perceive either by bodily sense or by the mind. The former we call "sensible things," the latter "intelligible things"; or, to use the terminology of our Christian authors, the former we call "carnal things," the latter "spiritual things." When we are asked about the former we reply if they are present to our senses, for example, if we are looking at the new moon and someone asks what it is or where. If our questioner does not see it he believes our words, or perhaps often does not believe them, but he learns nothing unless he himself sees what he is asking about. When he sees he learns not from words uttered but from the objects seen and his sense of sight. Words would have the same sound whether he saw or not. When the question concerns not things which are present to our senses but which once were, we do not speak of the things themselves, but of images derived from them and imprinted on the memory. I do not know how we can call these things true, since what we have in view are only false images, unless it is because we speak of them not as things we see and feel but as things we have seen and felt. So in the halls of memory we bear the images of things once perceived as memorials which we can contemplate mentally and can speak of with a good conscience and without lying. But these memorials belong to us privately. If anyone hears me speak of them, provided he has seen them himself, he does not learn from my words, but recognizes the truth of what I say by the images which he has in his own memory. But if he has not had these sensations, obviously he believes my words rather than learns from them.

40. But when we have to do with things which we behold with the mind, that is, with the intelligence and with reason, we speak of things which we look upon directly in the inner light of truth which illumines the inner man and is inwardly enjoyed. There again if my hearer sees these things himself with his inward eye, he comes to know what I say, not as a result of my words but as a result of his own contemplation. Even when I speak what is true and he sees what is true, it is not I who teach him. He is taught not by my words but by the things themselves which inwardly God has made manifest to him. Accordingly, if asked he can make answer regarding these things. What could be more absurd than that he should suppose that by my speaking I have taught him, when, if asked, he could himself have explained these things before I spoke? It often happens that a man, when asked a question, gives a negative answer, but by further questioning can be brought to answer in the affirmative. The reason lies in his own weakness. He is unable to let

the light illumine the whole pro all at once, yet when he is questioned, he is induced to bring them by the words of his questioner, and answers, but merely ask such questions to learn inwardly. For example at present discussing: "Can nothing first seem to you to be absurd because? So I must put my question in a way that you can answer. Teacher. Then, when you have answered, you are certain of it, and assuredly know that?" You might reply that I have to tell you that I had seen a man certain of their truth as if I had said: "I would certainly say: 'No, I don't know that it is true.' In this way of your not knowing what I affirm, well, had you learned anything from my question you were able to answer that you did know that. When you have seen the whole are clear and certain, you will agree that a man who does not know whether it is true, or know whether it is false, in the first case he must either believe or doubt, in the second case he must oppose it and deny the truth. In no case, therefore, will he both he who does not know whether they are false, and he who could have proved to have learned nothing from them."

ON

iii, 7. Augustine.—Let us discuss the order. First, how it is manifest that things are good, are counted among the good things. will, I think, be evident whether

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this wisdom every rational soul gives as he is able to receive, according to as ever deceived it is not the fault of the common light of day that the soul must pay heed to the light so far as we are able.

light that we may see colours, and the bodies that we may perceive things of the mind uses as interpreters in its other hand, to know intelligible things the interior truth. How, then, can it be besides the sound that strikes the ear? whether by bodily sense or by the mind. The latter "intelligible things"; or, to use us, the former we call "carnal things," are asked about the former we reply for example, if we are looking at the new where. If our questioner does not see and does not believe them, but he learns by asking about. When he sees he learns objects seen and his sense of sight. Words he saw or not. When the question is about our senses but which once were, yes, but of images derived from them not know how we can call these things only false images, unless it is because we feel but as things we have seen we bear the images of things once contemplated mentally and can speak of things. But these memorials belong to us of them, provided he has seen them words do not recognize the truth of what is his own memory. But if he has not seen my words rather than learns from

things which we behold with the mind, by reason, we speak of things which we know the truth which illumines the inner man if my hearer sees these things himself how what I say, not as a result of my explanation. Even when I speak what is I who teach him. He is taught not by which inwardly God has made manifest to make answer regarding these things. We should suppose that by my speaking he could himself have explained these things that a man, when asked a question, questioning can be brought to answer his own weakness. He is unable to let

the light illumine the whole problem. Though he cannot behold the whole all at once, yet when he is questioned about the parts which compose the whole, he is induced to bring them one by one into the light. He is so induced by the words of his questioner, words, mark you, which do not make statements, but merely ask such questions as put him who is questioned in a position to learn inwardly. For example, if I were to ask you the question I am at present discussing: "Can nothing be taught by means of words?" it might at first seem to you to be absurd because you cannot visualize the whole problem. So I must put my question in a way suited to your ability to hear the inward Teacher. Then, when you have admitted that what I said was true, that you are certain of it, and assuredly know it, I should say: "Where did you learn that?" You might reply that I had taught you. Then I should say: "If I were to tell you that I had seen a man flying, would my words render you as certain of their truth as if I had said, 'Wise men are better than fools?'" You would certainly say: "No, I don't believe your first statement, or, if I believe it, I certainly do not *know* that it is true; but your second statement I know most certainly to be true." In this way you would realize that neither in the case of your not knowing what I affirmed, nor in the case of your knowing quite well, had you learned anything from my words, because in answer to each question you were able to answer confidently that you did not know this and that you did know that. When you realize that all the parts which constitute the whole are clear and certain, you will then admit what you had denied. You will agree that a man who has heard what we have said must either not know whether it is true, or know that it is false, or know that it is true. In the first case he must either believe it, or suppose it, or doubt it. In the second case he must oppose it and deny it. In the third case he must testify to its truth. In no case, therefore, will he learn. When my words have been spoken both he who does not know whether my words are true, and he who knows they are false, and he who could have given the same answers when asked are proved to have learned nothing from my words.

. . .

ON FREE WILL

Book II

. . .

iii, 7. *Augustine*.—Let us discuss these three questions, if you please, and in this order. First, how it is manifest that God exists. Secondly, whether all good things, in so far as they are good, are from him. Lastly, whether free will is to be counted among the good things. When these questions have been answered it will, I think, be evident whether free will has been rightly given to man. First,

From *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, tr. J. H. S. Burleigh, Vol. VI, LCC. Published 1953, The Westminster Press. Used by permission; London: SCM Press, Ltd.

things which pass away so that it be made sure tracts of time. Therefore, either this is

the silence, and say that this silence has course lasted? Do we not apply our thought though it were sounding, so that we may be silence in a given tract of time? Even though our thought we run through poems and verses, measurements of motion. We report about tracts in relation to that, in the same manner as

whether long sound and had determined by could be, he has in fact already silently gone fitting it to memory, he has begun to utter has brought it to his proposed end. Yes, it is part of it that is finished has surely sounded; carried out, as long as his present intention with the past increasing by a diminution of the future the whole is made past.

as yet does not exist, diminished or continued no longer exists, increase, unless there are all this? It looks forward, it considers, it which it looks forward passes through what it Who, then, denies that future things are not the mind an expectation of things to come. exist? Yet there is still in the soul the memory present time lacks spatial extent, since it passes through it what shall be present present is, then, future time that is long, but a the future. Nor is past time, which is not, long, of the past.

that I know. Before I begin, my expectation. Once I have begun, my memory extends over and assign to the past. The life of this action reason of the part I have spoken and into am about to speak. But attention is actually borne along by it so as to become past. The much the more is memory lengthened by a entire expectation is exhausted. When this is and passes into memory. What takes place in each of its parts and in each of its syllables. action, of which perhaps the psalm is a a man's entire life, the parts of which are all holds throughout the whole age of the sons of of all men.

THE CITY OF GOD

Book XIX

11. *Which of the Three Sects that Seek the Supreme Good of Man Does Varro, Following the Doctrine of the Old Academy (on the Authority of Antiochus), Define as Worthy of Choice?*

Which, then, of these three is true and to be pursued he sets out to prove in the following manner. First, since philosophy seeks the supreme good not of a tree, or of a beast, or of God, but of man, he thinks that we must put the question what man himself is. He concludes that in man's nature there are two things, body and soul; and of these two he has no doubt at all that the soul is the better and by far more excellent. But is the soul alone the man, and is the body to him as the horse to the horseman? For the horseman is not a man and a horse, but only a man, and is called a horseman because he bears a certain relation in respect to a horse. Or is the body alone the man, bearing some relation to the soul, like that of the cup to the drink? For it is not the cup and the drink that it contains which are together called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because it is designed to hold the drink. Or again is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone but both together that constitute the man, of whom the soul and the body are each a part, while the whole man consists of both, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, though we do not call either the near or the off horse, however related to the other, a pair, but only call both together a pair?

Of these three possibilities, Varro chose the third, that man is neither soul alone nor body alone but soul and body together. Therefore, he says, the supreme good of man by which he becomes happy consists in the combination of the goods of each kind of thing, namely soul and body. And he holds accordingly that the primary wants of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and so also virtue, which is implanted by instruction, as being the art of living, which is most outstanding among the goods of the soul. Wherefore this virtue, or art of conducting life, when she has taken over the primary wants of nature, which were there apart from virtue,—nay, were there even when they lacked any instruction whatever,—seeks to satisfy all of them for her own sake and at the same time seeks her own development. She makes use of them and of herself at the same time to the end that she may delight in and enjoy all of them. Her enjoyment may be greater or less as these elements are severally more or less important; still they are all a source of joy, though she may, if that is a necessary condition, slight some ele-

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ments as less important, in order to win or preserve the more important.

Now of all goods, whether of soul or of body, virtue prefers none at all to herself. For virtue makes good use both of herself and of all the other goods that go to make man happy; but where she is lacking, however many goods a man has, they do him no good, and so must not be called his "goods"; since he uses them ill, they cannot be useful to him. Here, then, is the sort of human life that is termed happy, a life that enjoys virtue and the other goods of soul and body without which virtue cannot exist; a life is called happier, if it enjoys one or more of the goods that virtue can lack and still exist; and happiest, if it enjoys absolutely all goods, so that it lacks not one of the goods either of soul or of body. For life is not identical with virtue, since not every life, but only a wisely conducted life, is virtue; in fact, there can be life of a sort without any virtue, though there can be no virtue without some life. I might say as much of memory and reason and any other such human faculties; these exist before instruction, but without them there can be no instruction, and therefore no virtue, since virtue is in any case imparted by instruction. But swiftness in running, and physical beauty and victories won by unusual strength and the like, can exist without virtue, as virtue without them; yet they are goods, and according to these philosophers, even these are sought by virtue herself for their own sake, and are used and enjoyed by her in her own becoming way.

This happy life, they say, is also social, and loves the good of friends itself for its own sake as being its own good, and wishes for them for their own sakes what it wishes for itself, whether by friends we mean housemates, such as wife or children and others of the household, or neighbours with houses in the same locality, such as fellow citizens of a city, or men anywhere in the whole world, such as nations with whom we are joined by human society, or denizens even of the universe, which is designated by the term heaven and earth, such as those whom they call gods and like to think of as friends of the wise man, whom we more familiarly call angels. About the supreme good and its opposite the supreme evil they deny that there is any room for doubt, and this, they assert, distinguishes them from the New Academy; and they are not at all interested whether any one who practises philosophy, accepting those ends which they deem to be true, wears the Cynic dress and eats the Cynic food or some other. Finally, of those three kinds of life, the inactive, the active and the composite, they state that they prefer the third. That the Old Academy held and taught these doctrines Varro asserts on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero's master and his own, although Cicero would have it that on a good many points he appeared to be a Stoic rather than an Old Academic. But what does that matter to us, who ought rather to base our judgement on the bare facts than to set store on knowing what opinion each man held about them?

iv. *What View the Christians Hold About the Supreme Good and the Supreme Evil, as Against the Philosophers Who Have Maintained that for Them the Supreme Good Is in Themselves.*

If, then, we are asked what the City of God replies when asked about these several matters, and first what its opinion is about the ultimate good and the ultimate evil, it will reply that the ultimate good is eternal life, and that the ultimate evil is eternal death, and that in order to obtain the one and escape the other we

must live rightly. Wherefore it neither do we see as yet our goal is it in our power of ourselves to believe that we must seek help pray to him. But those who have to be found in the present life, in the soul or in both, or, to virtue or in both, in repose with repose or in virtue or in both, all these persons have in this life and to get happiness men through the words of the men," or, as the apostle Paul the thoughts of the wise, that

For who, no matter how great the miseries of this life? Cicero's *Consolation* on the death of his daughter. For when, where, how can there be a good footing in this life that accidents? Why, what pain is there, the opposite of repose, the amputation or weakening of defects to capitulate, ugliness his sleepiness or sluggishness his a flesh of the wise man? Fittingly the body are also reckoned as some disease makes the limbs be so bent that he puts his head quadruped, so to speak? Will bodily pose or of movement?

What of the so-called prima that are rated first, as means sensation and intelligence? But value, if a man becomes deaf or whither will reason and intelligence man is crazed by some disease? that are for the most part alien opposed to their good aims and or have them before our eyes, scarce hold back our tears, or say of those who are afflicted merged places do their intellect and bodies according to its own cannot befall the wise man in is there in this flesh, or how good of Wisdom: "The corruptible burden heavy on a mind that pond to act,—if either is the correct for that, too, is included amor

to win or preserve the more important. soul or of body, virtue prefers none at all to either of herself and of all the other goods that are. This lacking, however many goods a man must not be called his "goods"; since he uses him. Here, then, is the sort of human life that is virtue and the other goods of soul and body; a life is called happier, if it enjoys one or more and still exist; and happiest, if it enjoys absolutely of the goods either of soul or of body. For life is not every life, but only a wisely conducted life, of a sort without any virtue, though there can I might say as much of memory and reason ties; these exist before instruction, but without and therefore no virtue, since virtue is in any swiftness in running, and physical beauty and health and the like, can exist without virtue, as goods, and according to these philosophers, even for their own sake, and are used and enjoyed

social, and loves the good of friends itself for itself, and wishes for them for their own sakes what ends we mean housemates, such as wife or child, or neighbours with houses in the same locality, or men anywhere in the whole world, such as by human society, or denizens even of the universe term heaven and earth, such as those whom we regard as friends of the wise man, whom we more supreme good and its opposite the supreme evil in for doubt, and this, they assert, distinguishes and there are not at all interested whether any one thing is an end which they deem to be true, wears of food or some other. Finally, of those three kinds and the composite, they state that they prefer to be held and taught these doctrines Varro asserts Cicero's master and his own, although Cicero on many points he appeared to be a Stoic rather than that matter to us, who ought rather to base our order to set store on knowing what opinion each man

Told About the Supreme Good and the Supreme Others Who Have Maintained that for Them the selves.

The City of God replies when asked about these its opinion is about the ultimate good and the ultimate good is eternal life, and that the ultimate order to obtain the one and escape the other we

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must live rightly. Wherefore it is written: "The just man lives by faith." For neither do we see as yet our good, and therefore must seek it by believing, nor is it in our power of ourselves to live rightly unless he who has given us faith to believe that we must seek help from him shall help us, as we believe in and pray to him. But those who have supposed that the ultimate good and evil are to be found in the present life, placing the ultimate good either in the body or in the soul or in both, or, to speak more explicitly, either in pleasure or in virtue or in both, in repose or in virtue or in both, in the primary wants of nature or in virtue with repose or in virtue or in both, in the primary wants of nature or in virtue or in both, all these persons have sought, with a surprising vanity, to be happy in this life and to get happiness by their own efforts. Truth laughed at these men through the words of the prophet: "The Lord knows the thoughts of men," or, as the apostle Paul has set forth this passage: "The Lord knows the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain."

For who, no matter how great his torrent of eloquence, can avail to enumerate the miseries of this life? Cicero lamented them, as best he could, in the *Consolation* on the death of his daughter; but how inadequate was his best! For when, where, how can the so-called primary wants of nature be on such a good footing in this life that they are not tossed about at the mercy of blind accidents? Why, what pain is there, the opposite of pleasure, what turbulence is there, the opposite of repose, that may not assail the wise man's frame? Surely the amputation or weakening of a man's limbs forces his freedom from physical defects to capitulate, ugliness his beauty, illness his health, weariness his strength, sleepiness or sluggishness his agility; now, which of these may not invade the flesh of the wise man? Fitting and harmonious attitudes and movements of the body are also reckoned among the primary wants of nature; but what if some disease makes the limbs quake and tremble? What if a man's spine be so bent that he puts his hands on the ground, which makes of him a quadruped, so to speak? Will not this ruin all beauty and grace whether of bodily pose or of movement?

What of the so-called primary goods of the mind itself, of which the two that are rated first, as means to the grasping and observing of truth, are sensation and intelligence? But how much sensation remains, and of what value, if a man becomes deaf and blind, to say nothing of other defects? And whither will reason and intelligence withdraw, where will they slumber, if a man is crazed by some disease? When the insane say or do many absurd things that are for the most part alien to their own aims and characters,—nay, even opposed to their good aims and characters,—whether we use our imaginations or have them before our eyes, if we reflect on their case as it deserves, we can scarce hold back our tears, or it may be even that we cannot. What shall I say of those who are afflicted by attacks of demons? In what hidden or submerged places do their intellects lurk, when the evil spirit is using their souls and bodies according to its own will? And who is quite sure that this evil cannot befall the wise man in this life? Then what sort of observation of truth is there in this flesh, or how great is it, when, as we read in the truthful book of Wisdom: "The corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly frame lies heavy on a mind that ponders many things"? Furthermore, drive or impulse to act,—if either is the correct Latin word for what the Greeks call *hormē*, for that, too, is included among the primary goods of nature,—is not impulse

also responsible for those pitiable movements and acts of the insane that shock us, when sensation is distraught and reason is asleep?

Finally, as to virtue itself, which is not among the primary wants of nature, since it is a later addition ushered in by instruction, although it claims the highest place among human goods, what is its activity here but perpetual war with vices, not external vices but internal, not alien but clearly our very own, a war waged especially by that virtue called in Greek *sôphrosynê* and in Latin temperance, which bridles the lusts of the flesh lest they win the consent of the mind and drag it into crimes of every sort? For it is not the case that there is no vice when, as the Apostle says: "The flesh lusts against the spirit." For to this vice there is an opposing virtue, when, as the same Apostle says: "The spirit lusts against the flesh. These two," he says, "are opposed one to the other, so that you do not what you would." But what is it that we would do, when we wish to be made perfect by the ultimate good, unless it be that the flesh should not lust against the spirit, and that there should be in us no such vice for the spirit to lust against it? But since we cannot bring that to pass in the present life, however much we may desire it, we can at least with God's help so act that we do not yield to the lust of the flesh against the spirit by failure of the spirit, and we are not dragged with our own consent to the perpetration of sin. Far be it from us, then, so long as we are engaged in this internal war, to hold it true that we have already attained to that happiness which is the goal that we would gain by victory. And who is so wise that he has no battle at all to wage against his lusts?

What of that virtue which is called prudence? Does she not devote all her vigilance to the discrimination of good and evil, so that in pursuing the one and shunning the other no error may creep in? Thus she bears witness herself that we are among evils, that is, that evils are in us; for she teaches us herself that it is an evil to yield to a lust for sin, and a good not to yield to a lust for sin. But that evil to which prudence teaches and temperance causes us not to yield, is neither by prudence nor by temperance banished from this life. What of justice, whose function it is to assign to each man his due, whereby there is located in man himself a certain right order of nature, so that soul is subordinated to God, and flesh to soul, and therefore both soul and flesh to God? Does not justice thereby demonstrate that she is still labouring in her task rather than resting already at the goal of her labours? For the less the soul keeps God clearly in mind in all its activity, the less it is subordinate to God; and the more the flesh lusts against the spirit, the less it is subordinate to the soul. So long, then, as we have in us this weakness, this sickness, this torpor, how shall we dare say that we are already saved, and if not saved, how already blest with that ultimate bliss? Then truly that virtue called fortitude, though combined with however great wisdom, bears witness most convincingly to human ills, for they are what she is required to endure with patience.

Now I am amazed that the Stoic philosophers have the face to argue that these ills are no ills, though they admit that, if they should be so great that the wise man cannot or ought not to endure them, he is compelled to inflict death on himself and depart from this life. But such is the stupid pride of these men who suppose that the supreme good is to be found in this life, and that they can be the agents of their own happiness, that their wise man,—I mean the man whom they describe as such with astounding inanity,—whom,

even if he be blinded and grow deaf tortured with pain, and visited by evil utter or fancy conceive, whereby he do not scruple to call happy. What an end it! If it be happy, let a man stay that vanquish the good that is fortitude to them but so to rave that it calls the to escape? Who is so blind as not to not be a life to escape from? Why, mission of weakness in their argument, with stiff-necked pride broken, life? Was it not through lack of fortitude the famous Cato took his life? For lacked the fortitude to bear the victory. It yielded, it succumbed, it was so escaped from this happy life. Or was it? How, then, were those not evils that escaped from?

And therefore those who admitted and the Old Academics, the sect that manner; but they, too, are sponsors of that amid these evils, even if they are obliged to escape by seeking his own evils," says Varro, "are pains and ang in proportion to their severity; and t life." What life, pray? "This life," So it is definitely happy, then, amid that one must escape from it? Or do to escape from these evils by death? you were held among them and were free of them? Then, no doubt, at as wretched. So it is not unwretched mer as, if it were everlasting, even you y And so it ought not to be judged wretchedness is brief; or, still mor brief, on that account be even called

Mighty is the power in these evils philosophers compel even a wise man as a man; although they say, and a mandment of nature is that a man himself and therefore instinctively a in such wise as to be vigorously dete and to live on in this union of bod evils that overcome the natural feeli every means and bend all our stren, and so completely defeat nature th pursued, and, if it may not arrive man by himself. Mighty is the powe cide, if indeed she should still be

movements and acts of the insane that shock and reason is asleep?

It is not among the primary wants of nature, but by instruction, although it claims the good, what is its activity here but perpetual lusts but internal, not alien but clearly our very own. What virtue called in Greek *sôphrosynê* and in Latin *temperantia* is the lust of the flesh lest they win the consent of every sort? For it is not the case, as the Apostle says: "The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit is against the flesh. These two," he says, "are opposed to each other, not what you would." But what is it that the spirit lusts against? The ultimate good, unless it be the lust of the spirit, and that there should be no lust against it? But since we cannot bring it to pass, however much we may desire it, we can at least not yield to the lust of the flesh against the spirit. And we are not dragged with our own consent into it from us, then, so long as we are engaged in the pursuit of the good, true that we have already attained to that which we would gain by victory. And who is so wise as to fight against his lusts?

What is called prudence? Does she not devote all her strength to good and evil, so that in pursuing the one she may creep in? Thus she bears witness herself that evils are in us; for she teaches us herself to fight for sin, and a good not to yield to a lust for which she teaches and temperance causes us not to yield. By temperance banished from this life. What is the duty of each man his due, whereby there is a right order of nature, so that soul is subordinate, and therefore both soul and flesh to God? We rate that she is still labouring in her task rather than of her labours? For the less the soul keeps God, the less it is subordinate to God; and the more the spirit, the less it is subordinate to the soul. So weakness, this sickness, this torpor, how shall we be saved, and if not saved, how already blest with that virtue called fortitude, though combined with witness most convincingly to human ills, for we endure with patience.

Stoic philosophers have the face to argue that they admit that, if they should be so great that they do not to endure them, he is compelled to inflict on himself this life. But such is the stupid pride of man, that the supreme good is to be found in this life, and that their own happiness, that their wise man,—I describe as such with astounding inanity,—whom,

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even if he be blinded and grow deaf and dumb, lose the use of his limbs, be tortured with pain, and visited by every other evil of the sort that tongue can utter or fancy conceive, whereby he is driven to inflict death on himself, they do not scruple to call happy. What a happy life, that seeks the help of death to end it! If it be happy, let a man stay in it. How can those things not be evil that vanquish the good that is fortitude, and compel it not only to give way to them but so to rave that it calls the same life happy from which it advises us to escape? Who is so blind as not to perceive that, if it were happy, it would not be a life to escape from? Why, the word "escape" is an unconcealed admission of weakness in their argument! What ground have they now to keep them, with stiff-necked pride broken, from admitting that it is even a wretched life? Was it not through lack of fortitude, rather than through fortitude, that the famous Cato took his life? For he would not have done it, had he not lacked the fortitude to bear the victory of Caesar. Where, then, is his fortitude? It yielded, it succumbed, it was so far vanquished that he gave up, forsook, escaped from this happy life. Or was it no longer happy? Then it was wretched. How, then, were those not evils that made life wretched and a thing to be escaped from?

And therefore those who admitted that these are evils, as did the Peripatetics and the Old Academics, the sect that Varro defends, speak in a more tolerable manner; but they, too, are sponsors of a surprising error, in that they maintain that amid these evils, even if they be so grave that he who suffers them is obliged to escape by seeking his own death, life is nevertheless happy. "Among evils," says Varro, "are pains and anguish of body, and their evil is the greater in proportion to their severity; and to avoid them one should escape from this life." What life, pray? "This life," he says, "that is beset by so great evils." So it is definitely happy, then, amid those very evils because of which you say that one must escape from it? Or do you call it happy because you have freedom to escape from these evils by death? What, then, if by some divine judgement you were held among them and were not permitted either to die or ever to be free of them? Then, no doubt, at any rate, you would say that such a life is wretched. So it is not unwretched merely because it is soon abandoned, inasmuch as, if it were everlasting, even you yourself would pronounce it to be wretched. And so it ought not to be judged free from all wretchedness because the wretchedness is brief; or, still more absurdly, because the wretchedness is brief, on that account be even called a state of bliss.

Mighty is the power in these evils that compel a man, and according to these philosophers compel even a wise man, to deprive himself of his own existence as a man; although they say, and say truly, that the first and greatest commandment of nature is that a man should be brought into harmony with himself and therefore instinctively avoid death, and that he be his own friend in such wise as to be vigorously determined and eager to keep the breath of life and to live on in this union of body and soul. Mighty is the power in these evils that overcome the natural feeling we hear of, by whose working we use every means and bend all our strength and all our endeavours to avoid death, and so completely defeat nature that what was avoided is now longed for, pursued, and, if it may not arrive from some other quarter, inflicted on a man by himself. Mighty is the power in these evils that make fortitude a homicide, if indeed she should still be called fortitude who is overcome by these

evils so completely that she not only cannot by her endurance safeguard the man whom, as virtue, she has undertaken to govern and protect but is herself compelled to go to the length of killing him. The wise man ought, to be sure, to endure even death with firmness, but death that befalls him from an external source. If, then, he is compelled, according to these philosophers, to inflict it on himself, surely they must admit not only that those are evils but that they are in fact intolerable evils that compel him to perpetrate this crime.

The life, then, that is oppressed by the weight of such great and grievous evils or exposed to the chance of them would by no means be termed happy if the men who use that term,—men who, when they are defeated by the increasing pressure of their ills, in the act of inflicting death upon themselves, surrender to misfortune,—would with equal condescension, when they are defeated by sound logic in the attempt to discover a happy life, surrender to the truth, instead of supposing that the enjoyment of the supreme good is a goal to be attained in the mortal state of which they speak. For our very virtues, which are surely the best and most useful attributes of a man, bear trustworthy witness to life's miseries so much the more, the more strongly they support us against life's dangers, toils and sorrows. For if our virtues are genuine,—and genuine virtues can exist only in those who are endowed with true piety,—they do not lay claim to such powers as to say that men in whom they reside will suffer no miseries (for true virtues are not so fraudulent in their claims); but they do say that our human life, though it is compelled by all the great evils of this age to be wretched, is happy in the expectation of a future life in so far as it enjoys the expectation of salvation too. For how can a life be happy, if it has no salvation yet? So the apostle Paul, speaking not of men who lacked prudence, patience, temperance and justice, but of men who lived in accordance with true piety, and whose virtues were therefore genuine, says: "Now we are saved by hope. But hope that is seen is not hope. For how should a man hope for what he sees? But if we hope for that which we do not see, then we look forward with endurance." As, therefore, we are saved by hope, so it is by hope that we have been made happy; and as we have no hold on a present salvation, but look for salvation in the future, so we look forward to happiness, and a happiness to be won "by endurance." For we are among evils, which we ought patiently to endure until we arrive among those goods where nothing will be lacking to provide us ineffable delight, nor will there now be anything that we are obliged to endure. Such is the salvation which in the life to come will itself be also the ultimate bliss. But those philosophers, not believing in this blessedness because they do not see it, strive to manufacture for themselves in this life an utterly counterfeit happiness by drawing on a virtue whose fraudulence matches its arrogance.

v. *About Social Life, Which, Though Very Greatly to Be Desired, Is Often Upset by Many Distresses.*

But in that they believe that the life of the wise man must be social, we approve much more fully. For how could the City of God, about which we are already engaged in writing the nineteenth book, begin at the start or progress in its course or reach its appointed goal, if the life of the saints were not social? But who could reckon up the number and the magnitude of the woes with

which human society overflows amid th could be equal to the task of assessing one of their own comedies, who says w a wife; what misery I have known t responsibility." What of the ills that l Terence: "Slights, suspicions, enmities, everywhere made up the tale of human when friends are united in a noble love infested with them; in this list we co war, as certainly evil; while peace is bu the hearts of those with whom we co know them today, in any case we kno Who, moreover, are wont to be more those who dwell together in the same b such relations, seeing that from the h have often arisen,—woes the more bi counted real when it was most cleverly

That is why the words of Cicero s perforce: "No ambushed foes are har aim with a counterfeit loyalty or unde an open adversary you would be on y this hidden evil, being internal and d you before you have a chance to o the divine word has also been spoken: household," words that are heard wit man is strong enough to bear them w with prudent foresight against the de if he is himself a good man, he must experience that they are utterly base, v goodness or whether they underwent that he finds in them. If, then, the hon human life, is not safe, what of the forum teem with lawsuits both civil disturbed by the turbulence, or more wars. Cities are indeed free at times f of them.

vi. *About the Error of Human Judg*

What of those judgements pronou are indispensable in cities however c sad, how lamentable we find them, look into the consciences of those w compelled to seek the truth by tor does not concern them. What shall man himself? The question is whet he is innocent, and for a doubtful doubtful at all, not because it is disc not known that he did not commit i

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

with its capital at New York, and its territory extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean. It was the first of the great nations of the world, and its history is the history of the world.

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cannot by her endurance safeguard the men to govern and protect but is herself in peril. The wise man ought, to be sure, to be aware of what befalls him from an external source, but he ought to be able to inflict it only on those who are evils but that they do not wish to perpetrate this crime.

The weight of such great and grievous misfortune would by no means be termed happy if it were when they are defeated by the increasing weight of death upon themselves. Surrender and submission, when they are defeated by a happy life, surrender to the truth, and the pursuit of the supreme good is a goal to be spoken. For our very virtues, which are the fruits of a man, bear trustworthy witness to the truth. More strongly they support us against the truth. Our virtues are genuine,—and genuine virtues are endowed with true piety,—they do not deceive men in whom they reside will suffer no harm (valent in their claims); but they do say that they are killed by all the great evils of this age. The notion of a future life in so far as it is a hope, how can a life be happy, if it has no hope, being not of men who lacked prudence, but of men who lived in accordance with true piety. Now we are saved by hope. Should a man hope for what he sees? If he does not see, then we look forward with hope, so it is by hope that we have hope. We have a present salvation, but look forward to happiness, and a happiness to overcome all evils, which we ought patiently to wait for where nothing will be lacking. There now be anything that we are waiting for in the life to come will itself be ours, not believing in this blessedness and the manufacture for themselves in this life an end in a virtue whose fraudulence matches

Very Greatly to Be Desired, Is Often

of the wise man must be social, we are the City of God, about which we are a book, begin at the start or progress of the life of the saints were not social? And the magnitude of the woes with

which human society overflows amid the worries of this our mortal state? Who could be equal to the task of assessing them? Let them give ear to a man in one of their own comedies, who says what every man concurs in: "I have taken a wife; what misery I have known therewith! Children were born; another responsibility." What of the ills that love breeds, as enumerated by that same Terence: "Slights, suspicions, enmities, war, then peace again"? Have they not everywhere made up the tale of human events? Do they not usually occur even when friends are united in a noble love? The history of man is in every cranny infested with them; in this list we count the slights, suspicions, enmities and war, as certainly evil; while peace is but a doubtful good, since we do not know the hearts of those with whom we choose to be at peace, and even if we could know them today, in any case we know not what they may be like tomorrow. Who, moreover, are wont to be more friendly, or at least ought to be, than those who dwell together in the same home? And yet who is free from doubt in such relations, seeing that from the hidden treachery of such persons great woes have often arisen,—woes the more bitter, as the peace was sweeter that was counted real when it was most cleverly feigned?

That is why the words of Cicero so touch all men's hearts that we lament their perforce: "No ambushed foes are harder to detect than those who mask their aim with a counterfeit loyalty or under the guise of some close tie. For against an open adversary you would be on your guard, and so easily escape him; but this hidden evil, being internal and domestic, not only arises but even crushes you before you have a chance to observe and investigate it." That is why the divine word has also been spoken: "A man's foes are even those of his own household," words that are heard with great sorrow of heart. For even if any man is strong enough to bear them with equanimity, or alert enough to guard with prudent foresight against the designs of a pretended friend, nevertheless, if he is himself a good man, he must needs feel grievous pain when he finds by experience that they are utterly base, whether they were always evil and feigned goodness or whether they underwent a change from goodwill to the evil mind that he finds in them. If, then, the home, our common refuge amid the ills of this human life, is not safe, what of the city? The larger it is, the more does its forum teem with lawsuits both civil and criminal, even though its calm be not disturbed by the turbulence, or more often the bloodshed, of sedition and civil wars. Cities are indeed free at times from such events, but never from the threat of them.

VI. *About the Error of Human Judgement, When the Truth Is Hidden.*

What of those judgements pronounced by men on their fellow men, which are indispensable in cities however deep the peace that reigns in them? How sad, how lamentable we find them, since those who pronounce them cannot look into the consciences of those whom they judge. Therefore they are often compelled to seek the truth by torturing innocent witnesses though the case does not concern them. What shall I say of torture inflicted on the accused man himself? The question is whether he is guilty; yet he is tortured even if he is innocent, and for a doubtful crime he suffers a punishment that is not doubtful at all, not because it is discovered that he committed it but because it is not known that he did not commit it. Thus the ignorance of the judge generally

results in the calamity of the innocent. And what is still more intolerable, and still more to be deplored and, were it possible, purged by floods of tears, is that the judge, in the act of torturing the accused for the express purpose of avoiding the unwitting execution of an innocent man, through pitiable ignorance puts to death, both tortured and innocent, the very man whom he has tortured in order not to execute him if innocent.

For if he has chosen, applying the wisdom of the philosophers mentioned above, to escape from this life rather than endure those torments any longer, he pleads guilty to a crime that he did not commit. And after he has been condemned and put to death, the judge still does not know whether it was a guilty or an innocent man whom he put to death and whom he tortured that he might not unwittingly execute an innocent man; so he has both tortured an innocent man in order to learn the truth and put him to death without learning it. Since there are such dark places in political life, will a wise judge sit on the bench, or will he not dare to do so? Clearly he will; for the claim of society constrains and draws him until he consents to serve; for to desert his duty to society he counts abominable.

For he does not think it abominable that innocent witnesses are tortured in other men's cases; or that the accused are often overcome by the pain of torture and so make false confessions and are punished, though innocent; or that, although not condemned to death, they often die under torture or as a consequence of torture; or that the accusers, perhaps moved by a desire to benefit society by seeing that crimes do not go unpunished, are themselves condemned by an ignorant judge, if both the evidence of witnesses is false and the defendant with fierce resistance to torture makes no admission of guilt, so that they have no way to prove the truth of their allegations, although those allegations are true. These many great evils he does not count as sins; for the wise judge does not commit them because of any will to do harm but because his action is determined by his ignorance, being also, however, determined by the binding claim of society that requires him to sit in judgement. Here, then, is a clear proof of man's miserable lot, of which I speak, even though we may not accuse the judge of evil intent. But if by ignorance and by office he is constrained to torture and punish the innocent, is it not enough that we acquit him of guilt? Must he be happy as well? How much more creditable is it for his powers of reflection and for his worth as a human being when he acknowledges our pitiable condition in that our acts are determined in spite of us, and loathes his own part in it, sending up, if he is wise as a religious man, a cry to God: "From my necessities deliver thou me!"

vii. *About the Diversity of Languages by Which Human Society Is Divided; and About the Misery of Wars, Even of Those Called Just.*

After the state or city comes the world, to which they assign the third level of human society; they begin with the household, then progressively arrive at the city, and then at the world. And this, like a confluence of waters, is the fuller of dangers as it is the larger. In the first place, the diversity of languages separates one man from another. For if two men, each ignorant of the other's language, meet and are compelled by some necessity not to pass on but to remain together, then it is easier for dumb animals, even of different kinds, to associate together

than for them, though both are unable to communicate their views to one another in the same languages, so little good does it do so far as social unity is concerned that human slaughter and bloodshed on conquered peoples, as a bond of friendship, so that there has been far from a True; but at what a cost has this been, that human slaughter and bloodshed!

These wars are past; yet the misdeeds of foreign foes have not been, and always been waged and are being waged, empire has begotten wars of a world which the human race is more actually being waged for the sake of fear lest a new storm arise. If it were not for many and manifold disasters, to which we cannot possibly deal with them adequately? But the wise man, they say, is more, if he remembers his human condition, just wars; for if they were not just wars, so a wise man would have no war, so that imposes on the wise man the injustice, even if no necessity of war is to be deplored by a human being, a man, then, reflect with sorrow upon his misdeeds and confess his misery. But if any man suffers himself or when he imagines himself more miserable, for he thinks himself more human feeling to boot.

viii. *That the Friendship of Good Men Is Necessary as Long as It Is Necessary to War.*

If we escape from a kind of ignorance in the wretched condition of a foe for a friend or a friend for a foe, society, full of mistakes and distrust, affection of true and good friends more widely scattered they are, the fears lest some evil may befall the world. For we are anxious not only for our own welfare, disease, captivity and the like, with far more bitter fear lest friendliness and villainy. And when these contingencies are the more numerous, and the more the man who experiences them, the more hearts? Indeed, we would rather than we could not hear without sorrow.

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than for them, though both are human beings. For where they cannot communicate their views to one another, merely because they speak different languages, so little good does it do them to be alike by endowment of nature, so far as social unity is concerned, that a man would rather have his dog for company than a foreigner. But the imperial city has taken pains to impose on conquered peoples, as a bond of peace, not only her yoke but her language, so that there has been far from a lack, but rather a superfluity, of interpreters. True; but at what a cost has this unity been achieved, all those great wars, all that human slaughter and bloodshed!

These wars are past; yet the miseries of these evils are not ended. For though foreign foes have not been, and are not, lacking, against whom wars have always been waged and are being waged, nevertheless the very extent of the empire has begotten wars of a worse kind; I mean social and civil wars, by which the human race is more wretchedly shaken, whether while they are actually being waged for the sake of calm at last or while they are a source of fear lest a new storm arise. If it were to attempt to do verbal justice to the many and manifold disasters, to the hard and harsh necessities, though I could not possibly deal with them adequately, where would my long-drawn argument end? But the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. As if he would not all the more, if he remembers his humanity, deplore his being compelled to engage in just wars; for if they were not just, he would not have to wage them, and so a wise man would have no wars. For it is the injustice of the opposing side that imposes on the wise man the necessity of waging just wars; and this injustice, even if no necessity of waging war were to arise from it, must still be deplored by a human being, since human beings perpetrate it. Let every man, then, reflect with sorrow upon all these great evils, so horrible and so cruel, and confess his misery. But if any man has no sorrow in his heart either when he suffers himself or when he imagines such suffering, his case is certainly far more miserable, for he thinks himself happy precisely because he has lost all human feeling to boot.

viii. *That the Friendship of Good Men Can Not Be Free from Anxiety, So Long as It Is Necessary to Worry About the Dangers of this Life.*

If we escape from a kind of ignorance, akin to madness, that often befalls men in the wretched condition of this life, and that leads them to mistake a foe for a friend or a friend for a foe, what consolation have we in this human society, full of mistakes and distresses, save the unfeigned faith and mutual affection of true and good friends? But the more friends we have, and the more widely scattered they are, the further and more widely spread are our fears lest some evil may befall them among the accumulated evils of this age. For we are anxious not only for fear lest they may be afflicted by hunger, warfare, disease, captivity and the unimaginable sufferings of slavery, but also with far more bitter fear lest friendship be changed into perfidy, malice and villainy. And when these contingencies do occur, more frequently as our friends are the more numerous, and the tidings come to our knowledge, who, save the man who experiences them, can conceive of the pain that consumes our hearts? Indeed, we would rather hear that they were dead, although this, too, we could not hear without sorrow.

For if their lives delighted us with the comforts of friendship, how could it be that their death should bring us no sadness? He who would forbid such sadness must forbid, if he can, all friendly conversation, must interdict or intercept all friendly affection, must break with harsh brutality the bonds of all human relationships, or else lay down the law that they must be so indulged that no pleasure may be derived from them. But if this is utterly impossible, how can it be that a man's death shall not be bitter to us if his life be sweet to us? For hence it is that the sorrow of a heart not devoid of human feeling is like some wound or sore for whose healing we use as salve our kindly messages of comfort. Nor must it be supposed that there is nothing to be healed merely because healing is the easier and the more rapid the finer a man's spirit is. Since, then, the life of mortals is afflicted now more gently, again more harshly, by the death of those very dear to us, and especially of those whose performance of public duties is needful for human society, nevertheless we would rather hear of or behold the death of those whom we love than perceive that they have fallen from faith or virtue, that is, that the soul itself has suffered death. The earth is full of this vast store of evils; wherefore it is written: "Is man's life on earth anything but temptation?" And therefore the Lord himself says: "Woe to the world because of offences"; and again: "Because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold." The result is that we feel thankful at the death of good men among our friends, and that, though their death brings sorrow, it is the more surely mitigated in that they have been spared those evils by which in this life even good men are crushed or contaminated or at least are in danger of either fate.

- ix. *About the Friendship of the Holy Angels, Which Can Not Be Manifest to Man in this Life Because of the Deceitfulness of the Demons into Whose Power Have Fallen Those Who Judged It Proper to Worship Many Gods.*

On the other hand, the society of the holy angels, which those philosophers who held that the gods are our friends placed at a fourth level as it were (passing from the earth to the universe in order thereby in a way to embrace heaven itself), we have no fear lest such friends bring us grief by their death or deterioration. But because they do not mingle with us with the familiarity of men (which in itself is also one of the distresses of this life), and because, as we read, Satan sometimes takes the form of an angel of light in order to tempt men who are in need of the discipline so provided, or deserve to be deceived, there is great need of God's mercy lest some one, when he thinks that he enjoys the friendship of good angels, be enjoying the feigned friendship of evil demons and suffering from their enmity, which is the more harmful the more shrewd and deceitful they are. Indeed, who is in need of this mercy of God if not men in their great misery, which is so weighed down by ignorance as easily to be deceived by such masquerades? And indeed it is most certain that those philosophers in the sacrilegious city who said that the gods were their friends have fallen into the company of the malignant demons to whom that city itself is altogether subject and with whom it will suffer everlasting punishment. The truth is sufficiently revealed by those beings who are worshipped by them, in the sacred, or rather sacrilegious, rites, and in the most filthy shows in which their crimes are celebrated; it is those same demons on whose authority and demand

the worshippers supposed that showed required as propitiation.

- x. *What Reward Is Begotten for the End of this Life.*

But not even the saints and the faithful God are safe from the deceitful demons. For in this region of wealth also not without its uses in causing a sense of safety where peace is most completely bestowed on our nature by the creature everlasting, not only as regards the body, which will be free from struggle against any vice or the reward of victory, an eternal peace indeed is the final blessedness, the devouring end. Here, to be sure, however small may be the portion of this blessedness, when compared with downright misery. So when we are in this mortal estate, if we live rightly, but when we have it not, virtue makes us suffer. But true virtue is this: to use of, and all that it does in making itself, to that end where our peace cannot be improved or increased.

- xi. *About the Blessedness of the End of this Life or True Perfection.*

We might say, therefore, of peace that it is the end of all our good, especially of the city of God, about which our laudation. Jerusalem, praise thy God, O Zion, thy gates; he has blessed thy children. For when the bars of her gates are shut out of her; so we must understand that finally it is our purpose to deny the city itself, Jerusalem, as we have seen in the word "peace" is often applied to things in which there is no eternal life, we know in which shall be found its supreme end. But about this end the Apostle says: "You are servants to God, you have your freedom." But, on the other hand, because of this eternal life by those who are not free from the eye to the immortality of the soul or with an eye to our own belief

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the worshippers supposed that shows so full of such vile indecencies were required as propitiation.

x. *What Reward Is Begotten for the Saints of Their Victory over the Temptation of this Life.*

But not even the saints and the faithful worshippers of the one true and most high God are safe from the deceptions and the manifold temptations of the demons. For in this region of weakness and in these evil days such anxiety is also not without its uses in causing them to seek with a keener longing that place of safety where peace is most complete and assured. For there the gifts of nature, bestowed on our nature by the creator of all natures, shall be not only good but everlasting, not only as regards the spirit, which is healed by wisdom, but also as regards the body, which will be restored by resurrection. There the virtues shall not struggle against any vice or evil whatsoever, but shall hold in possession the reward of victory, an eternal peace that no adversary can disquiet. For this indeed is the final blessedness, the end of perfect attainment that knows no devouring end. Here, to be sure, we are called blessed when we have peace, however small may be the portion which we can possess here in a good life; but this blessedness, when compared to that final blessedness, is found to be downright misery. So when we mortals have such peace as we can enjoy in this mortal estate, if we live rightly, virtue makes the right use of its good things; but when we have it not, virtue makes good use even of the ills from which men suffer. But true virtue is this: to subordinate all the good things that it makes use of, and all that it does in making good use of good and evil things, and also itself, to that end where our peace shall be so excellent and so great that it cannot be improved or increased.

xi. *About the Blessedness of the Everlasting Peace in Which the Saints Find Their End or True Perfection.*

We might say, therefore, of peace, as we have said of the eternal life, that it is the end of all our good, especially since the sacred psalmist says of the city of God, about which our laborious work is written: "Praise the Lord, Jerusalem, praise thy God, O Zion; for he has strengthened the bars of thy gates; he has blessed thy children within thee; he has made thy borders peace." For when the bars of her gates are strengthened, then none shall go in or come out of her; so we must understand that her borders are that peace whose finality it is our purpose to demonstrate. For even the mystic name of the city itself, Jerusalem, as we have said before, means "vision of peace." But since the word "peace" is often applied to the story of our mortal days, where certainly there is no eternal life, we have preferred to call the end of this city, that in which shall be found its supreme good, eternal life rather than peace. And about this end the Apostle says: "But now, being freed from sin, and become servants to God, you have your fruit unto holiness, and the end life everlasting." But, on the other hand, because the life of the wicked may also be held to be eternal life by those who are not familiar with the holy scriptures, either with an eye to the immortality of the soul that is also taught by certain philosophers, or with an eye to our own belief in the endless punishment of the wicked, who

surely cannot be tormented forever if they are not also to live forever, it behooves us to say, in order that all may understand our meaning more easily, that the end of this city, whereby it will possess its supreme good, may be put either way, as peace in everlasting life or as everlasting life in peace. For so great a good is peace that even where earthly and mortal affairs are in question no other word is heard with more pleasure, nothing else is desired with greater longing, and finally nothing better can be found. So if we choose to speak about it at a little greater length, we shall not be tedious to our readers, I think, both because our theme is the end of this city and because of the very sweetness of peace, which is dear to all.

- xii. *That Even the Fierceness of Those at War and All the Restless Drives of Men Have in Them a Yearning to Attain the End of Peace, a Good that Is Sought by Every Creature.*

Whoever reviews at all, with me, the pattern of human affairs and our common nature observes that just as there is no man who does not wish joy, so there is no man who does not wish peace. For even they who choose warfare desire nothing but victory; it follows that they desire by waging war to arrive at a glorious peace. For what else is victory but the conquest of the other party to the fight? And when this is achieved, there will be peace. Wars also, then, are waged in a struggle for peace, even by those who seek a field of training for prowess in war, whether in command or in personal combat. It follows that peace is the desired end of war. For every man even in the act of waging war is in quest of peace, but no one is in quest of war when he makes peace. For even those who prefer that a state of peace should be upset do so not because they hate peace but because they desire a different state of peace that will meet their wishes. Therefore they do not desire that there shall be no peace, but only that the peace shall be such as they choose. And supposing even that they have separated themselves from other men by sedition, they cannot effect their design without maintaining some sort of peace with their confederates and fellow conspirators. Why, even robbers, in order the more violently and the more safely to attack the peace of other men, choose to maintain peace with their comrades.

Why, even though one man may be so preëminent in strength and so cautious in letting no one know his secrets that he trusts no partner, but lies in wait and triumphs alone, taking his booty after overcoming and slaying such as he can, yet he keeps up some shadow of peace with those whom he cannot kill and from whom he wishes to conceal his deeds. And in his own home he surely strives to be at peace with his wife and children and any other members of the household, since there is no doubt that he is pleased when they are at his beck and call; for if they disobey, he is angry, he rebukes and punishes, and if need be he secures even by cruelty the peace of his home, which, he judges, cannot exist unless all the other members of the same domestic society are subject to one chief; and this chief, in his own home, is himself. So if he were offered the servitude of many, whether of a city or of a nation, on the same terms that he had imposed on his own household, he would no longer keep himself concealed out of sight like a brigand, but would lift his royal head before men's eyes, though the same covetousness and malice were still in him. Thus all men

desire to have peace with their own they decree. For even those against to make their own, and to impose their own peace.

But let us imagine a man such unsocial and wild that they have rather than a man. Although, then, cave, and although he himself was from it (the Greek for "bad" is *kakos*), had no wife to exchange fond words with, none to command when they were the enjoyment of conversation, none he much surpassed merely because he gave to none, but took what he could; nevertheless in the very season always reeking with fresh carnage peace unmolested by any, a peace without violence or the fear of it. In a word, body; and so far as he succeeded in his commands; and in order to pacify when it rebelled against him through wage a civil war that aimed to sever and devoured. And yet, cruel by his cruelty and savagery for that, been willing to keep the peace within his cave and with himself, he would man. Or if the ugliness of his body off human companions, perhaps it the need of keeping alive that he was or more likely, that he was not such Hercules would be underpraised in existence of such a man, or rather of the poets, is not credited.

For even the most savage beasts, (for he was in fact called half-wild cohabitation, by begetting, bearing most of them are not gregarious, but and bees, but like lions, wolves, and softly purr over her cubs and subduer, kite, however solitary in circling the nest, hatch the eggs, rear the young brood as peaceful a domestic society moved by the laws of his nature, all his fellow men, and to maintain wicked men wage war to protect their all men their own, if they could, and master. And how could that be, through love or through fear? So pride is a society of peers under God, but se

they are not also to live forever, it behooves us to understand our meaning more easily, that the end of its supreme good, may be put either in this or in the next life in peace. For so great a good, nothing else is desired with greater desire. So if we choose to speak about it, it will not be tedious to our readers, I think, both because of the very sweetness of

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the pattern of human affairs and our comfort is no man who does not wish joy, so peace. For even they who choose warfare think that they desire by waging war to arrive at peace, but the conquest of the other party, there will be peace. Wars also, then, are fought by those who seek a field of training for personal combat. It follows that peace is not even in the act of waging war in itself, but in the war when he makes peace. For even if one should be upset do so not because they are in a different state of peace that will meet their desire that there shall be no peace, but only because of war. And supposing even that they have made peace, they cannot effect their design with their confederates and fellow soldiers, but more violently and the more they choose to maintain peace with their

to preëminent in strength and so cautious he trusts no partner, but lies in wait and overcomes and slaying such as he can, he is with those whom he cannot kill and slays. And in his own home he surely kills his children and any other members of the household. He is pleased when they are at his beck and call, he rebukes and punishes, and if need be, he drives them from his home, which, he judges, cannot be the same domestic society are subject to him, is himself. So if he were offered the crown of a nation, on the same terms that he would no longer keep himself concealed, he would lift his royal head before men's eyes, but malice was still in him. Thus all men

AUGUSTINE

desire to have peace with their own associates, when they wish them to live as they decree. For even those against whom they wage war they wish, if they can, to make their own, and to impose on them after their subjection the laws of their own peace.

But let us imagine a man such as epic and mythical poetry describe, one so unsociable and wild that they have perhaps preferred to call him a semi-man rather than a man. Although, then, his kingdom was the solitude of a dismal cave, and although he himself was so exceedingly bad that his name derived from it (the Greek for "bad" is *kakos*, and Cacus was his name); although he had no wife to exchange fond words with him, no little children to play with, none to command when they were somewhat bigger, no friends to give him the enjoyment of conversation, not even his father Vulcan (whose happiness he much surpassed merely because he begot no monster like himself); although he gave to none, but took what he chose from any one he chose whenever he could; nevertheless in the very solitude of his cave, "the floor of which was always reeking with fresh carnage," as the poet says, all that he desired was peace unmolested by any, a peace whose calm was untroubled by any man's violence or the fear of it. In a word, he longed to be at peace with his own body; and so far as he succeeded in this, all was well with him. His limbs obeyed his commands; and in order to pacify with all possible speed his mortal nature when it rebelled against him through its impoverishment, and incited hunger to wage a civil war that aimed to sever and eject his soul from his body, he ravished, slew and devoured. And yet, cruel and savage though he was, he was providing by his cruelty and savagery for the peace of his life and safety; so if he had been willing to keep the peace with other men as he was content to keep it in his cave and with himself, he would not be called bad or a monster or a semi-man. Or if the ugliness of his body and his belching of murky flames frightened off human companions, perhaps it was not through lust for harm but through the need of keeping alive that he was fierce. But it may be that he never existed, or more likely, that he was not such as he is described with poetic fancy; for Hercules would be underpraised if Cacus were not too much abused. So the existence of such a man, or rather semi-man, as I have said, like many fictions of the poets, is not credited.

For even the most savage beasts, from whom he derived a part of his savagery (for he was in fact called half-wild), preserve their species by a sort of peace: by cohabitation, by begetting, bearing, suckling and rearing their young, although most of them are not gregarious, but solitary; not like sheep, deer, doves, starlings and bees, but like lions, wolves, foxes, eagles and owls. What tigress does not softly purr over her cubs and subdue her fierceness as she caresses them? What kite, however solitary in circling over his prey, does not join a mate, build a nest, hatch the eggs, rear the young birds and maintain with the mother of his brood as peaceful a domestic society as possible? How much more is a man moved by the laws of his nature, so to speak, to enter upon a fellowship with all his fellow men, and to maintain peace with them, so far as he can, since even wicked men wage war to protect the peace of their own fellows, and would make all men their own, if they could, so that all men and all things might serve one master. And how could that be, unless they accepted his peace either through love or through fear? So pride is a perverse imitation of God. For it abhors a society of peers under God, but seeks to impose its own rule, instead of his, on

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society. In other words, it abhors the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace; but peace, of some kind or other, it cannot help loving. For no creature's vice is so completely at odds with nature that it destroys the very last traces of nature.

He, then, who knows enough to prefer right to wrong and the orderly to the perverse, sees that the peace of the unjust, compared with that of the just, does not deserve the name of peace at all. Yet even the perverted must be in, or in dependence upon, or in accord with a part of the whole order of things in which it rests or of which it is made; otherwise it could not exist at all. Just as if a man were to hang with his head downwards, this position of body and limbs is certainly perverted, because the normal attitude of nature is turned topsyturvy. This perverted position disturbs the peace of the flesh, and is therefore painful; yet the spirit is at peace with its body, and labours for its preservation, and that is why there is one that suffers. But if it is banished from the body by its pains, then so long as the framework of the limbs remains, there is still a sort of peace among them, and that is why there is still some one to hang there. And because the earthly body presses earthwards, and pulls against the bond by which it is suspended, it tends toward its proper peace, and by the plea of its weight, so to speak, demands a place of rest; and now, though lifeless and without sensation, it does not depart from the peace natural to its rank, whether while possessed of it or while tending toward it. For if preservative and treatment are applied to prevent the form of the corpse from dissolution and disintegration, a sort of peace still unites the several parts, and keeps the whole mass attached to its fitting and therefore its peaceable place in the earth.

But if no treatment for embalming is given, and nature is left to take its course, for a time the body is jarred by warring exhalations, offensive to our senses (for that is what we smell in case of putrefaction), until the body joins company with the elements of the world, and little by little, particle by particle, it departs to enter into their peace. And yet in this process not a whit is abated from the laws of the most high Creator and Ruler by whom the peace of the universe is administered. For although tiny animals breed in the carcass of a larger animal, by the same law of the Creator all these little creatures serve in salutary peace their own little spirits. And although the flesh of dead animals be devoured by other animals, no matter where it is transported, no matter what other things it is mixed with, no matter what transformation or permutation it undergoes, it still finds itself among the same laws that are everywhere diffused for the preservation of every mortal species, and act as peacemakers in that they match the parts that belong together.

XIII. *About the Universal Peace, Which Amid All Disturbances Whatsoever Is Preserved by a Law of Nature, While Every One Under the Decree of the Just Judge Attains to the Ordered State that He Has Earned by His Free Will.*

The peace of the body, therefore, is an ordered proportionment of its components; the peace of the irrational soul is an ordered repose of the appetites; the peace of the rational soul is the ordered agreement of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the ordered life and health of a living creature; peace between mortal man and God is an ordered obedience in the faith under an

everlasting law; peace between men and peace is an ordered agreement among command and obedience; the peace of the universe is the ordered agreement and fully concordant fellowship in the government by union with God; the peace of the world is the classification of things equal to their position.

Therefore the wretched,—for, in a state of peace,—lack the tumultuous activity; nevertheless, because in that very wretchedness of their realm of order. Though they are not a law of order that they are separated from tumultuous activity, they are slightly. Hence there is among them some peace. But they are to some degree free from anxiety, as could justify their being free from it, they, however, if they are not a order is administered. But when the that suffers; but in the part where of nature is not dissolved, peace still without pain, while there can be no without any war, but no war without from the nature of war, but because have some natural being, for they of peace to hold them together.

Therefore there is a nature in which can even exist; but there cannot be not even the nature of the devil but perversity makes it evil. So he did not escape the judgement of the truth; he yet did not thereby flee from the pain imparted to his nature, does not re-ordains his punishment; nor does created, but the evil that the devil had that he gave to his nature; but some that there should be something removed.

And this very pain is evidence of what was left. For had good not been left For a sinner is worse if he rejoices tormented, though he may gain no salvation. And since both righteousness any good is cause for grief rather than compensation in the form of a better bodily health), surely it is more fitting than to rejoice in sin. So even as abandoned what is good is evidence because of the good that he has lost

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peace is an ordered agreement among those who dwell together concerning
command and obedience; the peace of the heavenly city is a perfectly ordered
and fully concordant fellowship in the enjoyment of God and in mutual enjoy-
ment by union with God; the peace of all things is a tranquillity of order. Order
is the classification of things equal and unequal that assigns to each its proper
position.

Therefore the wretched,—for, in so far as they are wretched, they certainly
are not in a state of peace,—lack the tranquillity of order, in which there is no
tumultuous activity; nevertheless, because they are deservedly and justly wretched,
in that very wretchedness of theirs they are still unable to escape from the
realm of order. Though they are not indeed united with the blessed, yet it is by
a law of order that they are separated from them. And when they are free
from tumultuous activity, they are adjusted to their condition, no matter how
slightly. Hence there is among them some tranquillity of order, and therefore
there is among them some peace. But they are wretched because, although they
are to some degree free from anxiety and suffering, they are not in such a case
as could justify their being free from anxiety and suffering. Still more wretched
are they, however, if they are not at peace with the law by which the natural
order is administered. But when they suffer, their peace is embroiled in the part
that suffers; but in the part where there is no torment of pain and the frame
of nature is not dissolved, peace still abides. Just as there can be life, then,
without pain, while there can be no pain without life, so, too, there can be peace
without any war, but no war without some sort of peace. This does not follow
from the nature of war, but because war is waged by or within persons who
have some natural being, for they could not exist if there were not some sort
of peace to hold them together.

Therefore there is a nature in which there is no evil, nay, in which no evil
can even exist; but there cannot be a nature in which there is no good. Hence
not even the nature of the devil himself is evil, so far as it is nature; but
perversity makes it evil. So he did not stand steadfast in the truth, yet did not
escape the judgement of the truth; he did not remain in the tranquillity of order,
yet did not thereby flee from the power of the ordainer. The goodness of God,
imparted to his nature, does not remove him from the justice of God, which
ordains his punishment; nor does God thereby punish the good that he has
created, but the evil that the devil has committed. Nor does God take away all
that he gave to his nature; but something he takes, and something he leaves, so
that there should be something remaining to feel pain at the loss.

And this very pain is evidence of the good that was taken and the good that
was left. For had good not been left, he could not feel pain for the good lost.
For a sinner is worse if he rejoices in the loss of righteousness; but he who is
tormented, though he may gain no good thereby, yet grieves for the loss of
salvation. And since both righteousness and salvation are good, and the loss of
any good is cause for grief rather than for joy (at least where there is no com-
pensation in the form of a better good, as righteousness of soul is better than
bodily health), surely it is more fitting for an unjust man to grieve in punishment
than to rejoice in sin. So even as the rejoicing of a sinner because he has
abandoned what is good is evidence of a bad will, so his grief is punishment,
because of the good that he has lost, is evidence of a good nature. For he who

mourns the lost peace of his nature does so by his possession of some remnants of that peace, by reason of which his nature is friendly to itself. Now it is right that in the last punishment the wicked and impious should weep in their torments for the loss of the good that was in their natures, being aware that he who deprived them is an altogether just God whom they scorned when he was the altogether kindly distributor of bounty.

God, then, the most wise creator and most just ordainer of all natures, who has set upon the earth as its greatest adornment the mortal human race, has bestowed on men certain good things that befit this life; to wit, temporal peace, so far as it can be enjoyed in the little span of a mortal life in terms of personal health and preservation and fellowship with one's kind, and all things necessary to safeguard or recover this peace (such as the objects that are suitably and conveniently available for our senses: light, speech, air to breathe and water to drink, and whatever befits the body, to feed and cover it, to heal and adorn it); all this under the most just condition that every mortal who rightly uses such goods, that are designed to contribute to the peace of mortals, shall receive larger and better goods, that is, the peace of immortality, and the glory and honour appropriate to it in an everlasting life spent in the enjoyment of God and of one's neighbour in union with God; while he who uses the goods of this life perversely shall lose them, and shall not receive those of the everlasting life.

xiv. *About Order and Law, Whether Earthly or Heavenly, by Which Human Society Is Both the Concern of Those Who Rule and Served by Their Concern.*

Therefore every use of temporal things is related to the enjoyment of earthly peace in the earthly city, while in the heavenly city it is related to the enjoyment of everlasting peace. Wherefore, if we were irrational animals, we should seek nothing beyond the ordered proportionment of the components of the body and the assuagement of the appetites; nothing, that is, beyond repose of the flesh and good store of pleasures, so that the peace of the body might further serve the peace of the soul. For if bodily peace be wanting, the peace of the irrational soul is also impaired, because it cannot achieve the assuagement of its appetites. But the two together serve the mutual peace of soul and body, the peace of an ordered life and of health. For just as animals, by avoiding pain, show that they love bodily peace, and by pursuing pleasure in order to satisfy the wants of their appetites show that they love peace of soul, so by their shunning death they give a sufficient indication how great is their love of the peace that harmonizes soul and body.

But because man has a rational soul, he subordinates all that he has in common with the beasts to the peace of the rational soul in order that he may exercise his mind in contemplation and may act in accordance with it, and in order that he may thus enjoy that ordered agreement of knowledge and action which we called the peace of the rational soul. It is for this end that he ought to prefer to be annoyed by no pain, moved by no desire, and dissipated by no death, namely, that he may discover some profitable knowledge and may shape his life and character in accordance with such knowledge. But lest by his very eagerness for knowledge he should fall, through the weakness of the human mind, into some fatal infection of error, he needs divine instruction that he may follow with assu-

rance, and divine assistance that he may long as he is in this mortal body, he wander by faith, not by sight, and therefore he submit of both, to that peace which exists before God, that he may show an ordered obedience.

Now since the divine instructor teaches love of one's neighbour, and since in them himself, and his neighbour, and he who loves it follows that he is concerned also for his since he is bidden to love his neighbour as wife, his children, his household and for would wish his neighbour to be so concerned in need of it. Therefore he will be at peace that human peace, or ordered agreement, harm to no man, and, secondly, to help even, he has the care of his own household of human society provides him with a read their interest. Wherefore the Apostle says own, and especially for those of his household than an infidel." So at this point begins among those who dwell together, concern who are concerned for others give commands to their children, the masters to their subjects of concern obey; for example, the we their parents, the servants their masters. lives by faith and who is still a pilgrim in who give commands serve those whom t mand not through lust for rule but through pride in exercising princely rule but with

xv. *About the Freedom Natural to Man, the Prime Cause Is Sin, Because a Man Is Not the Property of Another*

This is the prescription of the order of For, he says: "Let him have dominion over that fly in the heavens, and over every creature. For he did not wish a rational creature, man save over irrational creatures: not man only was that the first just men were established kings of men, so that even so God might the principle of gradation among his creatures demands; for of course it is understood imposed on the sinner. Wherefore we do Scriptures until the just man Noah bran earned this name by his fault, not by his "slave" is believed to be derived from the might have been put to death, when preserved so named from their preservation. But even

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rance, and divine assistance that he may follow it as a freeman. And since, so
long as he is in this mortal body, he wanders on alien soil far from God, he walks
by faith, not by sight, and therefore he subordinates all peace, of body or of soul
or of both, to that peace which exists between mortal man and the immortal
God, that he may show an ordered obedience in faith under the everlasting law.

Now since the divine instructor teaches two chief precepts, love of God and
love of one's neighbour, and since in them man finds three objects of love, God,
himself, and his neighbour, and he who loves God does not err in loving himself,
it follows that he is concerned also for his neighbour that he should love God,
since he is bidden to love his neighbour as himself. He is thus concerned for his
wife, his children, his household and for other men so far as he can be; and he
would wish his neighbour to be so concerned for him, should he perchance stand
in need of it. Therefore he will be at peace, so far as in him lies, with all men in
that human peace, or ordered agreement, of which the pattern is this: first, to do
harm to no man, and, secondly, to help every man that he can. In the first place,
then, he has the care of his own household, inasmuch as the order of nature or
of human society provides him with a readier and easier access to them for seeking
their interest. Wherefore the Apostle says: "Whosoever does not provide for his
own, and especially for those of his household, he denies the faith, and is worse
than an infidel." So at this point begins domestic peace, the ordered agreement
among those who dwell together, concerning command and obedience. For those
who are concerned for others give commands, the husband to his wife, the
parents to their children, the masters to their servants; while those who are ob-
jects of concern obey; for example, the women obey their husbands, the children
their parents, the servants their masters. But in the home of the just man who
lives by faith and who is still a pilgrim in exile from the celestial city, even those
who give commands serve those whom they seem to command. For they com-
mand not through lust for rule but through dutiful concern for others, not with
pride in exercising princely rule but with mercy in providing for others.

Hippocratic
OATH.

xv. *About the Freedom Natural to Man, and About the Servitude of Which
the Prime Cause Is Sin, Because a Man Whose Will Is Evil, Even Though
He Is Not the Property of Another Man, Is the Slave of His Own Lust.*

This is the prescription of the order of nature, and thus has God created man.
For, he says: "Let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds
that fly in the heavens, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth."
For he did not wish a rational creature, made in his own image, to have dominion
save over irrational creatures: not man over man, but man over the beasts. So it
was that the first just men were established as shepherds of flocks, rather than as
kings of men, so that even so God might indirectly point out what is required by
the principle of gradation among his creatures, and what the guilt of sinners
demands; for of course it is understood that the condition of slavery is justly
imposed on the sinner. Wherefore we do not read of a slave anywhere in the
Scriptures until the just man Noah branded his son's sin with this word; so he
earned this name by his fault, not by nature. The origin of the Latin word for
"slave" is believed to be derived from the fact that those who by the law of war
might have been put to death, when preserved by their victors, became slaves,
so named from their preservation. But even this could not have occurred were it

not for the wages of sin; for even when a just war is waged, the enemy fights to defend his sin, and every victory, even when won by wicked men, humbles the vanquished through a divine judgement, correcting or punishing their sins. Witness the man of God, Daniel, who in captivity confesses to God his own sins and those of his people, and in pious sorrow recognizes in them the cause of his captivity. The prime cause of slavery, then, is sin, so that man was put under man in a state of bondage; and this can be only by a judgement of God, in whom there is no unrighteousness, and who knows how to assign divers punishments according to the deserts of the sinners.

But as our Lord in heaven says: "Every man who sins is the slave of his sins," so many wicked masters, though they have religious men as their slaves, yet are not on that account themselves free; "For by whom a man is vanquished, to him is he also bound as a slave." And surely it is a happier lot to be slave to a man than to a lust; for the most cruel overlord that desolates men's hearts, to mention no other, is this very lust for overlordship. Moreover, in a peaceful order in which some men are subjected to others, humility is as beneficial to servants as pride is harmful to masters. But by nature, in which God first created man, no man is the slave either of another man or of sin. Yet slavery as a punishment is also ordained by that law which bids us to preserve the natural order and forbids us to disturb it; for if nothing had been done contrary to that law, there would have been nothing requiring the check of punishment by slavery. For this reason too the Apostle admonishes slaves to be subject to their masters, and to serve them heartily and with good will, so that if they cannot be freed by their masters they may themselves make their very slavery in some sense free, by serving not in crafty fear but in faithful affection, until all wickedness pass away and all lordship and human authority be done away with and God be all in all.

xvi. *About Equitable Rule of Masters over Slaves.*

Therefore even if our righteous fathers had slaves, they so administered domestic peace as to distinguish the lot of children from the condition of slaves in regard to these temporal goods; yet in regard to the worship of God, in whom we should find our hope of everlasting goods, they took thought with an equal affection for all the members of their households. And this the order of nature prescribes, so that from it the name of *paterfamilias* arose, and has been so widely used that even those who rule unjustly are glad to be called by it. But those who are true fathers of their households take thought for all in their households just as for their children, to see that they worship and win God's favour, desiring and praying that they may reach the heavenly home where the duty of commanding men will not be necessary, because there will be no duty of taking thought for those who are already happy in that immortal state; but until they arrive there the fathers are more obligated to maintain their position as masters than the slaves to keep their place as servants.

So if any one in the household by disobedience breaks the domestic peace, he is rebuked by a word or a blow or some other kind of just and legitimate punishment, to the extent permitted by human fellowship, for the sake of the offender, so that he may be closely joined to the peace from which he broke away. For just as it is no kindness to help a man at the cost of his losing a greater good, so it is not blameless behaviour to spare a man at the cost of his falling into a graver

sin. Hence blamelessness involves the obligation but also to restrain a man from sinning or that either the man himself who is chastised or others may be deterred by his example. Since the beginning or least part of the city, and end of its own kind and every part to the part, it follows clearly enough that domestic is, that the ordered agreement concerning those who dwell together in a household concerning command and obedience among father of a family ought to draw his precepts his household that it shall be in harmony

xvii. *About the Origin of Peace and of Domestic Societies.*

But a household of human beings whose an earthly peace by means of the good temporal life, while a household of those who blessings that are promised for the future, earthly and temporal things, not letting the path that leads to God, but making the burden and by no means to aggravate body, which weighs down the soul. Therefore of households use alike the things that are has its own very different end in using the not by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and its ing command and obedience on the part of of human wills in regard to the things that the heavenly city, or rather the part of the life and lives by faith, needs must make use this mortal lot which has need of it shall pass its life in captivity, as it were, being a stranger already received the promise of redemption. of it, it does not hesitate to obey the laws of minister to the support of mortal life as a mortal life is common to both, a harmony with regard to the things that belong to it.

But because the earthly city has had ce doctrine is rejected by the divine teaching, a were deceived by demons, and so believed to support human interests, and that different abilities of theirs, so that the body is the pro in the body, one governs the head, another the several members; likewise in the soul, gence, another over education, another ov in the adjuncts of life, one god cares for wine, oil, woods, money, navigation, wars a and so forth; and because the heavenly cit

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

The first of these is the fact that the United States is a young nation. It is only about 150 years old, and its history is therefore a history of rapid growth and change. The second is the fact that the United States is a large nation. It covers a vast area of land, and its population is one of the largest in the world. The third is the fact that the United States is a diverse nation. It is made up of many different peoples, races, and religions, and this diversity has been a source of both strength and conflict. The fourth is the fact that the United States is a nation of immigrants. Most of the people who live in the United States today are the descendants of immigrants from other countries. This has made the United States a melting pot of different cultures and traditions. The fifth is the fact that the United States is a nation of pioneers. From the first settlers to the present day, Americans have been known for their spirit of adventure and their willingness to explore new frontiers. The sixth is the fact that the United States is a nation of freedom. It is a country where the rights of the individual are highly valued, and where the government is limited in its power. The seventh is the fact that the United States is a nation of progress. It has been at the forefront of many of the great inventions and discoveries of the modern world. The eighth is the fact that the United States is a nation of power. It is one of the most powerful countries in the world, both in terms of its military and its economic strength. The ninth is the fact that the United States is a nation of hope. It is a country where the future is seen as a land of opportunity, and where the American dream is still a powerful ideal. The tenth is the fact that the United States is a nation of love. It is a country where the people are known for their kindness and their willingness to help others. These are the ten characteristics that make the United States a unique and important nation in the world.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

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n a just war is waged, the enemy fights
en when won by wicked men, humbles
ment correcting or punishing their sins.
n c. City confesses to God his own sins
row recognizes in them the cause of his
hen, is sin, so that man was put under
be only by a judgement of God, in whom
nows how to assign divers punishments

ry man who sins is the slave of his sins,"
ave religious men as their slaves, yet are
r by whom a man is vanquished, to him
it is a happier lot to be slave to a man
d that desolates men's hearts, to mention
o. Moreover, in a peaceful order in which
lity is as beneficial to servants as pride is
ich God first created man, no man is the
t slavery as a punishment is also ordained
e natural order and forbids us to disturb
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wickedness pass away and all lordship
th and God be all in all.

over Slaves.

had slaves, they so administered domestic
n f. the condition of slaves in regard
the worship of God, in whom we should
y took thought with an equal affection
And this the order of nature prescribes,
s arose, and has been so widely used that
o be called by it. But those who are true
it for all in their households just as for
ind win God's favour, desiring and pray-
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tal state; but until they arrive there the
their position as masters than the slaves

obedience breaks the domestic peace, he
other kind of just and legitimate punish-
fellowship, for the sake of the offender,
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e cost of his losing a greater good, so it
an at the cost of his falling into a graver

sin. Hence blamelessness involves the obligation not only to do evil to no man
but also to restrain a man from sinning or to punish him if he has sinned, so
that either the man himself who is chastised may be reformed by his experience
or others may be deterred by his example. Since, then, a man's house ought to be
the beginning or least part of the city, and every beginning ministers to some
end of its own kind and every part to the integrity of the whole of which it is a
part, it follows clearly enough that domestic peace ministers to civic peace, that
is, that the ordered agreement concerning command and obedience among
those who dwell together in a household ministers to the ordered agreement
concerning command and obedience among citizens. Thus we see that the
father of a family ought to draw his precepts from the law of the city, and so rule
his household that it shall be in harmony with the peace of the city.

xvii. *About the Origin of Peace and of Discord Between the Heavenly and the Earthly Societies.*

But a household of human beings whose life is not governed by faith pursues
an earthly peace by means of the good things and the conveniences of this tem-
poral life, while a household of those who live by faith looks to the everlasting
blessings that are promised for the future, using like one in a strange land any
earthly and temporal things, not letting them entrap him or divert him from
the path that leads to God, but making them a means to brace his efforts to ease
the burden and by no means to aggravate the load imposed by the corruptible
body, which weighs down the soul. Therefore both kinds of human groups and
of households use alike the things that are necessary for this mortal life; but each
has its own very different end in using them. So, too, the earthly city, that lives
not by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and its end in aiming at agreement concern-
ing command and obedience on the part of citizens is limited to a sort of merging
of human wills in regard to the things that are useful for this mortal life. Whereas
the heavenly city, or rather the part of it that goes its pilgrim way in this mortal
life and lives by faith, needs must make use of this peace too, though only until
this mortal lot which has need of it shall pass away. Therefore, so long as it leads
its life in captivity, as it were, being a stranger in the earthly city, although it has
already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the spirit as a pledge
of it, it does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city whereby matters that
minister to the support of mortal life are administered to the end that since this
mortal life is common to both, a harmony may be preserved between both cities
with regard to the things that belong to it.

But because the earthly city has had certain philosophers of its own, whose
doctrine is rejected by the divine teaching, and who followed their own surmise or
were deceived by demons, and so believed that there are many gods to be won over
to support human interests, and that different provinces belong to different responsi-
bilities of theirs, so that the body is the province of one, the soul of another; and
in the body, one governs the head, another the neck, and so forth with each of
the several members; likewise in the soul, one presides over the natural intelli-
gence, another over education, another over anger, still another over lust; and
in the adjuncts of life, one god cares for flocks, other gods severally for grain,
wine, oil, woods, money, navigation, wars and victories, marriage, birth, fecundity
and so forth; and because the heavenly city, on the other hand, knew only one

God to be worshipped and believed with faithful piety that he is to be served with that service which in Greek is called *latreia*, and should be rendered only to God, it has come to pass that the heavenly city could not have common laws of religion with the earthly city, and on this point must dissent and become a tiresome burden to those who thought differently, and must undergo their anger and hatred and persecutions, except that at length it shook the hostile intent of its adversaries with fear of its own numbers and with evidence of the ever-present divine aid.

While this heavenly city, therefore, goes its way as a stranger on earth, it summons citizens from all peoples, and gathers an alien society of all languages, caring naught what difference may be in manners, laws and institutions, by which earthly peace is gained or maintained, abolishing and destroying nothing of the sort, nay rather preserving and following them (for however different they may be among different nations, they aim at one and the same end, earthly peace), provided that there is no hinderance to the religion that teaches the obligation to worship one most high and true God. Even the heavenly city, therefore, in this its pilgrimage makes use of the earthly peace, and guards and seeks the merging of human wills in regard to the things that are useful for man's mortal nature, so far as sound piety and religion permit, and makes the earthly peace minister to the heavenly peace, which is so truly peace that it must be deemed and called the only peace, at least of a rational creature, being, as it is, the best ordered and most harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God and on one another in God. And when we arrive thither, there shall be no mortal life, but a life indeed; no animal body to burden the soul with its corruption, but a spiritual body that wants nothing and is subdued in every part to the will. This peace the heavenly city during its pilgrimage enjoys by faith, and by this faith it lives justly when it makes the attainment of that peace the goal of every good action in which it engages for the service of God and one's neighbour; for the life of a city is certainly a social life.

xviii. *How Different the Uncertainty of the New Academy Is from the Certainty of the Christian Faith.*

As to that peculiarity which Varro alleges to be a characteristic of the New Academy, the uncertainty of everything, the city of God utterly denounces such doubt, as madness. About matters that its mind and reason apprehend it has most certain knowledge, even though it is slight because of the corruptible body that weighs down the spirit; for, as the Apostle says: "We know in part." It also trusts in all matters the evidence of the senses, which the mind uses through the agency of the body; for wretchedly deceived indeed is he who supposes that they should never be trusted. It believes, too, in the holy Scriptures, old and new, that we call canonical, whence comes the very faith by which the just man lives; by this faith we walk without doubting, so long as we are exiled from the Lord on our pilgrimage. Provided that this faith is sound and certain, we may without just reproach feel doubt about some matters that neither sense nor reason have perceived, and that have not been revealed to us by the canonical Scriptures, and that have not come to our knowledge through witnesses whom it is absurd not to trust.

xxiv. *What Definition of a People and of the Romans but Other Kingdoms.*

But if a people be defined not in this way: "A people is a large gathering by their agreement about the object they perceive the character of each people, and is united in fellowship by common love." Yet whatever it loves, if it is a large gathering and is united in fellowship by common love, then there is no absurdity in using the term of the objects of its united love, the better of its love, the worse the people. Accord people is a people, and its estate is with loved in its early and in subsequent time into bloody sedition and then into social corrupted that very unity of heart, which history bears witness, and I have dealt with. And yet I shall not on this account say people's estate is not a state, so long as there is of rational beings united in fellowship by love of its love. But what I have said about be understood to have said and meant any other Greeks, of the Egyptians, of of any other nation whatsoever, when it sway, whether small or great. For in ge by God, since it is disobedient to the offered save to himself only, whereby in and faithful rule over the body and rea

xxv. *That There Can Be No True Vi*

For however praiseworthy may seem and of the reason over the vices, if the God has commanded that he should rule the body and the vices. For wha vices can a mind be that knows not subject to his command is prostituted to demons? Accordingly, the very virtue of which it rules the body and the vices, whatsoever, if it does not subordinate than virtues. For although some suppose when they are made subject to them even then they are puffed up and rather than as virtues. For as it is not makes the flesh live, but something above man but something above man that true not only of man but of every heav

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xxiv. *What Definition of a People and of a State Must Be Accepted If Not Only
the Romans but Other Kingdoms Are to Claim These Titles.*

But if a people be defined not in this but in some other manner, for example,
in this way: "A people is a large gathering of rational beings united in fellow-
ship by their agreement about the objects of their love," then surely, in order to
perceive the character of each people, we must inspect the objects of its love.
Yet whatever it loves, if it is a large gathering, not of cattle but of rational beings,
and is united in fellowship by common agreement about the objects of its love,
then there is no absurdity in using the term "people" of it; and surely the better
the objects of its united love, the better the people, and the worse the objects
of its love, the worse the people. According to this definition of ours, the Roman
people is a people, and its estate is without doubt a state. But what this people
loved in its early and in subsequent times, and by what moral decline it passed
into bloody sedition and then into social and civil warfare, and disrupted and
corrupted that very unity of heart, which is, so to speak, the health of a people,
history bears witness, and I have dealt with it at length in the preceding books.
And yet I shall not on this account say either that there is no people or that the
people's estate is not a state, so long as there remains, however slight, a gathering
of rational beings united in fellowship by a common agreement about the objects
of its love. But what I have said about this people and about this state let me
be understood to have said and meant about those of the Athenians, those of
any other Greeks, of the Egyptians, of that earlier Babylon of the Assyrians and
of any other nation whatsoever, when they maintained in their states an imperial
sway, whether small or great. For in general a city of the impious, not governed
by God, since it is disobedient to the command of God that sacrifice be not
offered save to himself only, whereby in that city the soul should exercise righteous
and faithful rule over the body and reason over the vices, has no true justice.

xxv. *That There Can Be No True Virtues Where There Is No True Religion.*

For however praiseworthy may seem to be the rule of the soul over the body
and of the reason over the vices, if the soul and the reason do not serve God as
God has commanded that he should be served, then in no wise do they rightly
rule the body and the vices. For what kind of mistress over the body and the
vices can a mind be that knows not the true God, and that instead of being
subject to his command is prostituted to the corrupting power of the most vicious
demons? Accordingly, the very virtues that it thinks it possesses, and by means
of which it rules the body and the vices in order to obtain or keep any object
whatsoever, if it does not subordinate them to God, are themselves vices rather
than virtues. For although some suppose that virtues are true and honourable
when they are made subject to themselves and are sought for no further end,
even then they are puffed up and proud, and so must be reckoned as vices
rather than as virtues. For as it is not something that comes from the flesh that
makes the flesh live, but something above it, so it is not something that comes from
man but something above man that makes him live a blessed life; and this is
true not only of man but of every heavenly domination and power.

xxvi. *About the Peace of a People that Is Alienated from God, and the Use Made of It for Pious Ends by the People of God During Their Pilgrimage in the World.*

Wherefore, as the life of the flesh is the soul, so the blessed life of man is God, of whom the sacred scriptures of the Hebrews declare: "Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord." Wretched, therefore, is the people that is alienated from that God. Yet even this people loves a peace of its own, which must not be rejected; but it will not possess it in the end, because it does not make good use of it before the end. But that it should possess this peace meanwhile in this life is important for us, too, since so long as the two cities are intermingled we also profit by the peace of Babylon; and the people of God is by faith so freed from it as meanwhile to be but strangers passing through. For this reason the Apostle too admonished the church to pray for its kings and other high persons, adding these words: "That we may live a quiet and tranquil life with all piety and love." And the prophet Jeremiah, in predicting the captivity that was to befall the ancient people of God, and in bidding them by divine inspiration to go obediently to Babylon and by their very patience to do God service, added his own admonition that they should pray for Babylon, saying: "Because in her peace is your peace"; that is, of course, the temporal peace of the present that is common to the good and the evil alike.

xxvii. *About the Peace of the Servants of God, a Peace Whose Perfect Tranquillity Can Not Be Apprehended in this Temporal Life.*

But the peace that is ours we even now enjoy with God by faith, and we shall enjoy it with him forever by sight. But peace in this life, whether that common to all men or our own special possession, is such as must be called rather a solace of our wretchedness than a positive enjoyment of blessedness. Our very justice, too, though true, thanks to the true final good to which it is subordinated, is nevertheless in this life only such as consists rather in the remission of sins than in the perfection of virtues. Witness the prayer of the whole city of God that is exiled on earth, when it cries out to God through all its members: "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors." And this prayer is not efficacious for those whose faith is without works, and dead, but only for those whose faith brings forth works through love. It is because the reason, though subjected to God, in this mortal condition and in the corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, does not perfectly rule the vices, that just men need such a prayer. For even though the reason exercises command over the vices, surely it is not without a struggle on their part. And even if we fight the good fight or rule as master, after foes of that sort have been defeated and subdued, still in this realm of weakness something creeps in, so that sin is found, if not in quick-acting performance, at least in some tripping utterance or some fitting dalliance of thought.

Hence there is no complete peace so long as mastery is exercised over the vices, because on the one hand the battle is precarious as long as the war continues against such vices as resist, while those that have been defeated do not yet permit a triumph of carefree ease, but are held down under a sway that is still full of anxiety. Among all these temptations, therefore, about which it has been briefly

said in the divine oracles: "Is n who will dare assume that his life us our debts," unless it be a proud bloated, who is justly resisted to humble? Wherefore it is written gives grace." In this life, according and man obeys, the soul rules over when they are rebellious, whether from God himself we seek to obtain forgiveness for our sins, and the benefits received. But in that future ordained and for the sake of which nature will be healed of its sickness no vices, and since nothing either any one of us, the reason will not more; but God will rule man, at pleasure and facility we seek as to for all and for every one, this state be certain; and therefore the peace will be the highest good.

xxviii. *What End Awaits the V*

But, on the other hand, those receive everlasting wretchedness, neither the soul that is alienated body, which will be subjected to be all the harder to bear in that wretchedness is the opposite of peace, the question is to be understood as present in the peace that is heralded and lauded; the questioner note what is harmful it is nothing but the mutual opposition; he imagine more grievous and the passion and passion to the will of neither, and in which the position the body that neither yields to arises, either pain conquers, and health removes the pain. E hand, to torment, and nature least the punishment also should

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servants of God, a Peace Whose Perfect Transcendence is in this Temporal Life.

men now enjoy with God by faith, and we shall have peace in this life, whether that common possession, is such as must be called rather a positive enjoyment of blessedness. Our very end is the final good to which it is subordinated, which consists rather in the remission of sins. Witness the prayer of the whole city of God goes out to God through all its members: "For our debtors." And this prayer is not efficacious for the living, and dead, but only for those whose faith is because the reason, though subjected to the vices in the corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, that just men need such a prayer. For command over the vices, surely it is not without if we fight the good fight or rule as master, defeated and subdued, still in this realm of weakness, is found, if not in quick-acting performance, for some fitting dalliance of thought. So long as mastery is exercised over the vices, the soul is precarious as long as the war continues. Those that have been defeated do not yet permit themselves to be held down under a sway that is still full of vices, therefore, about which it has been briefly

said in the divine oracles: "Is man's life on earth anything but temptation?", who will dare assume that his life is such that he need not say to God: "Forgive us our debts," unless it be a proud man, one not truly great, but puffed up and bloated, who is justly resisted by him who gives grace in abundance to the humble? Wherefore it is written: "God resists the proud, but to the humble he gives grace." In this life, accordingly, justice for the individual means that God rules and man obeys, the soul rules over the body and reason rules over the vices even when they are rebellious, whether by subjugating or by withstanding them, and that from God himself we seek to obtain favour for our well-deserving deeds and forgiveness for our sins, and that we offer our service of thanksgiving for the benefits received. But in that final peace to which this justice should be subordinated and for the sake of winning which it should be maintained, since our nature will be healed of its sickness by immortality and incorruption and will have no vices, and since nothing either in ourselves or in another will be at war with any one of us, the reason will not need to rule the vices, since they will be no more; but God will rule man, and soul the body, and we shall find in obeying a pleasure and facility as great as the felicity of our living and reigning. And there, for all and for every one, this state will be everlasting, and its everlastingness will be certain; and therefore the peace of this blessedness, and the blessedness of this peace, will be the highest good.

xxviii. *What End Awaits the Wicked.*

But, on the other hand, those who do not belong to that city of God will receive everlasting wretchedness, which is called also the second death, because neither the soul that is alienated from God's life can be said to live there, nor the body, which will be subjected to everlasting torments; and this second death will be all the harder to bear in that it cannot find an end in death. But since, just as wretchedness is the opposite of blessedness, and death of life, so war is the opposite of peace, the question is properly raised what or what sort of war can be understood as present in the final state of the wicked, to correspond to the peace that is heralded and lauded in the final state of the righteous. But let the questioner note what is harmful or destructive in warfare, and he will see that it is nothing but the mutual opposition and conflict of things. Now what war can he imagine more grievous and bitter than one in which the will is so opposed to passion and passion to the will that their enmities can be ended by the victory of neither, and in which the power of pain so contends with the very nature of the body that neither yields to the other? For in this life, when such a conflict arises, either pain conquers, and death takes away feeling, or nature conquers, and health removes the pain. But in the life beyond, pain remains, on the one hand, to torment, and nature lasts, on the other, to feel it; neither ceases to be, lest the punishment also should cease.

But since these are the ultimate limits of good and evil, of which we should seek to win the former and escape the latter, and since there is a judgement through which good men will pass to the former and bad men to the latter, I will, so far as God may grant, deal with this judgement in the following book.

Medieval History 300-1100

	BARBARIANS	ROMAN EMPIRE	CHURCH	ARTS AND LETTERS
300	Franks and Alamans on the Rhine	Diocletian (284-305) Constantine (306-37)	Persecutions	
10		Conversion to Christ. at Battle of Milvian Bridge (312)	Grant of toleration to Christianity	
20	Goths and other Germanic tribes on Danube		Arian heresy Council of Nicea (325)	
30		Founding of Constantinople		
40			St. Anthony in Egypt	
50			St. Pachomius (d. 346)	
60	Huns invade Europe	Julian the Apostate (attempt to return to paganism)	St Augustine of Hippo (354-430)	
70			St. Basil (d. 379)	Vulgate of St. Jerome
80	Visigoths in Empire Adrianople (378)	Theodosius the Great (379-95)		Gothic Bible of Ulfilas
90	Rise of Alric (Visigoth)	Honorius & Stilicho in west Final split of Empire (395)	St. Ambrose (d. 397)	Ammianus Marcellinus
400	Franks, Alamans, Burgund- ians, Vandals and others enter Gaul			Augustine's <u>Confessions</u>
10	Visigoths in Gaul	Visigoths sack Rome (410)		
20				St. Jerome (d. 420)
30	Anglo-Saxons in Britain Visigoths in Spain		Nestorian Controversy Pope Leo the Great	St. Augustine (d. 430)
40	Franks in Gaul Burgundians in Rhone V.	Huns in Eastern Empire	Monophysite Heresy	<u>City of God</u>
450	Vandals in Africa			

BARBARIANS	ROMAN EMPIRE	THE CHURCH	ARTS AND LETTERS
450 Attila in W. Europe (d. 453)	Vandals sack Rome	Pope Leo the Great Council of Chalcedon (451)	Great period for Byzantine architecture Ravenna in West
60 Period of the establishment of the tribes as successor states		St. Patrick (d. 461)	
70 in Europe and No. Africa.	Odoacer (476-93)		
80 Gaiseric king of Vandals (d. 477)	Deposes last western emperor in 476	Schism betw. East and West Churches	Appolinarius Sidonius
90 Clovis(481-511)	Theodoric and Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy		Cassiodorus
500			

ENGLAND & FRANCE	ITALY	BYZANTINE EMPIRE	ASIA	ARTS AND LETTERS
500 Eng: continued Anglo-Saxon Conquests		Anastasius	Revival of Persian offensive	German law codes are written down
10 Sons of Clovis unify holdings in France by taking Burgundia, Provence, etc.		Justin I		Boethius (d. 534)
20		Justinian & Theodora		St. Benedict's reform of of monasticism
30	Justinian's reconquest & destruction of Ostrogothic king.	Justinian's reconquests in No. Africa		Justinian's <u>Corpus Iuris Civilis</u>
40			Continued problem of heresy	Procopius, <u>Conquests</u>
50 - - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	St. Sophia in Const.

DATE	PAGE	NAME	ADDRESS
10/10/50	1	J. H. H. H.	1000 1st St. N. W. Wash. D. C.
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	BRITISH ISLES	FRANKISH KINGDOM	ITALY	BYZANTINE EMPIRE	ASIA & ISLAM	ARTS, LETTERS
550		Plague	Plague	Plague		Procopius, <u>Secret History</u>
60	St. Columba of Iona	war among Merovingians	Alboin & Lombards invade	Becomes Greek speaking Justinian dies Invasions of Slavs & Avars		
70					Muhammad (c. 571-632)	Gregory of Tours (d. 495) <u>History of Franks</u>
80		St. Coloman in Gaul				
90	Augustine in Canterbury Conversion		Pope Gregory the Great (590-604)			Pope Gregory, <u>Pastoral Care</u>
600	of Kent		Papacy strong	Balkans lost to Avars & Slavs		Isidore of Seville
	Northumbria is dominant kingdom			Heraclius (610-641)		
10			Lombard control dissipates			
20					Heigra (622) Heraclius defeats Persia	
30			Byz. control weakens	Defeats by Moslems	Islam conquers Syria, Persian Empire, Egypt (632-655)	The <u>Koran</u>
40		Last of Merovingians			Abu-Bakr (632-34) Omar (634-44) Othman (644-55)	
50						

Area	Location	Depth	Material	Notes	Remarks
10	100-150	100-150	100-150	100-150	100-150
20	150-200	150-200	150-200	150-200	150-200
30	200-250	200-250	200-250	200-250	200-250
40	250-300	250-300	250-300	250-300	250-300
50	300-350	300-350	300-350	300-350	300-350
60	350-400	350-400	350-400	350-400	350-400
70	400-450	400-450	400-450	400-450	400-450
80	450-500	450-500	450-500	450-500	450-500
90	500-550	500-550	500-550	500-550	500-550
100	550-600	550-600	550-600	550-600	550-600

BRITISH ISLES	FRANKISH KINGDOM	ITALY	BYZANTINE EMPIRE	ASIA & ISLAM	ARTS AND LETTERS 3
650 60 Council of Whitby 664 70 80 90 700	Mayors of the Palace Willibrord in Friesland		Collapse of Byz. power Defense of Asia Minor and Constantinople	Ali (655-61) Ommiad Caliphs at Damascus to 750 Islam controls the Mediterranean and No. Africa	Irish and No. England are centers of learning Illuminated manuscripts
10 Mercia is dominant kingdom 20 30 40 750	Pepin II, Mayor of Palace Charles Martel (714-41) Battle of Tours (632) Pepin III, M. of P. (741-68)	Lombard revival Pope condemns iconoclasm	Iconoclastic controversy Schism in East and West Churches	Moslem conquest of Visigothic King. Battle of Tours (632)	Bede (d. 735) <u>Ecc. Hist. of the English People</u> Irish and Eng. missionaries bring learning to the continent St. Boniface and conversion of Europe (d. 754)
60 70 80 90 800	Pepin becomes king Charlemagne (768-841) Expansion of France into Germany Viking raids	Donation of Pepin Papal States Defeat of Lombards		Abbasid Caliphs of Bagdad to 1258 Harun-al-Rashid (786-809)	Beginning of Arabic Science Trans. from Greek Moslem Architecture Carolingian revival of learning. Alcuin (d. 804) Paul the Deacon

Date	Page	Project	Location	Remarks
1970-01-01	1	Project A	Site A	Initial survey
1970-01-15	2	Project A	Site A	Survey results
1970-02-01	3	Project A	Site A	Data analysis
1970-02-15	4	Project A	Site A	Report preparation
1970-03-01	5	Project A	Site A	Final review
1970-03-15	6	Project A	Site A	Project completion
1970-04-01	7	Project B	Site B	Initial survey
1970-04-15	8	Project B	Site B	Survey results
1970-05-01	9	Project B	Site B	Data analysis

written early in Irish

PATRICK'S HYMN

Patrick made this hymn. It was made in the time of Loegaire son of Niall. The cause of its composition, however, was to protect him and his monks against deadly enemies that lay in wait for the clerics. And this is a breast-plate of faith for the protection of body and soul against devils and men and vices. When anyone shall repeat it every day with diligent intentness on God, devils shall not dare to face him, it shall be a protection to him against every poison and envy, it shall be a defense to him against sudden death, it shall be a breast-plate to his soul after his death. Patrick sang this hymn when ambuscades were laid against his coming by Leogaire, that he might not go to Tara to sow the faith. And then it appeared before those lying in ambush that they (Patrick and his monks) were wild deer, with a fawn (Benén) following them. And its name is "Deer's Cry."

I arise to-day
through a mighty strength, the invocation of the
Trinity,
through belief in the Threeness,
through confession of the Oneness
towards the Creator.

I arise to-day
through the strength of Christ with His Baptism,
through the strength of His Crucifixion with His Burial,
through the strength of His Resurrection with His
Ascension,
through the strength of His descent for the Judgment
of Doom.

I arise to-day
through the strength of the love of Cherubim,
in obedience of Angels,
in the service of the Archangels,
in hope of resurrection to meet with reward,
in prayers of Patriarchs,
in predictions of Prophets,
in preachings of Apostles,
in faiths of Confessors,
in innocence of Holy Virgins,
in deeds of righteous men.

I arise to-day
through the strength of heaven:
light of Sun,
brilliance of Moon,
splendour of Fire,
speed of lightning,
swiftness of Wind,
depth of Sea,
stability of Earth,
firmness of Rock.

Th 299 History of Mediaeval Thought
MTS Program
Summer 1987
S. Katz, Instructor

I arise to-day
through God's strength to pilot me:
God's might to uphold me,
God's wisdom to guide me,
God's eye to look before me,
God's ear to hear me,
God's word to speak for me,
God's hand to guard me,
God's way to lie before me,
God's shield to protect me,
God's host to secure me --
against snares of devils,
against temptations of vices,
against inclinations (?) of nature,
against everyone who shall wish me ill,
afar and anear,
alone and in a crowd.

I summon to-day all these powers between me (and these evils) -
against every cruel and merciless power that may
oppose my body and my soul,
against incantations of false prophets,
against black laws of heathenry,
against false laws of heretics,
against craft (?) of idolatry,
against spells of women and smiths and wizards,
against every knowledge < that endangers > man's
body and soul.

Christ to protect me to-day
against poison, against burning,
against drowning, against wounding,
so that there may come abundance of reward.
Christ with me, Christ before me, Christ behind me,
Christ in me, Christ beneath me, Christ above me,
Christ on my right, Christ on my left,
Christ where I lie, Christ where I sit, Christ where I arise,
Christ in the heart of every man who thinks of me,
Christ in the mouth of every man who speaks of me,
Christ in every eye that sees me,
Christ in every ear that hears me.

I arise to-day
through a mighty strength, the invocation of the
Trinity,
through belief in the Threeness,
through confession of the Oneness
towards the Creator.

Salvation is of the Lord.
Salvation is of the Lord.
Salvation is of Christ.
May thy salvation, O Lord, be ever with us.

(1) Contra Eutychen, Loeb edition pp. 86-90

...essences can indeed be in universals, but they "substand" only in individuals and particulars. For the understanding of universal things is taken from particulars. Hence, since these subsistences are indeed in universals, but take on substance in particulars, they (i.e., the Greeks) rightfully called hypostases the subsistences substanding particularly. For to one who looks carefully and with subtlety, subsistence and substance will not seem to be the same.

For what the Greeks call ousiosis or ousiosthai, that we call "subsistence" or "to subsist." But what they call hypostasis or hypostasthai, that we translate as "substance" or "to substand." For that "subsists" which does not need accidents in order to be able to be. But that "substands" which furnishes a certain subject to other accidents, so that they may be. For it "stands under" them, as long as it is a subject for accidents. Hence genera and species only subsist. For accidents do not befall genera or species. But individuals not only subsist, they also substand. For neither do they need accidents in order to be. For they are already informed by their peculiar features (propriis) and specific differences, and provide to accidents the opportunity to be - that is to say, as long as they are subjects.

(2) De trinitate, Loeb edition, pp. 10-12

The judgment of this (Christian religion) about the unity of the Trinity is: "The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore, Father, Son, Holy Spirit are one, not three gods." The reason for this conjoining is lack of difference (indifferentia) ... Therefore that is truly one in which there is no number, in which there is nothing besides that which it is. Neither can it be a subject. For it is a form, and forms cannot be subjects. When another form, like humanity, is a subject for accidents, it does not take on accidents insofar as it is, but insofar as matter is subjected to it. For, as long as matter, subject to humanity, takes on any accident, humanity itself appears to take it on. But a form that is without matter cannot be a subject, and cannot be in matter. For it is not a form but an "image." From the forms that are outside of matter come the forms that are in matter and make a body. We misuse the others, which are in bodies, when we call them "forms" while they are images. For they are made like those that are not constituted in matter.

(3) De trinitate again, Loeb edition p. 7

For the principle of plurality is otherness. Neither can it be understood what plurality is without otherness. Now of three things, or however many, there exists a diversity in genus, in species, and in number. For in however many ways "the same" is said, in that many ways "diverse" is said too. Now "the same" is said in three ways: (a) either by genus, as a man is the same as a horse, because there is the same genus for them, to wit, animal; (b) or by species, as Cato is the same as Cicero, because he is the same species, to wit, man; (c) or by number, as Tully and Cicero, because he is one in number. Hence "diverse" is also said either by genus or by species or by number. For three men stand apart not by genus or species, but by their accidents. If by the mind we separate all their accidents from them, yet place is diverse for each of them, and we can in no way suppose that it is one. For two bodies will not occupy one place, which is an accident. And therefore they are several in number, because they are made several by their accidents.

ANICIUS MANLIUS TORQUATUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS

THE SECOND EDITION OF THE COMMENTARIES ON THE ISAGOGE OF PORPHYRY¹

Book I.

1. This second task of exposition, which I have undertaken, will clarify the course of my translation, for I am afraid I have fallen victim in my translation to the fault of the faithful interpreter, in that I have rendered every word, expressed or implied, with a word. The reason for the present undertaking is that in these writings, in which knowledge of things is sought, there must be expressed, not a charm of translucent style, but the uncorrupted truth. It seems to me that I shall have accomplished a great deal to this end if books of philosophy should be composed in the latin language by painstaking and complete translation, until nothing more were missing from the literature of the greeks. And since the most excellent good of philosophy has been related with human souls, the exposition must begin with the powers of the human soul itself that it may proceed in some sequence and order. There is a triple power of the soul to be found in animated bodies. Of these, one power supports the life for the body, that it may arise by birth and subsist by nourishment; an-

¹ ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS, *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commentaria*, in *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, vol. 45, pp. 13-102, or in J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, col. 71 sq.

BOETHIUS

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other lends judgment to perception; the third is the foundation for the strength of the mind and for reason. Of these, it is the function of the first to be at hand for creating, nourishing, and sustaining bodies, but it will exercise no judgment of reason or of sense. This power is possessed by herbs and trees and anything that is fixed, rooted to the earth. But the second is composite and conjoined: taking over to itself the first and making it part of itself, it is further able to form a varied and multiform judgment of things. For every animal who has the power of sense, is also born, and nourished, and sustained. But the senses are different, and rise in number as far as five; consequently anything that is only nourished, does not also perceive, but anything that can perceive is proved also to have the first power of the soul subject to it, that is, the power to be born and nourished. Moreover, all beings that possess sense grasp not only the forms of things by which they are bombarded, when the sensible body is present, but also retain the images of the forms known by sense even when the sense is withdrawn and when the sensible objects are removed; and they build up memory; and each animal, as he is able to, preserves these images a longer or a shorter time. But they [that is, sensible beings] take on these confused and unevident imaginations, so that they can make nothing from the conjunction and composition of their imaginations. And for this reason they can remember, to be sure, but not all things equally, for when oblivion has come upon the memory they can not recollect or recall it. Moreover, there is no knowledge of the future by these imaginations. But the third power of the soul, which carries with it the prior powers of nourishing and of perceiving, and which uses them as slaves and servants, is constituted completely in reason, and it is occupied in the very firm conception of

present things, or in the understanding of absent things, or in the investigation of unknown things. This power is present in the human genus alone, which not only receives sensations and perfect and unconfused imaginations, but also explains and confirms by the full act of understanding, what the imagination has supplied. Consequently, as has been said, those things which it comprehends subject to the senses do not alone suffice this divine nature for knowledge, but besides, it can put names conceived by the imagination on insensible and absent things, and it also opens to the imposition of words that which it comprehends by way of understanding. Moreover, it is proper to that nature to investigate unknown things by means of those known to it and to wish to know of each single thing, not only whether it is, but also what it is, and how it is, and even why it is. Only the nature of man, as has been said, has received this power of the threefold soul. The power of this soul does not lack the movements of intelligence, for it exercises the power of reason itself in the following four respects. It inquires of a thing *whether* it is, or if it has determined that it is, it has doubts concerning *what* it is. But if it has the knowledge of both of these by reason, it searches out *how* any particular thing is, and investigates the other changes of accidents in it; having learned these things, it also inquires and traces out by reason *why* it is thus.

2. Therefore, since the activity of the human soul is such that it is always occupied in the comprehension of present things, or in the understanding of absent things, or in the investigation and discovery of unknown things, there are two problems in which the power of the reasoning soul extends all its care: one, that it know the natures of things by a sure method of inquiry, and the

other, that that which moral gravity may later perform, may come to be known beforehand. In investigating these matters there must necessarily be many things which may lead the inquiring mind not a little from progress along the right road, as happened in many points to Epicurus, who thinks the world consists of atoms and who measures virtue by pleasure. It is clear, moreover, that this happened to him, and to others, because they thought, through inexperience in logical argument, that everything they comprehended in reasoning occurred also in things themselves. This surely is a great error; for in reasoning it is not as in numbers. For in numbers whatever has come out in computing the digits correctly, must without doubt also eventuate in the things themselves, so that if by calculation there should happen to be a hundred, there must also be a hundred things subject to that number. But this does not hold equally in argumentation; nor, in fact, is everything which the evolution of words may have discovered held fixed in nature too. Wherefore it was inevitable that they fall into error who, having cast aside the art of argument, made diligent search into the nature of things. For unless one have learned first the science that shows which reasoning holds to the true path of argument, and which holds to the path like to the truth, and unless one have learned to recognize what is trustworthy and what can be suspected, the uncorrupted truth of things can not be found by reasoning. Therefore, since the ancients often fell into a great many errors and brought together in argumentation many doctrines false and contrary to each other, and since it seemed impossible that this was done in order that, having come to contrary conclusions concerning the same thing, both conclusions which reasoning disagreeing with itself had formed should be true, and since it

was ambiguous which line of thought should be believed, it seemed proper to consider the true and whole nature of argumentation itself first, and when that was known, what was discovered or what had been comprehended truly by argument could then be understood too. Hence started the knowledge of the logical discipline, which so contrives the modes of arguing and the ways of distinguishing reasonings themselves, that one can recognize what reasoning is now false, and now again true, what reasoning is always false, what never false. The power of this discipline, moreover, must be considered to be twofold, one in finding, the other in judging. This Cicero, too, expresses clearly in the book whose title is the *Topics*, saying:

Although all reason suited to discourse has two parts, one of discovering, the other of judging, the prince of both, it seems to me, was Aristotle. The Stoics, however, exerted themselves in only one, for they pursued the ways of judging carefully in the science which they call dialectic, but they left aside the whole art of discovering, which is called topic, and which was more excellent in use and certainly prior in order of nature. But since there is the greatest utility in both and since we think to pursue both if there will be leisure, we shall begin from that which is first.

Since, therefore, the fruit of this consideration is so great, the whole attention of the mind must be given to this so very ingenious discipline, that we may be able, having been made steady in our first steps in the truth of arguing, to come easily to a sure comprehension of things themselves.

3. And since we have already stated what the beginning of the logical discipline is, the next question seems to follow: whether logic is absolutely a definite part of philosophy or, as others hold, an apparatus or instrument by which philosophy seizes on the knowledge and nature of things. I see that these opinions concerning this matter are diametrically opposed. For those who think the logical consideration a part of philosophy, use approximately the following arguments, saying, that philosophy doubtless has speculative and practical parts; the question concerning this third rational part is whether it is to be asserted to be a part; but it can not be doubted that it too is part of philosophy. For just as the investigation of philosophy alone is concerned with natural and other questions which are classed under the speculative part, and again as only philosophy deliberates concerning moral and other questions which fall under the practical part, so too only philosophy judges of this part of the inquiry, that is, concerning these questions which are subjects of logic. But if the speculative and practical are parts of philosophy because philosophy alone treats of them, then by the same reason logic will be part of philosophy, since this matter of arguing falls under philosophy alone. But then they say: since philosophy is concerned with these three, and since the subject matters distinguish the practical and speculative considerations, because the latter inquires concerning the nature of things, and the former concerning morals, there is no doubt that the logical discipline is distinct from the natural and the moral by the characteristic of its subject matter. For the consideration of logic is of propositions and syllogisms and other subjects of this sort, and neither that part of philosophy which speculates, not of discourse, but of things, nor the practical part which watches over morals, can take care

of that too. But if philosophy consists in these three, that is, speculative, practical, and rational, which are set off from each other by their separate and triple ends, since the speculative and the practical are said to be parts of philosophy, there is no doubt that the rational, too, may be demonstrated to be part of philosophy.

Those on the other hand who think it is not a part but an instrument of philosophy, urge approximately the following arguments. They say, there is no end of logic similar to the end of the speculative and practical parts. For each of these is turned to its proper end, the speculative to work out the knowledge of things, and the practical to perfect morals and institutions; nor is the one referred to the other. The end of logic, however, can not be absolute, but is drawn and bound up in a certain manner with the other two parts. For what is there in the logical discipline which should be desired for its own worth; or was not the practise of this art undertaken for the investigation of things? For to know how an argumentation is to be concluded, or what is true, and what similar to the true, tends obviously to this, that this science of reasons is referred either to a knowledge of things or to discovering those things which produce happiness, having led to the exercise of morality. And therefore since the end of the speculative and the end of the practical parts are their own and certain, whereas the end of logic is referred to the other two parts, it is clear that logic is not a part of philosophy but rather an instrument. There are, of course, many more arguments which may be stated on either part, of which it suffices that we have noted strictly these which have been stated.

We settle this controversy, however, with the following reasoning. We say that surely nothing prevents

the same logic from serving at the same time the function of part and of instrument. For since it retains its own end, and this end is considered by philosophy only, it must be asserted to be a part of philosophy, but since that end of logic, which philosophy alone contemplates, promises its aid to the other parts of philosophy, we do not deny that it is the instrument of philosophy; but the end of logic is the discovery and judgment of reasons. Obviously it will not seem strange that the same thing should be called a part and a kind of instrument, if we turn our mind to the parts of the body, for something is done by them, so that we use them as a manner of instruments, and yet they hold the place of parts in the whole body. For the hand is for touching, the eyes for seeing, and the other parts of the body seem to have each a proper function. But still if the utility of the whole body be considered, these, which no one would deny are also parts, are judged to be certain instruments of the body. So too the logical discipline is a part of philosophy, since philosophy alone is mistress of it, but it is an instrument too because by it the sought-for truth of philosophy is investigated.

4. But since I have explained, so far as succinct brevity has permitted me, the beginning of logic and what logic itself should be, I must now say a little concerning this book which I have undertaken here to expound. For in the title Porphyry proposes that he write an introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle. I shall explain briefly what the value of this introduction is, or for what it prepares the mind of the reader. For Aristotle composed the book which is entitled *On the Ten Categories* with this intention, that he might embrace with a small number of genera the infinite diversities (which

ISOLOGE
→
CATEGORIES

could not be encompassed in knowledge) of things, and so, that which could not come under discipline because of its number exceeding comprehension, might be made subject to the mind and to knowledge, as has been said, by the small number of the genera. Therefore, he considered that there are ten genera of all things, that is, one substance and nine accidents, which are quality, quantity, relation, place, time, action and passion, situation, condition; and since they were the supreme genera and no other genus could be placed above them, all the multitude of things must necessarily be found to be species of these ten genera. These genera are divided from each other by all differences, nor do they seem to have anything common except only the name, since all are predicated to be. Certainly substance is, quality is, quantity is, and the verb *is* is predicated commonly of all the others, but that is not their one common substance or nature, but only their name. Consequently the ten genera discovered by Aristotle are divided from each other by all differences. But things which are disjoined by any differences must necessarily have some peculiar property which maintains them in singular and solitary form. A property, moreover, is not the same as an accident. For accidents can appear or disappear, but properties are so implanted that apart from the things of which they are properties they could not be. Since these facts are so, and since Aristotle had found ten genera of things, which the mind seized in understanding or the disputant brought forth in speaking—for whatever we grasp by the understanding we divulge to another by word—it came about that he was led for the understanding of the ten categories to the treatments of these five predicables, namely, genus, species, difference, property, accident. Of *genus*, indeed, because we must first learn what genus is, to be

able to recognize that those ten which Aristotle placed before other things are genera; and the knowledge of *species* is extremely valuable for the ability to recognize what the species of any genus is. For if we understand what species is, we are not encumbered by error and thrown into confusion. It can often happen, in fact, that through ignorance of species we may place the species of quantity in relation, and classify the species of some first genus under some other genus, and in this way a promiscuous and indistinguishable confusion of things may be made. Lest this happen it should be known beforehand what the nature of species is. Not only is it important that the nature of species be known, that we may not interchange the species of prior genera with each other, but also that we may know how to choose in any single genus the species proximate to the genus, to the end that we may not say that animal is directly the species of substance instead of body, or man of body instead of animated body. Certainly the knowledge of differences holds an extremely important place in these things. For who of us would learn to distinguish quality at all from substance, or the other genera from each other, if we did not see their differences? But how can we distinguish their differences if we do not know what difference itself is? Nor is it only this error which the ignorance of difference spreads over us, but it also takes away all judgment of species. For differences inform all species, and if difference is not known, the species too can not be known. But how can it happen that we be able to recognize any difference at all if we absolutely do not know what the significance of that word is? Moreover, in the next instance, so great is the usefulness of property that Aristotle investigated carefully the properties of each of the categories. Who would understand what the properties are

before he learns at all what a property is? Nor is this knowledge valuable only in those properties which are stated by single words, as risible of man, but also in those which are employed in the place of definition. For all properties include the subject thing in a certain term of description, which too I shall take up more suitably in its place. Who furthermore can doubt how much the knowledge of accident aids, when he sees in ten categories nine natures of accident? How shall we judge that they are accidents, if we absolutely do not know what accident is, since certainly the knowledge of neither differences nor property would be had if we do not hold the nature of accident by most solid consideration? For it could happen that through ignorance accident might be set in the place of difference or property; this, definitions show, is also extremely defective, for although definitions themselves are composed out of differences, and although they are made of any property, nevertheless they do not seem to admit accident.

Since therefore Aristotle brought together the genera of things, which contained under them species truly diverse, which species would never be diverse, if they were not separated by differences, and since he reduced all things to substance and accident, and accident to the other nine categories, and since he followed through for the most part the properties of some of the categories; he taught concerning these categories themselves, what genus was, what species, what difference, what that accident was, of which we have just had to speak, or what property, which he passed by as known. Lest therefore those who come to the *Categories* of Aristotle should be ignorant of what any one of these which have been mentioned above signifies, Porphyry wrote this book on the knowledge of these five predica- bles that having examined and having considered what

each single one of these, which were set forth above, designated, the understanding might learn more easily the things which were set forth by Aristotle.

5. This is the intention of this book, which, Porphyry intimated (as has been said) in the very expression of the title, he had written as an introduction to the *Categories*. But although the intention of this book is turned to this one thing, nevertheless, the utility of it is not simple, but multiplex and extended very broadly. This, too, Porphyry notes in the beginning of this book, saying:

Since it is necessary, Chrysaor, to know what genus is, and what difference is, and species, and property, and accident, as well for that doctrine of categories which is in Aristotle as for the imposition of definitions and in general for those things which are in division or demonstration, I shall try briefly, in this useful contemplation of such things, to approach as if in an introductory manner those things which have been said by the ancients, making a compendious rendering for you, abstaining from the more lofty questions, but interpreting in an ordinary manner the more simple.

The utility of this book is spread in a fourfold direction. For it is of great use to readers for that to which its intention is directed and also for other things; although these are beyond the intention, a utility no less because of that accrues to readers from them. For by means of this work one has ready knowledge of the categories, and one has the whole imposition of definitions, and the right understanding of divisions, and the most true conclusion of demonstrations. These

things, the more difficult and arduous they are, the more they require in the reader a more perspicacious and diligent mind. It must be remarked, however, that this is true of all books. For, if it is known first what the intention is, the amount of utility which can arise thence is judged too; and although many other things besides, as it happens, may follow from a book of this sort, nevertheless, it seems to have that utility nearest, to which its intention is turned, as is shown by the very book which we have taken up. Since its intention is to prepare an easy understanding of the Categories, there is no doubt that this is shown to be its principal utility, although definition, division, and demonstration are no lesser associates, of which certain principles are here suggested to us. The whole meaning, indeed, is of this sort: *Since, he says, a knowledge of genus, species, difference, property, and accident is useful to the Categories of Aristotle and to its doctrine, and also to the imposition of definitions, to division and demonstration, I shall attempt briefly, he says, by making a compendious rendering of the things which have been said broadly and diffusely by the ancients, to lay open that which is the useful and richest knowledge of these things.* Nor, in fact, would it be compendious if the whole work were not bound together by brevity. And seeing that he was writing an introduction, *I shall avoid, he says, the more lofty questions willingly, but I shall interpret in an ordinary manner the more simple, that is, I shall treat the obscurities of the more simple questions by holding to a kind of conjectural reasoning in them.*

The whole sentiment of this introduction is such as to attract the mind of the beginner both by an extremely rich utility and by facility. But it seems proper to point out what else there is which the loftiness of the words conceals. The word *necessary* in the latin tongue, like ἀναγκαῖον in greek has several meanings.

ἀναγκαῖον

For when Cicero says that some one is his relation [*necessarium*], and when we say that it is necessary [*necessarium*] that we go down to the forum, in which word a certain utility is signified, we speak according to different meanings. Still another meaning is the one in which we say that it is necessary that the sun be moved, that is, it is necessary [*necesse esse*]. That first meaning, however, must be passed over, for it is wholly unrelated to this necessary of which Porphyry speaks here. But the last two are of such sort that they seem to war with each other as to which will hold the signification in the place in which Porphyry says: *Since it is necessary, Chrysaor; for, as has been said, the word necessary means both utility and necessity.* They seem, moreover, both to fit in this place. For it is both useful in the highest degree for these things which were spoken of above, to investigate genus and species and the others; and the necessity is of the highest, since unless these things are known first, those for which they are prepared, can not be known. For neither can the categories be learned without a knowledge of genus and species, nor does definition ignore genus and difference, and it will appear how useful this treatise is in the others, when the investigation will turn to division and demonstration. But although these five which must be examined here must necessarily be known before those things for which they are prepared, nevertheless the word *necessary* is not used here by Porphyry in a meaning in which he would want necessity and not rather utility to be signified. For the statement itself and the context of words indicate this by the clearest reason to the understanding. Nor indeed does anyone use a reason that he may say that some necessity is referred to something else. For necessity is through itself, but utility is always referred to that for which it is useful,

as is the case here. He says, in fact, *Since it is necessary, Chrysaor, for that doctrine of categories which is in Aristotle.* If, therefore, we understand this necessary [necessarium] as useful, and if we change it to that very word, saying: since it is useful, Chrysaor, to that doctrine of categories which is in Aristotle, to know what genus is and the rest, the order of words will be correct; but if we change it to *necessary* [necesse] and if we say: since it is necessary, Chrysaor, for that doctrine of categories which is in Aristotle, to know what genus is and the rest, the order of words does not accord with right understanding. Wherefore there is no need to delay longer here. For although it is of the highest necessity that, if these things are ignored, one can not arrive at those things for which this treatise is intended, still the word necessary is used here not as of necessity, but rather of utility.

6. Now, although the subject has been touched on above, still we shall estimate briefly what profit the knowledge of genus, species, difference, property, and accident is to the categories. For Aristotle stated in the *Categories* ten genera of things which were predicated of all others that whatever could come to have meaning, if it held full meaning, would be subjected to each of those genera of which Aristotle treats in the book which is entitled *On the Ten Categories*. But for it to be referred to something as to a genus, is as if one were to place a species under a genus. Certainly this can in no way be done without knowledge of species, nor assuredly can the species themselves be understood in respect to what they are, or rather in respect to the genus of which they are, unless their differences are known. But if the nature of differences is unknown, what the differences of each single species

are, will be ignored completely. Therefore, it must be recognized that if Aristotle treats of genera in the *Categories*, the nature of genera must also be known; an understanding of species also accompanies the knowledge of this. But when this is known, what difference is can not be ignored, since there are many things in the same book which absolutely no understanding will open up unless the reader bring to it a very great learning of genus and species and difference, as when Aristotle himself says: Things of diverse genera, and not of genera placed subalternately, are diverse as to species and are differences, which can not be understood if these things are not known. But Aristotle also searches out in most diligent investigation the property of each one of the categories, so that when he says after many questionings, that the property of substance is that remaining itself the same in number it is susceptible of contraries, or again that it is the property of quantity, that only in it may the equal and the unequal be spoken of, and the property of quality similarly that we state according to it that something is like or unlike something else, and in the others in the same manner, as, what the property of the contrary is, what the property according to the relation of opposition is, what the properties of privation and condition, of affirmation and negation are. In these he treats, as if for those already learned and scientific, what the nature of property is; if any one should be ignorant of it, he would enter in vain into the questions which are taken up concerning these things. Moreover, it is already clear that accident occupies a very large part of the categories, since it is applied generally as the proper name to nine categories.

7. And it is clear from these considerations how great the utility of this book is in regard to the cate-

gories. What he says concerning the *imposition of definitions* can surely be understood easily, if first a division of the principles [*rationum*] of substance is made. One principle of substance is affirmed in description, and another in definition. But that principle which is in description, brings out a certain characteristic of the thing, the principle of whose substance it brings forth, and it not only informs that which it reveals with a characteristic, but it itself becomes the property which must also enter into definition; if any one wishes to state the principle of quantity, he may properly say: quantity is that according to which equals and unequals are spoken of. Just as, therefore, he placed the character of quantity in the principle of quantity and that whole principle is proper to quantity itself, so the description brings out the characteristic, and the description itself is made proper to it. On the other hand, the definition does not bring out properties, but is itself made proper. For the definition reveals substance, joins genus to differences, and, reducing to one species which it defines those things which are *per se* common and of many, it makes them equal. Consequently, the knowledge of property is useful to description, since only the characteristic is brought out in description, and it is itself made proper: so too in the case of definition, but for definition one needs the genus, which is affirmed first, and the species to which that genus is proper, and differences by which, when they have been joined to genus, the species is defined. But if these things shall seem to any one more precise than the manner of exposition demands, it is fitting that he know that, as was said in the first edition, we had set this present exposition aside in our judgment, that the first edition may suffice for the simple understanding of this book, but that this later edition may speak to the interior speculation

of those already almost established in knowledge and not hanging upon every word about these things.

8. This book is surely so useful for the making of division, that, apart from the knowledge of the things which are investigated one after the other in this book, partition would be made by chance rather than by reason. This however will be manifest if we divide division itself, that is, if we separate the name of division into that which it signifies. For there is division of genus into species, as when we say of color some is white, some black, and some medium. Again there is division whenever a word signifying many things is examined, and whenever it is shown how many there are which are signified by it, as if one were to say the word *dog* signifies many things, this barking and four-legged animal, and a celestial constellation, and a marine beast, which are all separated from each other by definition. Moreover, a thing is said to be divided whenever a whole is separated into its proper parts, as when we say *house* is part foundations, part walls, part roof. And we call this triple division substantial partition. There is, however, another division which is said to be accidental. This too is done in three ways: when we divide accident into subjects, as when I say of goods there are some in mind and some in body; or again when we divide subject into accidents, as of bodies there are some white, some black, and some of medium color; or finally when we separate accident into accidents, as when we say of liquids some are white, some black, and some of medium color, or again of white things some are hard, some liquid, and some soft. Since therefore all division is either substantial or accidental, and every partition is made in three ways, and since in the above triple substantial partition one form of

division
by
substance

division
on
part

division is to separate genus into species, this can in no manner be done without a knowledge of genera or without a knowledge of differences, which must be assumed in the division of species. It is manifest therefore how great the utility of this book is for this division which at first approach treats of genus and species and differences. Furthermore, the second substantial division into the meanings of a word, is not unconnected with the utility of this book. For in one way it will be possible to know whether a word whose division we wish to make, seems to be equivocal or a genus, and that is, if the things which it signifies are defined. And if the things which are under the common name are included by a definition, it is necessary that they be species and it be their common genus. But if those things which the stated word designates, can not be brought together in one definition, no one doubts that the word is equivocal or that it is not common to the things of which it is predicated as genus, inasmuch as those things which it signifies subordinate to it, can not be comprehended according to the common word by one definition. If therefore it is made manifest by definition, what is genus and what is equivocal word, and if definition runs through genera and differences, can any one doubt that the authority of this book is equally very valuable in this form of division? In the next place, how is that substantial division, which is into the parts of the whole, distinguished, and how will one avoid thinking it rather to be a division of genus into species, if genus, and species, and differences, and their meanings are not treated before the principle of the discipline? Why, in fact, should one not say that the foundations, walls, and roof are the species of house rather than the parts? But since it happens that the name of the genus can fit wholly in

every single species, whereas the name of the whole can not accord with every one of its parts, it becomes clear that the division of genus into species is one thing, and the division of the whole into parts another. The name of the genus, however, is shown to accord with each one of the species by the fact that both man and horse are individually called animals. But it is not customary for the roof or the walls or the foundations to be called singly by the name of house, but when the parts have been joined, then they take on rightly the name of the whole. In the next place, concerning accidental division, no one is unaware that if accident is unknown, and if the meaning of genus and of differences is unknown, it can easily happen that the accident may be separated into subjects as genus is divided into species, and finally ignorance will mix shamefully all this order of division.

9. And since we have shown of what profit this book is for division, we shall speak now of *demonstration*, lest he who has toiled with watchful care and sagacious labor in this so very great discipline, should be brought to a standstill because of arduous and difficult obstacles. For demonstration, that is, a sure inference of reason concerning any thing inquired about, is made from things known prior naturally, from agreements, from first principles, from cause, from necessary things, from things subsisting through themselves. But genera are naturally prior to their proper species, for species flow from genera. Moreover, it is clear that species are prior naturally to the things subordinate to them, whether the latter be species or individuals. But whatever things are prior, are known before and are known better than those which follow naturally. In fact, a thing is said to be first and to be known in two man-

ners, namely, with respect to us and with respect to nature. For those things are more known to us which are nearest to us, as individuals, next species, finally genera; but by nature, conversely, those things are more known which are least proximate to us. And therefore the more distantly genera are removed from us, the more lucid, and naturally known, they will be. Substantial differences, now, are those which we recognize to be present through themselves in the things which are being demonstrated. A knowledge of genera and differences, however, must come first, that in any particular discipline it may be known what are the appropriate principles of the thing which is demonstrated. That these necessary principles moreover are those which we call genera and differences, no one doubts who understands that without genus and difference species can not be. For genera and differences are the causes of species. Species are, in fact, for this reason, that their genera and differences are, which when placed in demonstrative syllogisms are the causes not only of the thing but also of the conclusion, which the last Resolutorii² will state more fully.

Since therefore it is extremely useful to determine all this by definition, and separate it by division, and prove it by demonstration, but since that can not be understood or done without a knowledge of those things which will be examined in this book, who will ever be able to doubt that this book is the greatest aid of all logic, without which the other aids which have great force in logic, can afford no approach to the doctrine?

10. But Porphyry remembered that he was writing an introduction, and he does not depart from the form

²1. c. *The Posterior Analytics*.

of treatment which is the manner of instruction. He says in fact that *he abstains from the knots of the more lofty questions, but resolves the simple ones with ordinary interpretation*. Moreover he sets down what the more lofty questions are which he promises to put aside, thus:

At present, he says, I shall refuse to say concerning genera and species whether they subsist or whether they are placed in the naked under-standings alone or whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separated from sensibles or placed in sensibles and in accord with them. Questions of this sort are most exalted business and require very great diligence of inquiry.

Exist on their own or a mental entity.

Question I

I pass over, he says, the more lofty questions, lest by pouring them intemperately into the mind of the reader I disturb his beginnings and first efforts. But lest he should make the reader wholly negligent, and lest the reader think that nothing more is hidden than what he had said, he adds the very thing whose question he promised he would put off pursuing, that he might spread no confusion before the reader by treating of these things obscurely and completely, and yet that the reader, strengthened by knowledge, might recognize what could be inquired into rightly. The questions, however, concerning which he promises to be silent are extremely useful and secret and have been tried by wise men but have not been solved by many. The first of them is of this sort. The mind, whatever it understands, either conceives by understanding and describes to itself by reason that which is established in the nature of things, or else depicts to itself in vacant imagination that which is not. It is inquired therefore of which

The first of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. It is a system that is not easily understood, and it is one that is not easily understood.



The second of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. It is a system that is not easily understood, and it is one that is not easily understood.

The third of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. It is a system that is not easily understood, and it is one that is not easily understood.

The fourth of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex one, and it is one that is not easily understood. It is a system that is not easily understood, and it is one that is not easily understood.

sort the understanding of genus and of the rest is: whether we understand species and genera as we understand things which are and from which we derive a true understanding, or whether we deceive ourselves, since we form for ourselves, by the empty cogitation of the mind, things which are not. But even if it should be established that they are, and if we should say that the understanding of them is conceived from things which are, then another greater, and more difficult question would occasion doubt, since the most grave difficulty is revealed in distinguishing and understanding the nature of genus itself. For since it is necessary that everything which is, be either corporeal or incorporeal, genus and species will have to be in one of these. Of what sort then will that which is called genus be, corporeal or incorporeal? Nor in fact can attention be turned seriously to what it is, unless it is known in which of these classes it must be placed. But even when this question has been solved, all ambiguity will not be avoided. For there remains something which, should genus and species be called incorporeal, besets the understanding and detains it, demanding that it be resolved, to wit, whether they subsist in bodies themselves, or whether they seem to be incorporeal subsistences beyond bodies. Of course, there are two forms of the incorporeal, so that some things can be outside bodies and perdure in their incorporeality separated from bodies, as God, mind, soul; but others, although they are incorporeal, nevertheless can not be apart from bodies, as line, or surface, or number, or particular qualities, which, although we pronounce them to be incorporeal because they are not at all extended in three dimensions, nevertheless are in bodies in such fashion that they can not be torn from them or separated, or if they have been separated from bodies, they in no

manner continue to be. These questions although they are difficult, to the point that even Porphyry for the time refused to solve them, I shall nevertheless take up, that I may neither leave the mind of the reader uneasy, nor myself consume time and energy in these things which are outside the sequence of the task I have undertaken. First of all I shall state a few things concerning the ambiguity of the question, and then I shall attempt to remove and untie that knot of doubt.

Genera and species either are and subsist or are formed by the understanding and thought alone. But genera and species can not be. This moreover is understood from the following considerations. For anything that is common at one time to many can not be one; indeed, that which is common is of many, particularly when one and the same thing is completely in many things at one time. Howsoever many species indeed there are, there is one genus in them all, not that the individual species share, as it were, some part of it, but each of them has at one time the whole genus. It follows from this that the whole genus, placed at one time in many individuals, can not be one; nor in fact can it happen that, since it is wholly in many at one time, it be one in number in itself. But if this is so, no genus can possibly be one, from which it follows that it is absolutely nothing; for everything which is, is because it is one. And the same thing may properly be said of species. Yet if there are genus and species, but they are multiplex and not one in number, there will be no last genus, but it will have some other genus superposed on it, which would include that multiplicity in the word of its single name. For as the genera of many animals are sought for the following reason, that they have something similar, yet are not the same, so too, since the genus, which is in many and is there-

With the exception of the above, the following are the only other cases of the kind which have been reported. In the case of the first, the patient was a woman, aged 35, who had been married for 10 years. She had three children, two of whom were living. She had been married for 10 years, and had three children, two of whom were living. She had been married for 10 years, and had three children, two of whom were living.

The second case was a man, aged 45, who had been married for 15 years. He had four children, three of whom were living. He had been married for 15 years, and had four children, three of whom were living.

The third case was a woman, aged 30, who had been married for 5 years. She had two children, one of whom was living. She had been married for 5 years, and had two children, one of whom was living.

The fourth case was a man, aged 50, who had been married for 20 years. He had five children, four of whom were living. He had been married for 20 years, and had five children, four of whom were living.

The fifth case was a woman, aged 40, who had been married for 10 years. She had three children, two of whom were living. She had been married for 10 years, and had three children, two of whom were living.

The sixth case was a man, aged 35, who had been married for 5 years. He had two children, one of whom was living. He had been married for 5 years, and had two children, one of whom was living.

The seventh case was a woman, aged 25, who had been married for 2 years. She had one child, who was living. She had been married for 2 years, and had one child, who was living.

The eighth case was a man, aged 60, who had been married for 30 years. He had six children, five of whom were living. He had been married for 30 years, and had six children, five of whom were living.

The ninth case was a woman, aged 55, who had been married for 25 years. She had four children, three of whom were living. She had been married for 25 years, and had four children, three of whom were living.

The tenth case was a man, aged 40, who had been married for 10 years. He had three children, two of whom were living. He had been married for 10 years, and had three children, two of whom were living.

The eleventh case was a woman, aged 30, who had been married for 5 years. She had two children, one of whom was living. She had been married for 5 years, and had two children, one of whom was living.

The twelfth case was a man, aged 50, who had been married for 20 years. He had five children, four of whom were living. He had been married for 20 years, and had five children, four of whom were living.

The thirteenth case was a woman, aged 40, who had been married for 10 years. She had three children, two of whom were living. She had been married for 10 years, and had three children, two of whom were living.

The fourteenth case was a man, aged 35, who had been married for 5 years. He had two children, one of whom was living. He had been married for 5 years, and had two children, one of whom was living.

The fifteenth case was a woman, aged 25, who had been married for 2 years. She had one child, who was living. She had been married for 2 years, and had one child, who was living.

The first case was a man, aged 45, who had been married for 15 years. He had four children, three of whom were living. He had been married for 15 years, and had four children, three of whom were living.

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fore multiplex, has the likeness of itself, which is the genus, but is not one, because it is in many, another genus of this genus must likewise be looked for, and when that has been found, for the reason which has been mentioned above, still a third genus is to be sought out. And so reason must proceed in *infinitum*, since no end of the process occurs. But if any genus is one in number, it can not possibly be common to many. For a single thing, if it is common, is common by parts, and then it is not common as a whole, but the parts of it are proper to individual things, or else it passes at different times into the use of those having it, so that it is common as a servant or a horse is; or else it is made common to all at one time, not however that it constitute the substance of those to which it is common, but like some theatre or spectacle, which is common to all who look on. But genus can be common to the species according to none of these modes; for it must be common in such fashion that it is in the individuals wholly and at one time, and that it is able to constitute and form the substance of those things to which it is common. For this reason, if it is neither one, because it is common, nor many, because still another genus must be sought for that multitude, it will be seen that genus absolutely is not, and the same conclusion must be applied to the others. But if genera and species and the others are grasped only by understandings, since every idea is made either from the subject thing as the thing is constituted itself or as the thing is not constituted—for an idea can not be made from no subject—if the idea of genus and species and the others comes from the subject thing as the thing itself is constituted which is understood, then they are not only placed in the understanding but are placed also in the truth of things. And again it must be

sought out what their nature is which the previous question investigated. But if the idea of genus and the rest is taken from the thing not as the thing is constituted which is subject to the idea, the idea must necessarily be vain, which is taken from the thing but not as the thing is constituted; for that is false which is understood otherwise than the thing is. Thus, therefore, since genus and species neither are, nor, when they are understood, is the idea of them true, it is not uncertain that all this must be set forth relative to the care which is needed for investigating concerning the five predicables aforementioned, seeing that the inquiry is neither concerning the thing which is, nor concerning that of which something true can be understood or adduced.

11. This for the present is the question with regard to the aforementioned predicables, which we solve, in accord with Alexander, by the following reasoning. We say that it is not necessary that every idea which is formed from a subject but not as the subject itself is constituted, seem false and empty. For false opinion, but not understanding, is in only those ideas which are made by composition. For if any one composes and joins by the understanding that which nature does not suffer to be joined, no one is unaware that that is false, as would be the case should one join by the imagination horse and man and construct a centaur. But if it be done by division and by abstraction, the thing would not be constituted as the idea is, yet for all that, the idea is still not in the least false; for there are many things which have their being in others, from which either they can not at all be separated, or if they should be separated they subsist by no reason. And in order that this be shown to us in a well known

example, the line is something in a body, and it owes to the body that which it is, namely, it retains its being through body. Which is shown thus: if it should be separated from body, it does not subsist; for who ever perceived with any sense a line separated from body? But when the mind receives from the senses things confused and intermingled with each other, it distinguishes them by its own power and thought. For sense transmits to us, besides bodies themselves, all incorporeal things of this sort which have their being in bodies, but the mind which has the power to compound that which is disjoined and to resolve that which is composite, so distinguishes the things which are transmitted by the senses, confused with and joined to bodies, that it may contemplate and see the incorporeal nature in itself and without the bodies in which it is concrete. For the characteristics of incorporeal things mixed with bodies are diverse even when they are separated from body. Genera therefore and species and the others are found either in incorporeal things or in those which are corporeal. And if the mind finds them in incorporeal things, it has in that instance an incorporeal understanding of a genus, but if it has perceived the genera and species of corporeal things, it bears off, as is its wont, the nature of incorporeals from bodies, and beholds it alone and pure as the form itself is in itself. So when the mind receives these incorporeals intermixed with bodies, separating them, it looks upon them and contemplates them. No one, therefore, may say that we think about the line falsely because we seize it by the mind as if it were outside bodies, since it can not be outside bodies. For not every idea which is taken from subject things otherwise than the things are themselves constituted, must be considered to be false, but, as has been said above, that only is false which

does this by composition, as when one thinks, joining man and horse, that there is a centaur; but that which accomplishes it by divisions, and abstractions, and assumptions from the things in which they are, not only is not false, but it alone can discover that which is true with respect to the characteristic of the thing. Things of this sort therefore are in corporeal and sensible things, but they are understood without sensible things, in order that their nature can be perceived and their characteristic comprehended. Since genera and species are thought, therefore their likeness is gathered from the individuals in which they are, as the likeness of humanity is gathered from individual men unlike each other, which likeness conceived by the mind and perceived truly is made the species; again when the likeness of these diverse species is considered, which can not be except in the species themselves or in the individuals of the species, it forms the genus. Consequently, genera and species are in individuals, but they are thought universals; and species must be considered to be nothing other than the thought collected from the substantial likeness of individuals unlike in number, and genus the thought collected from the likeness of species. But this likeness when it is in individual things is made sensible, when it is in universals it is made intelligible; and in the same way when it is sensible, it remains in individuals, when it is understood, it is made universal. Therefore, they subsist in sensibles, but they are understood without bodies. For there is nothing to prevent two things which are in the same subject from being different in reason, like a concave and a convex line, which things, although they are defined by diverse definitions and although the understanding of them is diverse, are nevertheless always found in the same subject; for it is the same line which is convex and con-

*how species
are like
each other.*

collectively + individually
 case. So too for genera and species, that is, for singularity and universality, there is only one subject, but it is universal in one manner when it is thought, and singular in another when it is perceived in those things in which it has its being.

Once these distinctions are made, therefore, the whole question, I believe, is solved. For genera and species subsist in one manner, but are understood in another; and they are incorporeal, but they subsist in sensible things joined to sensible things. They are understood, to be sure, as subsisting through themselves and not as having their being in others. Plato, however, thinks that genera, and species, and the rest not only are understood as universals, but also are and subsist without bodies; whereas Aristotle thinks that they are understood as incorporeal and universal, but subsist in sensibles; we have not considered it proper to determine between their opinions, for that is of more lofty philosophy. But we have followed out the opinion of Aristotle very diligently for this reason, not in the least because we approved of it, but because this book has been written for the *Categories*, of which Aristotle is the author.

12. This, however, I shall now try to show you, how the ancients treated probably of the categories and the predicables, and of the ancients most of all the peripatetics.

Having passed by these questions which he said were too lofty, he seeks an ordinary treatment of this introductory work, but lest the very omission of these questions by him be adduced as a defect, he set down how each of the suggested subjects is to be treated, and he makes announcement beforehand of the authority of every one on whom he relied when he undertook the

work. Since he promises a moderateness of treatment, having removed the difficulty of obscurity, he invites the mind of the reader; but that his mind may acquiesce and listen silently to what will be said, he establishes what is said on the authority of the peripatetics. And therefore he says he will treat *probably* of these, that is, of genera and species concerning which he had raised the questions above, and of the predicables, that is, of differences, properties, and accidents. *Probably*, however, means *similarly to the true*, which the Greeks call λογικῶς or ἐνδόξως. For we often find the word λογικῶς meaning *similarly to the true* and *probably* in Aristotle and in Boethus and Alexander. Porphyry too has used that word in many places in that meaning, which we have omitted in translation, because he says that λογικῶς is to be interpreted as if we were to say *rationally*. For the following meaning seemed by far better and more true: that he promised to speak *probably*, that is, not beyond the imagination of beginners and of readers, which is proper for an introduction. For since the secret of the more lofty doctrine would be remote from the minds of unlearned men, an introduction ought to be such that it is not beyond the imagination of beginners. And therefore we have interpreted it better, it seems to us, as *probably* than as *rationally*. He says, moreover, that the ancients had investigated concerning the same things, but that he followed most of all the treatment which the peripatetics under the leadership of Aristotle left, so that the whole investigation is in accordance with the *Categories*.

could not conceal this from the brethren. He sought carefully, and examined all his brother's drugs, until he found the three gold pieces hidden away among the medicines. When he told me this great calamity that concerned a brother who had lived in common with us, I could hardly hear it with calmness. For the rule of this our monastery was always that the brothers should live in common and own nothing individually.

Then, stricken with great grief, I began to think what I could do to cleanse the dying man, and how I should make his sins a warning to the living brethren. Accordingly, having summoned Pretiosus, the superintendent of the monastery, I commanded him to see that none of the brothers visited the dying man, who was not to hear any words of consolation. If in the hour of death he asked for the brethren, then his own brother in the flesh was to tell him how he was hated by the brethren because he had concealed money; so that at death remorse for his guilt might pierce his heart and cleanse him from the sin he had committed.

When he was dead his body was not placed with the bodies of the brethren, but a grave was dug in the dung pit, and his body was flung down into it, and the three pieces of gold he had left were cast upon him, while all together cried, "Thy money perish with thee!" . . .

When thirty days had passed after his death, my heart began to have compassion on my dead brother, and to ponder prayers with deep grief, and to seek what remedy there might be for him. Then I called before me Pretiosus, superintendent of the monastery, and said sadly: "It is a long time that our brother who died has been tormented by fire, and we ought to have charity toward him, and aid him so far as we can, that he may be delivered. Go, therefore, and for thirty successive days from this day offer sacrifices for him. See to it that no day is allowed to pass on which the salvation-bringing mass [*hostia*] is not offered up for his absolution."¹ He departed forthwith and obeyed my words.

We, however, were busy with other things, and did not count the days as they rolled by. But lo! the brother who had died appeared by night to a certain brother, even to Copiosus, his brother in the flesh. When Copiosus saw him he asked him, saying, "What is it, brother? How art thou?" To which he answered: "Up to this time I have been in torment; but now all is well with me, because to-

2. from the *Dialogues*: On Monks.

There was in my monastery a certain monk, Justus by name, skilled in medicinal arts. . . . When he knew that his end was at hand, he made known to Copiosus, his brother in the flesh, how that he had three gold pieces hidden away. Copiosus, of course,

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